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The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the account-
ing scandals of the early 2000s.  While publicly traded firms around the 
world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required 
to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years.  
Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States 
since 2007.  By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the con-
solidated financial statements of publicly traded firms since 2005.  In the 
United States, IFRS, which are promulgated by the London-based Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), are often seen as an at-
tempt by Europeans to colonize U.S. accounting standard setting, and as 
an element of a foreign legal system alien to U.S. capital markets and se-
curities law.  In this article, we suggest that this perception is actually a 
myth, which we attempt to debunk.  In fact, the introduction of IFRS in 
Europe, particularly Continental Europe, was far from controversial.  
IFRS were promoted by Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions and strongly support-
ed by the United States, particularly when capital markets international-
ized in the 1990s.  They were—and still are—in many ways at odds with 
the Continental European accounting cultures of countries such as 
France and Germany, on whose examples we draw.  In spite of the EU 
mandate for publicly traded firms, accounting law in these jurisdictions 
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has still not fully absorbed IFRS; nevertheless, for now a solution that 
reconciles traditional and international accounting has been found.  In 
this article, we explore the problems and resistance of IFRS in Continen-
tal Europe and seek to draw lessons for the United States.  We argue that 
given the shared heritage of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples (“GAAP”) and IFRS as investor-oriented accounting standards, 
their introduction in the United States should be considerably easier than 
it was on the other side of the Atlantic. 
 
“IFRS are dangerous and obsolete.” 
(from a French accounting textbook published in 2011)1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
1  JACQUES RICHARD, CHRISTINE COLLETTE, DIDIER BENSADON & NADINE JAUDET, 
COMPTABILITE FINANCIERE: NORMES IFRS VERSUS NORMES FRANÇAISES 1 (9th ed. 2011). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States is the last major economy that has not yet 
adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) 
while, from Europe to Canada, from Australia to China, around 
120 countries are already requiring or permitting IFRS; this figure 
will likely rise to 150 countries in the near future.2  The introduc-
tion of IFRS has been debated in the United States for several 
years.3  The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first is-
sued a paper that included a plan for possible implementation, and 
several SEC Staff Reports followed up until the July 2012 Final 
Staff Report with regard to the work plan.4  However, whether 
                                                     
2  Analysis of the IFRS Jurisdictional Profiles, IFRS (last updated Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-
Profiles.pdf, (listing and outlining profiles of countries adopting IFRS for publicly 
traded firms); Geoffrey Pickard, Simplifying Global Accounting, J. ACCT., July 2007, 
at 36 (providing an interview with Sir Tweedie discussing “the future of IFRS, 
U.S. GAAP and the global accounting profession” and reporting Tweedie’s pre-
diction that the number of countries requiring or permitting IFRS will rise to 150);  
see Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the International Accounting Standards 
Board, Speech at Empire Club of Canada at the Toronto Conference (Apr. 25, 
2008) (discussing the existence of a “clear momentum towards accepting IFRS as a 
common financial reporting language throughout the world.”); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic 
Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2008) (critiquing the SEC’s approach, as set out in the SEC 
Concept Release of Aug. 7, 2007, infra note 4). 
3  See generally Peter White, It’s Greek to Me: The Case for Creating an Interna-
tional Agency to Enforce International Accounting Standards to Promote Harmonization 
and International Business Transactions, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 195 (2009). 
4  Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements 
in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, Exchange Act 
Release Nos. 33–8831, 34–56217, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter SEC Concept Release] (requesting information about whether U.S. issuers 
should be permitted to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS to 
satisfy SEC rules and regulations); see Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial 
Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards by U.S. Issuers, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–8982, 34–58960, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Roadmap, November 14, 2008] (pro-
posing a roadmap to allow the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers for the purpose of the 
SEC filings); Office of the Chief Accountant, Work Plan for the Consideration of 
Incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards into the Financial Re-
porting System for U.S. Issuers: Final Staff Report (July 13, 2012) [hereinafter SEC 
Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-final-
report.pdf (summarizing results of key areas identified for study in the SEC Work 
Plan); Office of the Chief Accountant, Work Plan for the Consideration of Incorpo-
rating International Financial Reporting Standards into the Financial Reporting 
System for U.S. Issuers: A Comparison of U.S. GAAP and IFRS, A Securities and 
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domestic issuers should be permitted to use IFRS is very contro-
versial.  Obviously, the “internationalization” of accounting would 
have far-reaching consequences for U.S. firms, for the relationship 
between managers and investors, for the accounting profession, 
and for the position of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (“FASB”) within the framework of securities law. 
The European Commission’s decision in 2000 to mandate the 
use of IFRS starting from 20055 and the unprecedented worldwide 
                                                     
Exchange Commission Staff Paper (Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Staff Paper, 
Nov. 16, 2011] (summarizing results of SEC evaluation of areas in which IFRS 
provides less guidance than GAAP); Office of the Chief Accountant, Work Plan 
for the Consideration of Incorporating International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards into the Financial Reporting System for U.S. Issuers: Exploring a Possible 
Method of Incorporation, A Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Paper  
(May 26, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Staff Paper, May 26, 2011] (outlining a possible 
approach for incorporating IFRS in the U.S.); Office of the Chief Accountant, Work 
Plan for the Consideration of Incorporating International Financial Reporting 
Standards into the Financial Reporting System for U.S. Issuers, Progress Report  
(Oct. 29, 2010) (outlining progress made on achieving objectives outlined in the 
SEC Work Plan, infra); Office of the Chief Accountant, Work Plan for the Consid-
eration of Incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards into the Fi-
nancial Reporting System for U.S. Issuers, Appendix to SEC Release No. 33-9109 
(Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Work Plan], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9109.pdf (considering specific issues 
relevant to whether the SEC transition U.S. issuers to a system incorporating 
IFRS); IFRS Foundation, Report to the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation, IFRS 
Foundation Staff Analysis of the SEC Final Staff Report—Work Plan for the Considera-
tion of Incorporating IFRS Into the Financial Reporting System for US Issuers (Oct. 22, 
2012) [hereinafter October 2012 IFRS Foundation Report].  
5  To be precise, the requirement only applies to the consolidated financial 
statements of all those companies governed by the law of a Member State and 
listed on a regulated market in a Member State.  See Regulation 1606/2002, 2002 
O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC) [hereinafter IAS Regulation] (“The Lisbon European Council of 
23 and 24 March 2000 . . . set the deadline of 2005 to implement the Commission’s 
Financial Services Action Plan and urged that steps be taken to enhance the com-
parability of financial statements prepared by publicly traded companies.”); see 
also Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), EU Im-
plementation of IFRS and the Fair Value Directive: A Report for the European Commis-
sion 19–24 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/studies/2007-
eu_implementation_of_ifrs.pdf (reporting on the implementation of IFRS within 
the EU).  The requirement applies to Member States of the European Economic 
Area (“EEA”), which consists of the twenty-seven EU member states plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway.  Regarding the application of the Accounting Direc-
tives in the EEA, see Paul Pacter, What Exactly is Convergence?, 2 INT’L J. ACCT., 
AUDITING & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 67, 75 (2005); Deloitte, IFRS in Europe—
Background Information, IAS PLUS (last visited Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrs-in-europe (containing information 
about the IFRS in Europe from 2001–2014); see also Robert K. Larson & Donna L. 
Street, The Roadmap to Global Accounting Convergence: Europe Introduces ‘Speed 
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acceptance of IFRS since then prompted a debate about the rela-
tions between the International Accounting Standards Board 
(“IASB”) and FASB.6  An important argument in the U.S. debate is 
the idea that IFRS, which are promulgated by the London-based 
IASB, are dominated by Europeans.  In the United States, IFRS are, 
therefore, often seen as a “Trojan horse” proposed by Europeans 
(and others) to replace American accounting culture, which is still 
based on the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), 
promulgated by the FASB.  To slightly exaggerate the argument, 
IFRS are seen as an effort of the European accounting tradition to 
colonize the United States with an allegedly inferior set of account-
ing standards.7  This view is bolstered by the fact that the SEC 
                                                     
Bumps,’ CPA J. (Oct. 2006), available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2006/1006/essentials/p36.htm (discussing 
“challenging hurdles . . . [on] the road to convergence for the United States and 
Europe via IFRS”). 
6  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Practical Implemen-
tation of International Financial Reporting Standards: Lessons Learned, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2008/1 (Aug. 2008) (detailing the “unprecedented” spread 
of IFRS).  
7  See, e.g., Paul Meller, International Auditing Rules Urged on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2002, at W1 (discussing the increased push by the European Commission 
for the United States to abandon GAAP following the Enron collapse); Floyd Nor-
ris, The Case for Global Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at B1 and B6 (outlin-
ing the historical and potential development towards a “common set of high-
quality accounting standards that applied globally” but noting that “[s]ome 
Americans argue that accepting international standards would reduce the quality 
of American financial statements”); Kara Scannell & Joanna Slater, SEC Moves to 
Pull Plug on U.S. Accounting Standards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at A1 (compar-
ing GAAP with IFRS and outlining problems with implementing IFRS within the 
United States); Charles Niemeier, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd. 
(PCAOB), Keynote Address on Recent International Initiatives at the 2008 Sar-
banes-Oxley, SEC and PCAOB Conference, New York State Society of Certified 
Public Accountants (Sept. 10, 2008), at 3 (arguing that political pressure from Eu-
rope, primarily from Angela Merkel of Germany, is the reason why the United 
States moved towards IFRS); Harmonizing Accounting Standards and Auditing Pro-
cedures – A Survey, in 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1-117—1:130.2 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 2003) 
(arguing that the EU was pushing the United States to accept financial statements 
prepared by EU firms in accordance with IFRS, and that the SEC found itself “be-
tween a rock and a hard place”); James E. Rogers, Going Too Far Is Worse than Not 
Going Far Enough: Principle-Based Accounting Standards, International Harmonization, 
and the European Paradox, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 429, 451 (2005) (arguing that IAS are 
similar to British and other European principles of accounting and very different 
from those of the United States); Robert Bruce, Now How Does It All Fit Together?, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1 (outlining difficulties with harmonizing, including 
that “[i]nternational standards are based on principles and guidance.  U.S. stand-
ards are based on detailed rulebooks.”); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing 
that the EU was pressuring the SEC on the adoption of IFRS); Neal F. Newman, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/2
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permitted foreign issuers to use IFRS largely because of pressure 
from the EU Commision.8  Nevertheless, in this article, we suggest 
that this perception is a myth.  In fact, IFRS have rather been an el-
ement of Anglo-American accounting culture, developed with the 
support of FASB, that Continental European countries have been 
encouraged, and ultimately forced, to accept by way of the EU 
with encouragement from the United States.  In other words, IFRS 
have been the Trojan horse of the United States that had and still 
has to overcome a significant level of resistance in Europe. 
The goal of our article is to counter the majoritarian view by 
shedding light on the purpose and origins of IFRS, and to draw 
possible lessons from the “internationalization” of accounting 
standards applicable to publicly traded European firms.  While 
these firms are required by EU law to use IFRS in their consolidat-
ed accounts, we show that IFRS developed out of an accounting 
tradition similar to the United States that is firmly rooted in the 
approach to capital markets and financial reporting found in the 
English-speaking world.  Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS share a com-
mon basis: the assumption that the purpose of public accounting is 
to provide a useful basis for decision-making by participants in 
capital markets. 
This situation was not the case in Continental Europe before 
the 1990s, where other purposes such as taxation and creditor pro-
tection played key roles.  The objections to IFRS in Continental Eu-
                                                     
The U.S. Move to International Accounting Standards—A Matter of Cultural Discord—
How Do We Reconcile?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 835, 868–72 (2009) (comparing the Unit-
ed States with Germany and suggesting that Germany is a better fit for IFRS than 
the U.S.); Karthik Ramanna, The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization, 3 
ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 9–12 (2013) (seeing IFRS as a product of the EU and consider-
ing it reasonable to treat the EU, including Britain, as a common accounting juris-
diction backing IASB).   
 Interestingly, IFRS are often defined as “the European ‘equivalent’ of U.S. 
GAAP.”  See, e.g., John Armour, Gérard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Transactions with 
Creditors, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 115, 126 (Reinier Kraakman et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2009) (quoting European Commission, DG Internal Market and Ser-
vices Working Document: Report on Convergence Between International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS) and Third Country National Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAPs) and on the Progress Towards the Elimination of Reconciliation Re-
quirements that Apply to Community Issuers Under the Rules of These Third Countries 
(2008),  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/equivalence_report_en.p
df). 
8  Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 
1704-5 (2008). 
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rope were far more severe than the ones brought in the United 
States today.  European accounting since the 1970s has been char-
acterized by the European Economic Community (now European 
Union) Accounting Directives, which set forth a supranational 
framework for national accounting laws and standards.  However, 
these directives had many gaps and created intended and unin-
tended options that were effectively used by the Member States to 
maintain their previous accounting systems, which were often very 
different from those of the United States or the United Kingdom.  
Thus, IFRS faced considerable resistance when they were initially 
introduced in Continental Europe, and some issues have still not 
been fully resolved.  We focus in particular on France and Germa-
ny, whose accounting traditions had originally inspired the direc-
tives.  German accounting standard setting was institutionally very 
different from both U.S. GAAP and IFRS, given that accounting 
was not primarily governed by standards set by an accounting 
standard-setter but by statutes that were interpreted as such.  Their 
purposes were also historically different, an important emphasis 
being on creditor protection and taxation.  With the possible intro-
duction of International Accounting Standards (IAS) looming on 
the horizon in the late 1990s, there was an enormous debate on 
how to best reconcile these goals with the capital-market-oriented 
“Anglo-Saxon” accounting.  Similarly, in France government ac-
tors’ influence on the accounting standard setting process was con-
siderable.  IFRS—like U.S. GAAP—are frequently criticized for on-
ly taking the interests of investors on the capital markets into 
account.  French standards, in this view, were subject to a process 
that took the interests of a wider set of corporate stakeholders into 
account.  The changeover to IFRS can thus be seen as a larger ele-
ment of a transition toward Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
practices that is still encountering resistance. 
In a number of key EU countries, including these two, the use 
of IFRS is still limited to consolidated accounts, and primarily to 
those of publicly traded firms.  Traditional domestic accounting 
standards tend to remain in parallel use for the financial state-
ments of other entities, as well as for the entity-level accounting 
even of publicly traded firms.  Convergence in accounting has, 
therefore, remained superficial. 
Paradoxically, most of the arguments in the United States 
against IFRS today relate to how the standards are supposedly an 
accounting system emerging from a foreign legal system that 
would provide a bad fit for the U.S. economy and its legal and cor-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/2
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porate governance environment.  As our article demonstrates, 
these arguments are false.  Culturally, economically, and legally, 
the U.S. capital market is much closer to the biotope from which 
IFRS developed than is Continental Europe.  Since other countries 
had to make much greater strides, we argue that the purported 
hurdles in the United States should be considered comparatively 
unimportant and rather easy to overcome.  Moreover, given the 
historical support of IFRS from the United States and capital mar-
ket actors in the Anglosphere in general, the SEC’s present reti-
cence to endorse IFRS is almost surprising.  Now that the U.S. has 
helped to foist an accounting tradition it shares on everyone else, it 
is surprising that the country itself would not embrace IFRS.  We 
discuss whether a changeover would lead to substantive changes 
in accounting, and what implications the inevitable institutional 
changes would have, looking at various possible policy strategies 
for the future. 
The article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives an overview of 
the current debate in the United States and discusses the objections 
currently brought in the U.S. against the introduction of IFRS.  Sec-
tion 3 looks at the implementation of IFRS in the EU and discusses 
hurdles they had and still have to face in these countries.  We focus 
on the institutional and historical context of the EU Accounting Di-
rectives and accounting standard-setting, as well as the function of 
accounting in Germany and France.  Section 5 uses this compara-
tive account to suggest that the problems in the United States are 
relatively small and should, therefore, in theory, be easier to over-
come.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  THE U.S. DEBATE ABOUT THE INTRODUCTION OF IFRS 
 
2.1. FASB-IASB Relations over the Past Decade 
 
Up to around 2000, policymakers in the United States and the 
SEC were confident that U.S. GAAP were the best available ac-
counting standards in the world.9  However, the Enron scandal in 
                                                     
9  See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 8 (citing GARY JOHN PREVITS & 
BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE 
CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (rev. ed. 1998)) (explaining that with the 
rise of globalization, the U.S.’s generally accepted accounting principles 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
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2001 and other subsequent scandals shook the confidence in the 
U.S. GAAP and accelerated the discussions about whether IFRS, 
supposedly based more strongly on principles as opposed to rules, 
would be more successful in preventing frauds in financial report-
ing.10 
In 2002, Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the 
SEC to conduct a study and report to the Congress on the adoption 
of a principles-based accounting system.  The report submitted in 
July 2003 concludes that global accounting standardization would 
produce merit benefits such as: 
i. greater comparability for investors across firms and in-
dustries globally, 
ii. a more efficient allocation by markets of scarce capital 
among investment alternatives, and 
                                                     
(“GAAP”) was “commonly reference as the gold standard”); Lisa M. Brown, Unit-
ed States Accounting Standards: Do the SEC Requirements Regarding U.S. GAAP Vio-
late GATS?, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1007, 1019 (2003) (summarizing argu-
ments in favor of retaining GAAP); Bernard Colasse, Harmonisation Comptable 
Internationale : De la résistible ascension de l’IASC/IASB, GERER & COMPRENDRE, Mar. 
2004, at 30, 34–35 (suggesting that in the early 1990s Americans no longer saw the 
need to support IOSCO/IASC because foreign firms were adopting U.S. GAAP 
voluntarily); Arthur Goldgaber, Global Investing: How to Research Foreign Companies 
to Find Opportunities, SEEKING ALPHA (July 16, 2013, 12:09 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1550862-global-investing-how-to-research-
foreign-companies-to-find-opportunities (referring to the “transparency” of 
GAAP and concerns about reliance on foreign accounting standards in relation to 
U.S. investors investing overseas); Edward F. Greene, Daniel A. Braverman & Se-
bastian R. Sperber, Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the Inter-
national Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 413, 429–30 (1995) (summarizing arguments 
in favor of retaining GAAP); George Mundstock, GAAP Did Their Job During the 
Economic Meltdown, 4 FIU L. REV. 463, 470–71 (2009) (arguing “GAAP have done 
well.  They are the best accounting standards in the world today GAAP should 
continue in effect for United States businesses.”) (footnote omitted).  
10  Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 108(d) (2002) (requiring 
the SEC to “conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial report-
ing system of a principles-based accounting system”); Financial Supervision and 
Crisis Management in the EU, EU Econ. & Scientific Policy Dept., EUR. PARL. 
STUDY IP/A/ECON/IC/2007-069 (2007) (by Kern Alexander et al.), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?                  
language=en&file=26588 (analyzing changes in financial markets and institutions 
over the past three decades and outlining the consequences of these changes); 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a 
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 749–59 (2009) (reviewing the literature outlining the 
“principles versus rules debate”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: 
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1416–17 (2002) (discussing 
models of reform following Enron); Lawrence M. Gill, IFRS: Coming to America, J. 
ACCT. (June 2007) (familiarizing American accountants with IFRS). 
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iii. lower costs of capital, since global accounting standards 
would eliminate the duplicate cost of preparing two sets of 
financial statements, and make it easier for companies to 
have access to capital in other markets.11  
In the same year, the 2002 Norwalk Agreement between FASB 
and IASB showed that the United States was committed to the goal 
of “the development of high-quality, compatible accounting stand-
ards that could be used for both domestic and cross-border finan-
cial reporting.”12  The February 2006 Memorandum of Understand-
ing issued by FASB and IASB laid down specific milestones to be 
reached by 2008.13  Subsequent revisions brought the two sets of 
standards closer to each other.14  In 2007, the SEC dropped the 
                                                     
11  Office of the Chief Accountant, SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the U.S. Financial Reporting 
System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (July 25, 2003) [hereinafter SEC 
Study 2003], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (outlining the re-
sults of the study into a standard setting required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
12  The Norwalk Agreement, The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) & The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Sept. 18, 2002 
[hereinafter Norwalk Agreement], available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&
blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175819018817&blobheader=application%2Fpdf (dis-
cussing the method of achieving compatibility between FASB and IASB); see also 
Letter from David Schraa, Director, Regulatory Affairs Dep’t., Institute of Int’l Fi-
nance, Inc., to the Securities and Exchange Commission, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/s71307-82.pdf (detailing written com-
ments from the Institute of International Finance, concerning the SEC’s Proposed 
Rule “Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared 
in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Recon-
ciliation to US GAAP . . . .”). 
13  For a discussion on FASB/SEC interactions with IFRS and strengthening 
the influence of FASB on IASB standard making process, see generally Luzi Hail, 
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Global Accounting Convergence and the Potential 
Adoption of IFRS by the U.S. (Part II): Political Factors and Future Scenarios for U.S. 
Accounting Standards, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS 567 (2010).  
14  BRUCE MACKENZIE, TAPIWA NJIKIZANA, DANIE COE TSEE, RAYMOND 
CHAMBOKO, AND BLAISE COLYVAS, WILEY IFRS 2011: INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (2011) [hereinaf-
ter WILEY IFRS 2011]; Larson & Street, supra note 5 (discussing the “road to con-
vergence” between the United States and EU); see also FASB, Completing the Feb-
ruary 2006 Memorandum of Understanding: A Progress Report and Timetable for 
Completion (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&
blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175819018778&blobheader=application%2Fpdf (outlin-
ing the progress of FASB and IASB toward the goals of the Norwalk Agreement, 
supra note 12, and providing a timetable for completion). 
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“reconciliation to U.S. GAAP” requirement for foreign companies 
reporting in a manner fully compliant with IFRS as issued by 
IASB.15  This decision, while politically driven by pressure from the 
EU,16 was widely seen as an acknowledgement by the SEC that 
IFRS constituted a fully acceptable set of “high quality financial re-
porting standards.”17  This change constitutes considerable pro-
gress from the perspective of foreign companies listed in the Unit-
ed States, which considered it costly and confusing to have two 
different financial statements for the same year.18  
The elimination of the reconciliation requirement permitted 
scholars to compare the value relevance of IFRS-based and U.S.-
GAAP-based accounting information by looking at the relation be-
tween accounting information and stock market values.19  Some 
                                                     
15  Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared 
in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Recon-
ciliation to U.S. GAAP, Security Act Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release No. 
57026, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239 (Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter SEC Release, Dec. 21, 
2007], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf (amending 
rules to allow foreign private investors to prepare SEC filings in accordance with 
IFRS without reconciliation to GAAP); Press Release, SEC, SEC Takes Action to 
Improve Consistency of Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies (Nov. 
15, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-235.htm 
(summarizing the effect of the SEC rule amendments in 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 
239, and 24); CPA Letter, SEC Eliminates Reconciliation Requirement for Foreign 
Companies; AICPA Recommends SEC Use International Accounting Standards 
(recommending international accounting standards) (Jan. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.ifrs.com/updates/aicpa/SEC_Eliminates_Reconciliation.html. 
16  Karmel, supra note 8, at 1694, 1704–05.  
17  WILEY IFRS 2011, supra note 14.  This is not the only acknowledgment on 
that matter.  For example, on Feb. 24, 2010, the SEC issued a release expressing its 
continued support for the convergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  See Commission 
Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards, Security 
Act Release No. 9109, Exchange Act Release No. 61578, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9109.pdf.  
18  See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-
Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 985 (2009) (“[I]t quite likely was a wise choice for 
the SEC to cast aside the need for foreign issuers to reconcile their financial state-
ments to GAAP, provided they employ high-quality IFRS for their financial re-
porting.  The reconciliations were months late so that the report that mattered was 
their earlier-released IFRS-based financial reports.”) (footnote omitted); Larson & 
Street, supra note 5, at 9 (“[I]t is up to each company to choose whether it wishes 
to issue another set of accounts as well as accounts based upon endorsed IAS, for 
instance using full IAS or US GAAP.”). 
19  See, e.g., Robert W. Holthausen & Ross L. Watts, The Relevance of the Value-
Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 
(2001) (evaluating the inferences drawn from value relevance studies); see also 
Mary E. Barth, William H. Beaver & Wayne R. Landsman, The Relevance of the Val-
ue-Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting: Another View, 31 J. 
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found positive or mixed results, while others found no evidence of 
change.20  Although it may still be necessary to find a better way to 
evaluate the switch,21 today, 450 companies using IFRS are listed in 
the U.S. report, with an aggregate market capitalization exceeding 
five trillion dollars.22 
Overall, the 2007 decision of the SEC was welcomed by many 
with the hope that U.S. capital markets would regain competitive-
ness as compliance with SEC regulations would become easier and 
less costly.23  At that time, the argument was that U.S. capital mar-
kets had become less likely to attract foreign issuers because of ex-
cessive regulation, including the requirement of filing financial re-
ports according to U.S. GAAP.24  The study of the Committee on 
                                                     
ACCT. & ECON. 77 (2001) (explaining that value relevance studies adequately and 
accurately assess accounting information); Ahsan Habib, Legal Environment, Ac-
counting Information, Auditing and Information Intermediaries: Survey of the Empirical 
Literature, 26 J. ACCT. LIT. 1, 13–18 (2007) (arguing that value-relevance of a coun-
try’s accounting information is dependent on that country’s legal system); Wayne 
R. Landsman, Edward L. Maydew & Jacob R. Thornock, The Information Content of 
Annual Earnings Announcements and Mandatory Adoption of IFRS, 53 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 34 (2012) (suggesting that the significance of accounting depends on the 
strength of legal enforcement in the respective country). 
20  See, e.g., Tzu-Ting Chiu & Yen-Jung Lee, Foreign Private Issuers’ Application 
of IFRS Around the Elimination of the 20-F Reconciliation Requirement, 48 INT’L J. 
ACCT. 54, 57 (2013) (finding that accounting data under IFRS and U.S. GAAP are 
of similar quality, but that quality is reduced by reconciliation); John (Xuefeng) 
Jiang et al., Did Eliminating the 20-F Reconciliation Between IFRS and U.S. GAAP 
Matter? 1–32 (Michigan State University, Working Paper, 2010) (finding no evi-
dence that reconciliation is associated with abnormal trading volume or return 
volatility); Yongtae Kim, Haidan Li & Siqi Li, Does Eliminating the Form 20-F Rec-
onciliation from IFRS to U.S. GAAP Have Capital Market Consequences?, 53 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 249 (2011) (finding no evidence of a negative impact on market liquidity or 
cost of equity). 
21  See Muhammad Jahangir Ali, A Synthesis of Empirical Research on Interna-
tional Accounting Harmonization and Compliance with International Financial Report-
ing Standards, 24 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 1, 44 (2005) (discussing difficulty of reconcil-
ing accounting standards across nations).  
22  See Hans Hoogervorst, Tokyo Speech: Defining Profit or Loss and 
OCI…Can It Be Done? (Feb. 5, 2014) (finding that most of the foreign companies 
in the United States reported using IFRS since 2007).  
23  See, e.g., Christopher Hung Nie Woo, United States Securities Regulation and 
Foreign Private Issuers: Lessons from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 121 
(2011) (“While U.S. securities laws should be reformed to decrease the risk of, and 
mitigate the effects of, future financial crises, absent a global harmonized regula-
tory regime, the United States should be careful to minimize the costs imposed by 
U.S. securities regulation on foreign private issuers.”).  
24  See Cox, supra note 18 (discussing decision by SEC that allows non-
convergence by foreign companies); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The 
Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 909 (2009) 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:04 PM 
102 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
Capital Markets Regulation found that “[f]oreign companies are 
not only choosing to stay away from the U.S. public market, those 
that have come are leaving.”25  Yet, the decision seems not to have 
strongly affected the competitiveness of U.S. markets.  If anything, 
the number of foreign issuers newly listed in the U.S. slightly de-
creased since 2007, although the decision to cross-list is driven by a 
variety of factors, including the financial crisis.26 
In 2008, when the global financial crisis highlighted the inter-
dependence of global financial markets, the leaders of the G20 
called for global accounting standards, and urged FASB and IASB 
to complete their convergence projects by 2011.27  For many, the in-
troduction of IFRS in the U.S. seemed inevitable in today’s global 
capital markets.28 
                                                     
(explaining that the SEC “set forth a ‘roadmap’ for eliminating the need for non-
U.S. companies to reconcile to U.S. GAAP financial statements prepared accord-
ing to IFRS” in response to the international shift toward IFRS and the threat of 
multinational corporations leaving the U.S. to raise capital in the growing Euro-
pean and Asian markets, because of their uniform use of IFRS); Donald C. Lange-
voort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 192 
(2008) (discussing the effect of the financial meltdown on economic activity shift-
ing away from the United States); Larson & Street, supra note 5 (discussing “chal-
lenging hurdles” on “the road to convergence for the United States and Europe 
via IFRS”); Woo, supra note 23, at 121 (suggesting that the United States should be 
cautious in implementing IFRS in relation to foreign private issuers); Scannell & 
Slater, supra note 7, at A1 (noting that political pressure from Germany is possible 
explanation for why the United States moved towards IFRS). 
25  The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market, COMM. ON CAP. 
MKTS. REG. (2007), www.capmktsreg.org/press/the-competitiveness-position-of-
the-u-s-public-equity-market/; see also Woo, supra note 23, at 130–34 
(“[A]ccounting and disclosure appear to be the biggest costs for most foreign pri-
vate issuers.”).  
26  See Annual Query Tool, WORLD FED’N OF EXCHANGES, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual-query-tool (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (explain-
ing that in 2007, seventy-four foreign companies were newly listed either in NYSE 
or NASDAQ.  After the financial crisis, there was a sharp decline in the newly 
listed companies.  For instance, there were only thirty-two newly listed companies 
in 2008.  Most recently, sixty-two new foreign companies were listed in 2011).  
27  See Declaration, G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Econo-
my (Nov. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Summit], 
http://g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/washington.pdf (declaring a joint col-
laboration to encourage global economic growth); Leaders’ Statement, The Pitts-
burgh Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Summit], 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Dec
laration_0.pdf (reaffirming the G20 Washington Summit in 2008). 
28  See William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment Differences 
and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989 (2009) (highlight-
ing the complications that can arise with switching to IFRS despite the benefits of 
incorporating it); Moritz Pöschke, Incorporation of IFRS in the United States: An 
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The same year, FASB and IASB agreed on a “Roadmap” for po-
tential use of IFRS by U.S. issuers and targeted a successful con-
vergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.29  It underlines the point 
that, as trading and investment become more global, investors face 
an increasing need for disclosure that facilitates comparison of fi-
nancial information across investment alternatives in different 
parts of the world.30  Organizations such as the G20 and AICPA 
had concluded that IFRS provide the best available set of global ac-
counting standards,31 and the SEC seemed set to achieve conver-
gence by 2011, and adoption by 2014.32 
However, when Mary Shapiro took office as the SEC chair in 
2009, she declared that the move towards IFRS, “if it were to oc-
cur,” should take place more slowly than had previously been in-
dicated.33  In line with this, the SEC’s April 2011 Progress Report 
                                                     
Analysis of the SEC’s Options and the Implications for the EU, 9 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 
51 (2012) (analyzing the effects of the SEC switching to IFRS); Sharda Sharma, The 
Impact of the Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards on the Legal Pro-
fession, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 139 (2010) (describing the impact that the inevitable 
implementation of IFRS will have on the legal profession in the United States); 
Stephen A. Zeff, IFRS Developments in the USA and EU, and Some Implications for 
Australia, 18 AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 275 (2008) (“The US has already taken a long stride 
towards joining the more than 110 countries and other jurisdictions that have 
committed themselves to allow or require the use of IFRS for some or all reporting 
entities.”). 
29  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4 (discussing the creation of a 
roadmap to allow the implementation and use of IFRS in the United States for the 
purpose of SEC filings). 
30  Id. (”U.S. investors would benefit from an enhanced ability to compare fi-
nancial information of U.S. companies with that of non-U.S. companies.”). 
31  2009 Summit, supra note 27 (finding that IFRS provides the best global ac-
counting standards); see also PWC, IFRS AND U.S. GAAP: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES 3 (2011) (comparing IFRS and U.S. GAAP accounting standards); 
Harvey Goldschmid, Keynote Address at IFRS Foundation/AICPA Conference in 
Boston: U.S. Incorporation of IFRS is a National Imperative (Oct. 5–7, 2011) (stat-
ing that the goal of a single set of high quality global accounting standards is im-
portant for the SEC, and this, realistically, can only be IFRS); Ervin Black, Greg 
Burton & Spencer Paul, US Perspectives on Implementation of IFRS, in LAW, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND ACCOUNTING: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 19, 19 (Victo-
ria Krivogorsky ed., 2011) (finding IFRS to be “uniquely positioned” to fill the 
need for globally accepted accounting principles). 
32  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4 (noting that in November 2008, 
the SEC proposed making a decision in 2011 to mandate IFRS adoption with a 
planned phase-in of adoption dates—2014 for larger accelerated filers, 2015 for 
mid-sized companies, and 2016 for small companies).   
33  Questions from Senator Carl Levin for Mary Schapiro, Nominee to Be 
Chair of the Securities & Exchange Commission (Jan. 8, 2009), available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2009/PSI.SchapiroRespons
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disclosed that the two Boards had extended the timetable for the 
convergence projects “beyond June 2011 to permit further work 
and consultation with stakeholders.”34  The first half of 2012 was 
targeted for the completion according to the press release of the 
projects, and a decision on the specific date for mandatory IFRS for 
U.S. companies was expected thereafter.  However, to date, there is 
still no definite decision as to “whether, when, and how the current 
financial reporting system for U.S. issuers should be transitioned to 
a system incorporating IFRS.”35  While the Final Staff Report of the 
SEC had been expected to make a clear recommendation, the re-
port failed to recommend the endorsement of IFRS or even provide 
a timeline.36  In spite of widespread frustration with this situation 
among EU policymakers,37 the SEC is still not sure whether the 
U.S. will move forward with IFRS, as it is not even clear whether 
the two boards will be able to reach convergence on the key aspects 
of all projects.38   
 
2.2. Objections to the Adoption of IFRS 
 
While the SEC is committed to the goal of a single set of global 
                                                     
es.012209.pdf. 
34  IASB and FASB, Progress Report on IASB-FASB Convergence Work (Apr. 21, 
2011), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175822338795&bl
obheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (noting 
that “the boards extended the timetable for the remaining priority MoU conver-
gence projects and insurance beyond June 2011” and discussing reasons for the 
delay in convergence). 
35  See SEC Staff Paper, May 26, 2011, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing how to in-
corporate IFRS in the United States). 
36  See SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, supra note 4 (failing to make a clear 
recommendation or endorsement for a financial reporting system). 
37  See Olivier Guersent, Address at Conference EFRAG/Trustees: An EU 
Perspective on the Move Towards Global Accounting Standards (Oct. 11, 2012) 
(citing frustration with the U.S.’ failure to commit to or endorse IFRS); Press Re-
lease, European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), An EU Perspec-
tive on the Move Towards Global Accounting Standards (Oct. 16, 2012) (“Europe-
an Commission representatives expressed disappointment with financial 
reporting developments in the U.S. and made clear that frustration in the EU was 
growing.”). 
38  See SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, supra note 4; SEC Staff Paper, May 
26, 2011, supra note 4, at 8 (“[I]n the event that the Commission determines to in-
corporate IFRS, the Staff envisions that FASB would remain the standard-setting 
body responsible for promulgating U.S. GAAP under the framework.”). 
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accounting standards,39 it seems reluctant to take the next step and 
set a date for adoption.  Once the EU persuaded the SEC to allow 
foreign companies to use IFRS when they are listed in the U.S., the 
expectation was that convergence between EU and the U.S. securi-
ties regulations would quickly spread to other areas, including al-
lowing U.S. listed companies to use IFRS.40  However, recent de-
velopments imply that there will be no “big bang approach” and 
the SEC might come up with “ways that a softer transition or 
change over time can occur.”41   The following sections explore 
several reasons that seem to underlie the SEC’s ambivalent stance.  
The first set of concerns address procedural issues relating to the 
introduction of IFRS.  The sheer size of the U.S. economy and the 
possibly disastrous consequences, both nationally and internation-
ally, of a rushed decision may be one reason (section 2.2.1.).42  
Moreover, we discuss the objection that it might not be legitimate 
for the SEC to delegate accounting standard setting to an interna-
tional body (section 2.2.2.).  The second and more important set of 
concern relates to the substance of IFRS.  U.S. GAAP currently fol-
low a “rules-based” model, while the IFRS model is purportedly 
“principles-based.”  Detractors of the IFRS have argued that this 
and other features of IFRS will make them less useful in the U.S. 
economic and legal setting.  Section 2.2.3. introduces the debate, 
and section 2.2.4. discusses how it may be linked to peculiar as-
pects of U.S. legal culture, in particular investor litigation.   
 
 
                                                     
39  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Statement on Global Accounting 
Standards (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
27.htm (stating that the SEC is committed to one accounting standard); see also 
SEC Work Plan, Feb. 24, 2010, supra note 4 (asserting the SEC’s commitment to a 
global accounting standard). 
40  Karmel, supra note 8, at 1694, 1712. 
41  See Ken Tysiac, Beswick: “Change Fatigue” a Barrier to IFRS in U.S., J. ACCT., 
May 2, 2013 (discussing the SEC’s lack of action towards incorporating the IFRS). 
42  See Goldschmid, supra note 31 (suggesting that the Dodd-Frank Act will 
not be a reason for a delay).  But see Michael Cohn, AICPA to Reconsider IASB 
Recognition, Definition of Attest, and Global Credentials, ACCT. TODAY (May 13, 2013) 
(noting that the SEC is understaffed, and that SEC Chair Mary Jo White has indi-
cated that Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act are priorities).  
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2.2.1. Too Big to Fail:  The U.S. Economy and the Role of the 
SEC 
 
Most obviously, the SEC appears reluctant to abandon Ameri-
can exceptionalism in accounting due to the fact that the U.S. is the 
largest economy in the world.  Given the high stakes, the SEC may 
reasonably want to be cautious about moving forward while mak-
ing sure that IFRS succeed in the long run.43  A premature adoption 
of a set of underdeveloped accounting standards might have se-
vere consequences around the world, given the role of the well-
developed U.S. public equity market in providing external finance 
to foreign companies.44  Metaphorically speaking, for a “large ves-
sel” such as the U.S. financial system, it may be simply more diffi-
cult to get back on the right course after a wrong (or even disas-
trous) one has been set. 
Moreover, because of the large size of the U.S. capital market, 
possible benefits from adopting IFRS will likely be less substantial 
than in smaller markets.  One of the standard rationales for manda-
tory financial disclosure of publicly traded firms is that infor-
mation is a public good whose benefits the issuer does not fully in-
ternalize.45  In part, the reason for this is network effects resulting 
from investors comparing different firms.46  Within the U.S., these 
                                                     
43  See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 64–65 (“Of note, it is not evident 
from official SEC documents or Commissioner speeches that the agency fully ap-
preciates IASB’s fragility.”); see also Ken Tysiac, Beswick: Rule-making Preventing 
SEC from Deciding on IFRS, J. ACCT. (Dec 9, 2013) (explaining that the SEC is hesi-
tant to change quickly over to IFRS, and that a gradual change is preferred).  
44  Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Global Accounting Convergence 
and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the U.S. (Part I): Conceptual Underpinnings and 
Economic Analysis, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS 355, 366–68  (2010) (providing a detailed 
discussion on costs and benefits of IFRS adoption in the US). 
45  Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman & Edward Rock, Issuers and Investor Pro-
tections, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 275, 276-281 (2d ed., Reinier Kraak-
man et al. eds., 2009); Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities 
Regulation around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007) (discussing 
effects of mandatory disclosure regulations across the globe); see also Allen Ferrell, 
Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007) (discussing mandatory disclosure requirements on 
publicly traded companies more generally); Holger Daske, Luzi Hail, Christian 
Leuz & Rodrigo Verdi, Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence 
on the Economic Consequences, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 1085 (2008) (examining the effects of 
mandatory IFRS).  
46  See Karthik Ramanna & Ewa Sletten, Network Effects in Countries’ Adoption 
of IFRS (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 10–092), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590245 (describing the hypothesis that worldwide 
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network effects may be large enough because of the sheer market 
volume.47  In smaller markets, these benefits may only materialize 
if investors are capable of diversifying across a set of exchanges, 
for which a single set of accounting standards may be required as a 
basis.48 
It is of course true that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is 
the largest stock market in the world by market capitalization.  As 
of December 2011, its equity market capitalization was 11.8 billion 
dollars, followed most closely by the domestic equity markets of 
Tokyo and London with 3.3 billion dollars each.49  However, there 
are a number of objections to this argument.  In a globalized world, 
capital markets are perhaps not best seen in national terms.  Collec-
tively, the countries using IFRS constitute a larger economy than 
the United States, with a market capitalization exceeding that of 
the U.S. exchanges by more than a quarter.50  In the United States, 
the number of publicly traded firms has decreased since the mid-
1990s,51 and there have been few IPOs since the dot-com bubble 
                                                     
IFRS acceptance is self-reinforcing, due in large part to network benefits such as 
lower transaction costs).  
47  Id. at 5 (“Larger countries, due to the size of their markets, are likely to at-
tract foreign capital and maintain international trade even if they continue using 
domestic standards.”). 
48  See, e.g., Ramanna & Sletten, supra note 46, at 5, 6, 30 (explaining that 
smaller markets may experience limited market benefits from IFRS); Hail et al., 
supra note 44, at 364–66 (“[T]here is evidence of positive capital market outcomes 
around the IFRS mandates in some countries.  However, there is considerable het-
erogeneity in the effects across firms and countries.”).   
49  WFE 2011 Market Highlights, WORLD FED’N OF EXCHANGES (Jan. 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.world-
exchang-
es.org/files/file/stats%20and%20charts/2011%20WFE%20Market%20Highlights.
pdf (analyzing financial market trends across the globe).  
50  Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Speech at Open Meeting in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-184.htm (stating that market capi-
talization in 85 countries requiring IFRS represented approximately 35% of global 
market capitalization in July 2008, which exceeded the 28% share of U.S. exchang-
es). 
51  WFE Statistics: 10 Years in Review, 2000-2009, WORLD FED’N OF EXCHANGES, 
available at www.world-exchanges.org (summarizing market capitalization and 
value of share trading over 2000-2009); David Weild & Edward Kim, A Wake-Up 
Call for America, in GRANT THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKETS SERIES (Nov. 2009), availa-
ble at 
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital
%20markets/gt_wakeup_call_.pdf (discussing the decline in the number of pub-
licly listed companies in the United States and its economic impact on the econo-
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burst.52  Some firms have permanently left the market, and interna-
tional issuers have increasingly sought listings elsewhere, e.g., in 
London.53  Accounting standards may therefore be a competitive 
factor for the U.S. stock market, and particularly for American 
firms seeking both domestic and international investment. 
Since the formation of FASB in the early 1970s, U.S. issuers be-
lieved that U.S. GAAP was well developed and perfectly met the 
needs of U.S. business and its investors and thus provided Ameri-
can firms with a competitive edge.54  In spite of incidents such as 
the Enron scandal, the SEC held on to the belief that this system 
generally works well.  The purpose of adopting IFRS would there-
fore not primarily be to remedy the defects of the existing system, 
but rather to harmonize U.S. accounting practices with those used 
in the rest of the world, and thus help the U.S. capital market, and 
U.S. firms, to regain international competitiveness.  In addition, 
adopting IFRS in the United States may facilitate U.S. public com-
panies’ access to international capital.55 
Harmonization may be desirable if the goal for SEC is to pro-
tect U.S. investors investing globally, and to secure a strong posi-
tion for the United States in today’s competitive global capital 
markets,56 whereas keeping U.S. specific financial reporting stand-
                                                     
my); see also Alix Stuart, Missing: Public Companies: Why is the Number of Publicly 
Traded Companies in the U.S. Declining?, CFO.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://ww2.cfo.com/growth-companies/2011/03/missing-public-companies/ 
(describing the general decrease in U.S. publicly traded companies).  
52  The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market, supra note 25 (“U.S. 
exchanges have captured just 13.8% of the total value of Global IPOs in 2007, 
compared with an average of 74% in the period from 1996 to 2000.”).  
53  SOX has often been blamed for this.  See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 24, at 
195 (describing the expanding geographic reach of U.S. investors); Newman, supra 
note 7, at 839 (“The United States is no longer the preferred choice for raising capi-
tal.  Today, companies can raise needed capital just as easily in London, Hong 
Kong, or Dubai rather than New York.”). 
54  See Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind 
Professional Standards, CPA J. (Feb. 2005) (providing a historical overview).  
55  See Langevoort, supra note 24, at 195 (“In the years since [2001], the 
world’s major wealth gains have not occurred in real economic activity in the 
United States”); Newman, supra note 7, at 842–61 (comparing differences between 
GAAP and IFRS); Ken Tysiac, IFRS Foundation Report Says SEC’s Concerns Can Be 
Overcome, J. ACCT. (Oct. 23, 2012) (IFRS chairman addresses U.S. concerns over 
shift to new standards). 
56  See Tysiac, supra note 55 (“[T]he United States could face consequences for 
not pushing steadily forward on convergence and adopting IFRS.”); Cunningham, 
supra note 2, at 21 (“Evidence demonstrates increasing divergence rather than 
convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP); Langevoort, supra note 24, at 195 (ar-
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ards may end up being the major barrier to the integration of fi-
nancial markets.57  As former SEC Chair Christopher Cox said in 
2008, “two thirds of U.S. investors own securities issued by foreign 
companies.”58  Thus, “[a] common accounting language around the 
world could give investors greater comparability and greater con-
fidence in the transparency of financial reporting worldwide.”59  
International harmonization of financial reporting standards al-
lows governments to develop standards that keep investors in-
formed in a uniform way and across borders.60  In other words, 
both American investors and issuers should be able to benefit from 
amplified network effects if the financial reporting landscape of the 
United States were integrated into the developing global one, in 
which investors are able to compare financial statements of firms 
worldwide using a single set of standards.   
 
2.2.2. Delegating Authority to a Private International Body 
 
Another concern also debated in the EU has been about “ratify-
ing as laws the set of rules created by a small, self-appointed, pri-
vate-sector body.”61  However, it is hard to justify such an argu-
ment in the United States, as the constitutional structures and 
decision-making processes of FASB and IASB are almost identi-
                                                     
guing that companies are already raising capital, not just in New York but all 
around the world, including London, Hong Kong, and Dubai); Newman, supra 
note 7, at 835 (“Convergence is, from the accounting and financial reporting 
world’s viewpoint, the single most important thing in the history of the world.”). 
57  WALTER MATTLI & TIM BÜTHE, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 197 (2013). 
58  Tysiac, supra note 55 (“[T]he United States’s contributions are lacking in 
proportion to the size of its economy and its number of representatives in IFRS 
Foundation bodies.”); see also Cunningham, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that differ-
ences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP continue to grow); Langevoort, supra note 24, 
195 (arguing that U.S. access to international capital and economic growth suf-
fered possibly as a result of U.S. regulation); Newman, supra note 7, at 835 (em-
phasizing that convergence is fundamentally important). 
59  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4 (discussing a plan that allows 
the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers for the purpose of SEC filings).  
60   MATTLI & BÜTHE, supra note 57, at 197.  
61  See Wiley IFRS 2011, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that IFRS achieved legal 
force in the EU only when the European Council of Ministers approved the IFRS 
Regulation in June 2002); Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1000–01 (sum-
marizing various criticisms of FASB’s governance model). 
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cal.62  Many describe the extent of the similarity as IASB being the 
“carbon copy” of FASB—only on a broader geographic scale.63  
FASB has been the standard-setter in the United States since 1973, 
and is a private body, as were its predecessors.  Since the 1930s, the 
Commission has been relied on as an independent, private-sector 
organization to establish accounting standards, which apparently 
never caused debate about the legitimacy of private standard-
setting.64  In fact, only the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created an 
explicit authority for the SEC to recognize a private standard-
setting body and set up criteria for recognition,65 but the private 
character of accounting standards was never an issue.  Hence, the 
concern obviously originates not from the fact that IASB is a private 
standard-setter, but from the fact that it is a foreign one. 
The United States is often reluctant to espouse foreign and in-
ternational standards.  The U.S. Supreme Court is divided on the 
question of “whether it is legitimate to rely on foreign law”66—
                                                     
62  Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1000–01 (noting that FASB’s gov-
ernance model has been replicated by IASB); see David S. Ruder, Charles T. Can-
field & Hudson T. Hollister, Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards: Conver-
gence and Independence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 513, 526–40 (2005) (noting that the 
overhaul of IASB’s structure in 2000 was motivated by the desire to follow the 
American model and thus facilitate the adoption of IFRS in the United States). 
63  William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting 
Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 476 (2010) (using the “carbon-copy” language 
and noting only two points of distinction—money and public oversight—between 
IASB and FASB); Ruder, Canfield & Hollister, supra note 62, at 540–54 (describing 
the ways in which IASB, prior to its reorganization in 2000, differed from FASB). 
64  See generally Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014) (describing that the Financial Accounting Foundation, found-
ed in 1972, is a private-sector organization overseeing FASB, which was estab-
lished by the FAF in 1973.  Accounting Standards codified by FASB are officially 
recognized as authoritative by the SEC (Financial Reporting Release No. 1, Section 
101, and reaffirmed in its April 2003 Policy Statement) and the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants; Rule 203, Rules of Professional Conduct, as 
amended May 1973 and May 1979). 
65  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 108(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (2002) (recognizing 
accounting standards set by private standard-setting bodies when they meet cer-
tain additional requirements). 
66  Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Be-
fore the Courts: Cross-Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 215, 220 (2013) (demonstrating that citation of foreign law by courts in the 
United States is not an isolated phenomenon); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (ruling that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on juve-
nile offenders); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (making same-sex sexual 
activity legal in the United States); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (ruling 
that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death without considering mitigating cir-
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even though foreign and international law are cited only as a sec-
ondary (nonbinding) sources (i.e., at the same level as law review 
articles).67  Justice Scalia, possibly the most outspoken opponent of 
the practice, argues in one of his decisions, “this Court . . . should 
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”68 
From not ratifying even the basic international human rights 
agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”),69 and the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,70 to arguing the legit-
imacy of citing international or foreign decisions and laws, when it 
comes to following foreign/international legal developments, “im-
posing foreign moods . . . on Americans”71 seems to be a major 
                                                     
cumstances); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (ruling that executions of men-
tally retarded criminals violate the Eighth Amendment).   
67  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Com-
parative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 331 
(2004) (noting that some jurists “adhere to the view that a comparative perspec-
tive . . . is inapplicable to [the Constitution’s] interpretation” but urging the Amer-
ican Constitutional Society to incorporate international perspectives in their un-
derstanding of the Constitution); see also Jess Bravin, Looking Global: Ginsburg 
Speaks Out on Kagan, Comparative Law Issue, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/07/30/looking-global-ginsburg-speaks-out-on-
kagan-comparative-law-issue/ (supporting the claim that judicial reference to for-
eign and international law is not unprecedented in the United States). 
68  Gelter & Siems, supra note 66, at 5 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 586, 
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
69  CEDAW is an international agreement that affirms principles of funda-
mental human rights and equality for women around the world that was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979.  All but seven countries—the 
U.S., Iran, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Palau, and Tonga—have ratified the trea-
ty.  United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en.  See CEDAW: U.S. Ratification and Local Implementation Ef-
forts, BERKELEY LAW SCH., available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8285.htm, for 
a description of efforts within the U.S. to ratify CEDAW; see also Women Senators 
Made the CEDAW Connection to Ending Violence Against Women and Girls, 
CEDAW at a Glance (June 26, 2014), http://www.cedaw2010.org (describing ef-
forts by U.S. Senators to ratify CEDAW).  
70  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (a human rights treaty setting out the civil, political, eco-
nomic, social, health and cultural rights of children. Since its adoption in 1989, the 
Convention has become the most widely ratified human rights treaty in history. 
Only two countries, Somalia and the United States, have not ratified the treaty). 
71  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)) (argu-
ing that the Court’s discussions of foreign views on sodomy are not only mean-
ingless but also dangerous dicta). 
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concern in the U.S.72  CEDAW and the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child are not the only examples.  The United States 
has so far signed hundreds of treaties but has not ratified them.73  
Arguably, harmonization in many fields has so far been possible 
only when the Europeans give in, but, more often than not, the 
United States subsequently does not apply those standards.74 
The skepticism U.S. judges, scholars, and politicians have re-
garding foreign law is not the only instance we see U.S. exception-
alism.  Rather, it is part of a larger pattern that includes the refusal 
to adopt the metric system75 and the use of the term “soccer” for 
the game known to the rest of the world as “football.” 
Clearly, IASB is not completely foreign in the sense of exclud-
ing U.S. representation.  Thus, the actual fear in the United States 
may be that the United States would be underrepresented in the new 
regime.  Against this fear must be balanced other countries’ con-
cerns that the United States, which has still not adopted IFRS but is 
in the position to influence IASB substantially, is actually overrepre-
sented in the current regime. 
The fear of delegating authority over financial reporting to a 
non-U.S. organization has grown so much by now that some have 
                                                     
72  See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S3, 109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Cornyn) (arguing that citation of foreign law implies that the American people are 
“losing control over the meaning of our laws and of our Constitution”); Martha 
Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United 
States, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2010) available at 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/08/online_52_minow/ (“locating the sources of 
the controversy over the place of international law within the United States” in 
order to “dismiss artificial issues” and focus on “developments that might be in-
structive”). 
73  Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Consti-
tution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 309–10 (2007) (describing the large number of trea-
ties that the United States has signed but not subsequently ratified, which include 
humanitarian, environmental, and private international law treaties, among oth-
ers); see, e.g., Guri Bang, Signed But Not Ratified: Limits to U.S. Participation in Inter-
national Environmental Agreements, 28 REV. POL’Y RES 65 (2011) (exploring two dis-
tinct explanations for why the United States signs environmental treaties but does 
not ratify them); see also Mara E. Trager, Towards a Predictable Law on International 
Receivables Financing: The UNCITRAL Convention, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 611, 
614, 637–38 (1999) (noting that the Anglo-American and Continental European 
big-law systems try to impose the law of their countries on others, making reach-
ing a consensus more difficult if not impossible). 
74  See Trager, supra note 73, at 625 (establishing the three different trans-
border transactions that might be covered by the draft rules). 
75  See Ramanna, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that besides the United States, on-
ly Liberia and Myanmar have eschewed the metric system). 
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started to question the authority of the SEC to decide on such dele-
gation.76  However, the SEC clearly stated that it has the authority 
and has been delegating its power to FASB since the 1970s.  Fur-
thermore, should the SEC decide to adopt IFRS, FASB will remain 
the body responsible for endorsing international standards, which 
would be a precondition for their application in the United States.77 
The influence of the United States on the emergence of IFRS 
dates back to before its foundation.  The predecessor of the current 
IFRS Foundation,78 the International Accounting Standards Com-
mittee Foundation (“IASC Foundation”) was formed in 1973, 
through an agreement among nine national accounting bodies: 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Holland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.79  Arguably, the Anglo-
                                                     
76  See, e.g., Interview by Sen. Carl Levin with Mary Schapiro, Nominee to be 
Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2009/PSI.SchapiroR
esponses.012209.pdf (asking whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows “the SEC to 
delegate the development of U.S. accounting standards to the IASB”); Jacob L. 
Barney, Note, Beyond Economics: The U.S. Recognition of International Financial Re-
porting Standards as an International Subdelegation of the SEC’s Rulemaking Authority, 
42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (2009) (questioning the SEC’s authority to recognize 
standard-setters besides FASB); see also Cunningham, supra note 2, at 28–33 (argu-
ing that the SEC’s authority to recognize standard-setters besides FASB is sus-
pect).  But see Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 10, § 108 (reaffirming the SEC's role 
in establishing accounting standards to be used by public companies); infra § 4.2.1. 
(discussing the SEC’s authority and suggesting an endorsement approach as a 
possible solution).  
77  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4, at 1 (proposing a roadmap to 
allow the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers for the purpose of the SEC filings); see Ste-
phen A. Zeff & Christopher W. Nobes, Commentary: Has Australia (or Any Other 
Jurisdiction) ‘Adopted’ IFRS?, 20 AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 178, 178–84 (2010) (analyzing 
the various methods that jurisdictions can use to implement IFRS).  For additional 
discussion on who actually adopted IFRS in a way that each standard is effective 
as soon as it is issued by IASB, see infra § 4.2.1. 
78  IFRS, IASC Foundation to Become IFRS Foundation on 1 July 2010, IFRS.ORG, 
(June 30, 2010), http://www.ifrs.org/news/announcements-and-
speeches/Pages/Announcements-and-Speeches.aspx (follow “Next” hyperlink to 
June 30, 2010) (noting that on July 1, 2010, the IASC Foundation formally renamed 
itself as International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS Founda-
tion)); IFRS FOUNDATION, CONST., preface at 4 (Jan. 2013) (amending the Constitu-
tion “to reflect the separation of the role of the Chair of the IASB from that of the 
Executive Director.”). 
79  See CLARE ROBERTS, PAULINE WEETMAN & PAUL GORDON, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REPORTING: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 331 (3d ed. 2005) (reflecting on 
the changes within international accounting standards); Mark J. Hanson, Becoming 
One: The SEC Should Join the World in Adopting the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 521, 521–23 (2006) (noting that many 
countries already use or will use IFRS and questioning whether the SEC can cur-
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Saxon countries dominated.80 
The “three-tier governance structure” of IFRS is similar to the 
U.S. model of FASB.  First, IASB consists of fifteen independent 
experts, four of whom are American.  Second, five out of the twen-
ty-two Trustees of the IFRS Foundation are from the United States.  
Third, the Monitoring Board is made up of five securities regula-
tors including the SEC.81  In other words, U.S. influence is percep-
tible at all levels of the institutional structure associated with the 
IFRS.  In addition to all these structural similarities, IASB’s stand-
ards have gradually been amended in the course of a deliberate 
process to create convergence with GAAP.  The FASB-IASB joint 
project has resulted in changes both in U.S. GAAP and IFRS to the 
extent that they are now “far more similar than they are differ-
ent.”82  In fact, IFRS mirror U.S. GAAP in many respects.83 
 
 
                                                     
rently adopt IFRS for foreign issuers); WILEY IFRS 2011, supra note 14, at 7 (de-
scribing the structure of the IASC Foundation); CHRISTOPHER NOBES & ROBERT 
PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 85 (12th ed. 2012). 
80  Leo van der Tas & Peter van der Zanden, The International Financial Report-
ing Standards, in THE INFLUENCE OF IAS/IFRS ON THE CCCTB, TAX ACCOUNTING, 
DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE LAW ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 1, 3 (Peter Essers et al. 
eds., 2009) (discussing the significant consequences that the introduction of 
IAS/IFRS might have); Alain Burlaud & Bernard Colasse, Normalisation comptable 
internationale: le retour du politique ?, 16 COMPTABILITE CONTROLE AUDIT 153, 155-56 
(2010) (pointing out that four former English colonies—and only one other coun-
try—joined in 1974). 
81  Goldschmid, supra note 31, at 8 (describing the ways in which the “three-
tiered governance model” of IFRS mirrors the U.S. FASB and noting that the simi-
larities are deliberate). 
82  Stuart H. Deming, International Financial Reporting Standards: Their Im-
portance to U.S. Business and Legal Practice, 84 MICH. BAR J. 14, 17 (Dec. 2005) (dis-
cussing how the United States will have to adapt its accounting standards to the 
international accounting standards now prominent among other nations); see gen-
erally SEC Staff Paper, Nov. 16, 2011, supra note 4 (providing examples of recent 
changes to FASB and/or IASB standards as a result of joint projects). 
83  See, e.g., SEC Staff Paper, Nov. 16, 2011, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that IFRS 
10 resulted in “substantial convergence of IFRS with U.S. GAAP on structural in-
vestment vehicles and other special purpose entities as well as related disclosures 
. . . .”).  For a more detailed discussion on Consolidation and SPEs, see § 2.2.3.  
Another example of substantially converged standards is IFRS 3.  See SEC Staff 
Paper, Nov. 16, 2011, supra note 4, at 6, 44–45 (noting that both IFRS 3 and ASC 
Topic 805 contain similar requirements for business combinations accounting and 
noncontrolling interests).  
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2.2.3. The Rules-Principles Debate in Accounting 
 
While procedural obstacles should normally be only tempo-
rary, substantive objections to IFRS should play a role in the debate 
irrespective of the cost of transition.  This kind of objection does 
not concern specific details, but rather the nature of this set of 
standards as a whole and its purported incompatibility with the 
U.S. financial reporting environment and the legal system as a 
whole.84 
The main critique relates to the level of detail of the two sets of 
accounting standards.85  It is often claimed that U.S. GAAP are 
rule-based, while IFRS are principles-based.86  These two terms 
used by accountants are more or less analogous to what legal 
scholars mean when they set up a dichotomy of “rules” and 
“standards.”87  In the accounting context, a rules-based approach 
means that a particular statement gives relatively detailed instruc-
                                                     
84  Newman, supra note 7, at 840–41 (arguing that the U.S.’s “shareholder 
demographic” and “corporate culture” fit poorly with the “principle-based ten-
ants” of IFRS); see Shyam Sunder, IFRS and the Accounting Consensus, 23 ACCT. 
HORIZONS 101, 101 (2009) (arguing for a re-examination of the accounting consen-
sus). 
85  E.g., Bratton, supra note 63, at 489–90 (discussing the some of the negative 
impacts of FASB rules); Newman, supra note 7, at 844–45 (pointing out that U.S. 
GAAP have a larger volume of information, totaling approximately 4,530 pages, 
than do IFRS with 2,719 pages). 
86  SEC Staff Paper, Nov. 16, 2011, supra note 4, at 9–11 (analyzing the text of 
IFRS as issued by IASB as compared to the text of U.S. GAAP); see, e.g., INST. OF 
CHARTERED ACCT. AUSTL., SEC Progress on U.S. IFRS Adoption, 
CHARTEREDACCOUNTANTS.COM.AU (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/Industry-Topics/Reporting/Current-
issues/Convergence/News-and-updates/SEC-progress-on-US-IFRS-
adoption.aspx (announcing the SEC’s completion of two key phases of its work 
plan toward adopting IFRS in the U.S.).  
87  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992) (“offer[ing] an economic analysis of the extent to which legal com-
mands should be promulgated as rules or standards”); Duncan Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685–1713 (1976) 
(“address[es] the problem of the choice between rules and standards”at Sections I 
and II); see, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2003) (looking at Enron 
as an example of governance breakdown and audit failures); Lance J. Phillips, The 
Implications of IFRS on the Functioning of the Securities Antifraud Regime in the United 
States, 108 MICH. L. REV. 603, 616–18 (2010) (explaining how “investors and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission will face greater difficulty in relying on ac-
counting violations to establish the elements of the securities antifraud causes of 
action if IFRS is adopted”). 
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tions regarding specific accounting treatment to be given to partic-
ular transactions.88  Under a principles-based approach, the appli-
cable accounting standard applies to a more general set of transac-
tions, which consequently requires the accountant to employ 
greater discretion to comply with a general objective such as fair 
presentation.89 
For example, accounting for leases is often used to illustrate the 
difference between the two systems because the accounting treat-
ment (i.e., an operating lease or a capital lease) determines whether 
the corporation should report the lease as an asset or as an ex-
pense.90  U.S. GAAP employ bright line criteria, such as requiring 
“seventy-five percent or more of the leased property’s economic 
life . . . ” to determine when the transaction will be recorded as a 
capital lease instead of an operating lease.91  In spite of requiring a 
similar treatment of accounting for leases, IFRS do not provide 
quantified measures and state the idea in principled terms.  IAS 17 
requires capital lease accounting if “the lease term is for the major 
part of the economic life of the asset.”  IFRS require preparers to 
understand the essence of the transaction and report on its sub-
stantive reflection, while U.S. GAAP are more prescriptive and try 
to be as clear as possible. 
Another important example is consolidation92—more precisely, 
                                                     
88  Phillips, supra note 87, at 616–17 (explaining the differences between 
GAAP and IFRS); see also Bratton, supra note 87, at 1037 (arguing that our corpo-
rate governing system is not yet ready for principles-based accounting because of 
incentive problems). 
89  Phillips, supra note 87, at 617–18 (asserting that because IFRS lacks guid-
ance, it requires managers to use “estimates, assumptions, and judgment calls”); 
Bratton, supra note 87, at 1036–37 (arguing that the use of principles allows regula-
tors more leeway in applying law to fact, but suggesting the principles can be ma-
nipulated by non-neutral regulators). 
90  Newman, supra note 7, at 845–50 (explaining the differences and similari-
ties between U.S. GAAP and IFRS); Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 994 
(establishing GAAP as rules-based and IFRS as principles-based); Bratton, supra 
note 63, at 479 (discussing the obstacles of implementing IFRS effectively in the 
U.S., as it is more “an international focal point around 
which a broad range of national systems converge as national regulators 
adopt IFRS with local carve outs” than it is a national system in itself). 
91  Newman, supra note 7, at 849 (describing similarities and differences in the 
accounting treatment for leases under GAAP and IFRS); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS 
BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 13: ACCOUNTING FOR 
LEASES ¶ 7 (1976) (describing criteria for classifying leases other than leveraged 
leases). 
92  Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 994–95 (establishing GAAP as 
rules-based and IFRS as principles-based); see Bratton, supra note 63, at 479–80 
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accounting for Special Purpose Entities (“SPEs”)—and when to re-
port SPEs on a consolidated basis.  Debate about this issue erupted 
shortly after the Enron scandal, when a partnership controlled by 
Enron’s CFO was used to circumvent consolidation requirements 
and thus effectively shift some corporate debt off the books.93  Crit-
ics argued that a more principles-based approach would have pre-
vented Enron from employing such tactics, since it would not have 
been possible to simply claim to have followed the rules while 
avoiding compliance with the more general objective of accounting 
standards to consolidate all entities under the de facto control of the 
reporting entity.94  Others objected that Enron did not follow U.S. 
GAAP to the letter.95  Yet, the criticism persuaded Congress to (leg-
                                                     
(describing cases in which GAAP is known for its rules and IFRS for its principles, 
including accounting for capital leases and accounting consolidation).  
93  JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 22–23 (2006); see U.S. v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 
2004) (explaining how Enron created special purpose entities to engage in off-
balance-sheet transactions and affirming the district court holding convicting Ar-
thur Andersen of obstructing SEC proceedings).  However, with Arthur Andersen 
v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696, 696–98 (2005), the Supreme Court reversed the charges 
against Arthur Andersen.  The Supreme Court decision did not declare the audit-
ing firm was innocent but merely found the jury instructions were erroneous. 
Even the Supreme Court decision overturning the charges could not save the 
company from dissolution as its reputation was already damaged irreparably by 
then. 
94  Coffee, supra note 10, at 1416–17 (2002); Bratton, supra note 87, at 1026 
(characterizing the “principles-based accounting and “international convergence” 
of GAAP as being within the “institutional contexts in which they would operate 
and effect consequences” and determining that its principles-based accounting 
presents risks for audit quality); see Joel S. Demski, Enron et al.—A Comment, 21 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 129–30 (2002) (discouraging a rush into new regulatory 
structures and encouraging a retreat from bright line reporting); Mark Nelson, 
John Elliott & Robin Tarpley, Evidence from Auditors About Managers’ and Auditors’ 
Earnings Management Decisions, 77 ACCT. REV. 175 (2002) (reporting “analyses of 
data obtained using a field-based questionnaire in which 253 auditors from one 
Big Five firm recalled and described 515 specific experiences they had with clients 
whom they believe[d] were attempting to manage earnings”). 
95  See, e.g., David Kershaw, Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously In 
Accounting Regulation, 68 MOD. L. REV. 594, 616–24 (2005) (comparing pre-Enron 
and post-Enron accounting standards); Coffee, supra note 93, at 24 (arguing that 
Enron’s incentives to manage for the short-term ultimately led to the crimes 
committed); Bratton, supra note 87, at 1041–43 (arguing that while the GAAP’S 
rules with respect to accounting were “poorly drafted and incomplete, it was En-
ron’s strategic decision to evade the rules that led to the scandal, not any failure in 
the rules themselves); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that in contrast to 
the suggestion that GAAP’s rules were written in such a way as to lead Enron into 
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islatively) commission (in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) an SEC 
report on whether the United States should adopt a principles-
based accounting system.96   
Before Enron, the test corporations reporting under U.S. GAAP 
were required to simply state whether they were “holding majority 
voting control over the affiliate.”97  The standard FASB enacted on 
that matter in 200398 is less specific, and it broadened the previous 
criterion, which merely required voting control over SPEs.99  The 
new standard requires a company to consolidate if “a company is 
exposed to a majority of an entity’s expected losses or entitled to a 
majority of entity’s residual returns.”100  Arguably, the new criteri-
on is more open-textured—and thus more principles-based—than 
the prior one.101  Still, the applicable IFRS on consolidation102 pro-
                                                     
demise, it was actually Enron’s blatant decision to evade the rules of GAAP that 
led to the scandal).  
96  SEC Study 2003, supra note 11 (outlining the results of the study into 
standard setting required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
97  Coffee, supra note 93, at 22–24 (analyzing the impact of Enron’ failures); 
Newman, supra note 7, at 853–58 (explaining the differences between U.S. GAAP 
and IFRS as seen through their approaches to consolidation); FIN ACCT. 
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 94: 
CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES ¶¶ 6–7 (1987) (noting that 
businesses use “nonhomogeneity” as grounds to exclude majority owned subsidi-
aries from consolidation); see also Kershaw, supra note 95, at 607 (discussing possi-
ble ambiguities in a consolidation standard based on voting control). 
98  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46, CONSOLIDATION 
OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB NO. 51, 1, 1–49  (2003) 
(addressing consolidation of business enterprises of variable interest entities pos-
sessing certain characteristics); Newman, supra note 7, at 853–58 (explaining the 
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS as seen through their approaches to 
consolidation). 
99  Newman, supra note 7, at 853–58 (explaining the differences between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS as seen through their approaches to consolidation). 
100  Id. at 854; see FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46, supra note 99 (describing con-
solidation of business enterprises); Newman, supra note 7, at 853–58 (describing 
how Financial Interpretation 46(R)’s consolidation model, the variable interest 
model, has enlarged SPE consolidation in order to prevent the kind of financial 
maneuvering that occurred with Enron); see also SEC, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
ACCOUNTANT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET 
IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 
91 (2003) (a study conducted by the SEC addressing “two primary questions: (1) 
the extent of off-balance sheet (“OBS”) arrangements, including the use of special 
purpose entities (“SPEs”), and (2) whether current financial statements of issuers 
transparently reflect the economics of off-balance sheet arrangements”).  
101  Newman, supra note 7, at 854–55 (discussing Financial Interpretation 46R 
and its implications of corporate consolidation of SPEs).  
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vides even less specific guidance about whether to consolidate an 
SPE:103  A reporting entity must consolidate an investee when the 
former controls the latter.  Arguably, the reporting entity and its 
auditor need to exercise a greater degree of judgment under IFRS 
10.104  In order to eliminate inconsistencies, IFRS 10 articulates the 
principle of control in such a way that it can be applied to all inves-
tees.  Under this standard, control consists of three elements:  pow-
er, exposure to variable returns, and an investor’s ability to use 
power to affect its amount of variable returns.105      
If a purportedly “principles-based” approach could solve 
America’s accounting woes, why would anyone object?  In spite of 
these examples, the established dichotomy is often considered 
problematic.106  Clearly, it does not imply that U.S. GAAP do not 
employ any principles, or that IFRS exclusively consist of princi-
ples.  To the contrary, U.S. GAAP and IFRS each combine both.107  
It may be true that the IFRS include fewer specific rules because 
                                                     
102  INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BD., IFRS 10 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(2011).  IFRS 10—Consolidated Financial Statements supersedes IAS 27—
Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements and SIC-12—Consolidation, Spe-
cial Purpose Entities.  See IFRS Foundation, Effect Analysis: IFRS 10 Consolidated 
Financial Statements and IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities  (Sept. 2011, 
updated Jan. 2012) [hereinafter IFRS Foundation, Effect Analysis] (observing sev-
eral causes of inconsistent application of IAS 27 and SIC-12 that have resulted in 
diversity in practice and thus resulting in the issuance of IFRS 10).  
103  Newman, supra note 7, at 856 (discussing the IFRS accounting consolida-
tion regime for SPEs and noting that it is based on the “broader and more com-
plex idea of control”). 
104  IFRS Foundation, Effect Analysis, supra note 102, at 22, 33, 39, 44 (outlin-
ing substantive rights for investors); Newman, supra note 7, at 855–56 (noting that 
issuers must use greater judgment and discretion under the principles-bases IFRS 
standards when determining whether to consolidate a group of SPEs).  
105  IFRS Foundation, Effect Analysis, supra note 102, at 8 (explaining the 
principle of control and its elements in detail). 
106  See Phillips, supra note 87, at 616 n.100 (describing the dichotomy between 
rules and standards); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules 
vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 30 (2000) (questioning the dichotomy be-
tween rules and standards). 
107  See SEC Study 2003, supra note 11 (concluding that the benefits of using 
objectives-oriented or principles-based standards in the United States are chal-
lenging to determine); see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the 
Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Ac-
counting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2007) (explaining how defining a system as 
principle-based or rule-based may be too narrow); Newman, supra note 7, at 845 
(describing Professor Cunningham’s view that rule-based and principle-based 
standards are too rigid); see also Bratton, supra note 87, at 1026, 1036–55 (explain-
ing that Enron violated both rules and standards under U.S. GAAP). 
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such rules could create problems in countries with very different 
economies, while more general prescriptions could be interpreted 
in ways that would better fit the particular circumstances.108  For 
instance, U.S. GAAP include detailed cost and expense guidance 
for extractive industries (oil and gas), but there is no corresponding 
guidance under IFRS.  While industry-specific standards are an 
important aspect of the U.S. accounting system, IASB has not fol-
lowed in FASB’s footsteps in this respect,109 nor is it planning to do 
so.110  Moreover, even if a system has a larger number of rules than 
another, this does not make it automatically rules-based, because 
of the importance of how a specific rule is interpreted and applied 
against the backdrop of the underlying principles.111  As we will 
discuss below, U.S. GAAP and IFRS are both much more similar to 
each other than they are to Continental European accounting sys-
tems, which often had completely different objectives and were – 
in a certain way – more principles-based than either of them. 
Even if we accept the rules-principles dichotomy as typically 
presented in the debate, one objection is that a principles-based 
approach could trigger negative reactions by accountants, auditors, 
and firms in the United States, who are accustomed to working 
with bright-line rules rather than principles.  They may perceive 
IFRS’s lack of bright-lined rules and detailed guidance as an un-
wanted complication to the current system of audit and enforce-
ment.  For instance, Sunder strongly argues against the implemen-
tation of IFRS for several reasons, including that IFRS favor 
principles instead of detailed rules.112  These principles focus on 
“fairness” which could only be “an ex post judgment about a par-
ticular instance of valuation,” as opposed to an “ex ante judg-
ment.”113  Thus, it is impossible for a standard to “specify the num-
bers arrived at by the application of a particular method to be ‘fair’ 
                                                     
108  See October 2012 IFRS Foundation Report, supra note 4, at 9–10 (assessing 
the differences in comprehensiveness between U.S. GAAP and the IFRS). 
109  See SEC Staff Paper, May 26, 2011, supra note 4 (discussing one approach 
to incorporating IFRS into the U.S. system); SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, 
supra note 4 (discussing the Work Plan and how to incorporate IFRS into the U.S. 
system).  
110  See generally October 2012 IFRS Foundation Report, supra note 4. 
111  See Kershaw, supra note 95, at 606–08 (discussing the relationship between 
accounting standards and rule entrenchment).  
112  Sunder, supra note 84, at 103 (asserting that principles, and not rules, 
should be used to describe accounting standards). 
113  Id. 
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by definition. . . .”114 
Consequently, IFRS allow for greater discretion compared to 
U.S. GAAP.  This seems to be the major concern raised by account-
ants in the United States, given that discretion increases the risk of 
opportunistic accounting.115  IFRS focus on fair value measurement 
has been criticized, as it “significantly impairs the ability of an au-
ditor to limit opportunistic actions of management and improve 
financial reporting.”116  Arguably, by providing principles rather 
than bright-line rules, IFRS create greater opportunities to engage 
in “financial engineering” to achieve the desired presentation in 
the financial statements.117 
However, a detailed comparison with U.S. GAAP would not 
necessarily reveal that the latter standards are indeed better at pro-
tecting investors in a public company from managerial misconduct 
with the help or tacit support of accountants and auditors.  Cur-
rently, U.S. GAAP are characterized by exceptions to more general 
rules, and often there are exceptions to these exceptions.118  After 
Enron, a common criticism has been that the larger number of rules 
and exceptions makes it even more complicated and harder to 
track “financial engineering.”119  As Goldschmid states,  
 
“[P]rinciples (with enough specificity to create comparabil-
                                                     
114 Id.; see also Kaplow, supra note 87, at 560 (offering an economic analysis of 
rules versus standards, suggesting that the distinction “is the extent to which ef-
forts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act.”). 
115  SEC Work Plan, supra note 4 (citing various comment letters to the SEC, 
including those from the American Accounting Association, Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee (“AAA-FASC”), Fund Stockowners Rights, National Asso-
ciation of State Boards of Accountancy (“NASBA”), and Psoras)). 
116  Id. 
117  See WILEY IFRS 2011, supra note 14.  But see supra note 89 (regarding the 
prevalence of financial engineering).  
118  For a detailed discussion on rules and exceptions, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 962 (1995) (“It is familiar to find rules 
that have explicit or implicit exceptions for cases of necessity or emergency.  It is 
unfamiliar to find rules without any such exceptions.”); see also Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Ac-
counting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 324 n.169 (2005) (explaining difficulties in access-
ing FASB materials). 
119  E.g., Newman, supra note 7, at 878 (“A good crook can outsmart a good 
cop any day of the week.”); Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1004 (“There 
is no question that GAAP’s layers of rules can have perverse effects. . . .  Worse, 
there results a dysfunctional, check-the-box approach to compliance that admits 
transaction structuring and other strategic behavior . . .”).  
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ity) can be better applied and enforced than detailed rules 
with bright lines and multiple exceptions.  The modern 
principle-based approach has been incorporated into 
IASB/FASB converged standards.  It is much harder to de-
feat—by financial engineering—a well-crafted principle 
than a detailed, specific rule.  The last two decades have 
taught us that financial types find it much too easy to ma-
nipulate and structure their ways around ‘hard and fast’ 
rules.”120 
 
2.2.4. “Vague Principles” and Their Fit with Prevalent Investor 
Litigation 
 
Scholars such as Newman link the rules-principles dilemma to 
the “cultural fit” discussion and question whether U.S. issuers 
have the “proper mindset to apply principles-based standards.”121  
IFRS require issuers to capture the “economic substance” of trans-
actions and to prepare financial statements accordingly.  However, 
Newman claims that U.S. issuers’ intent is “not necessarily to get 
the numbers ‘right’ but to present their company’s financial posi-
tion as favorably as possible without running afoul of the account-
ing guidance in that particular area.”122  Without having clear 
boundaries of right and wrong, it is not apparent whether U.S. is-
suers would choose the “fair presentation” over “presenting finan-
                                                     
120  Goldschmid, supra note 31 (explaining the need for the SEC to make a de-
cision with respect to IFRS incorporation). 
121  Newman, supra note 7, at 859 (analyzing the suitability of the United 
States for adoption of the IFRS); Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 998–99 
(explaining how blockholders, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel 
experience less problems with respect to agency and informational access); see 
William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United States, 5 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 7 (2004) (demonstrating that the cultural fit discussion was 
most lively during the acceptance of IAS/IFRS across Europe due to Anglo-
American origin of these standards); see also Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: 
Dependence Despite Independence, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 275, 299 (2008) (describing 
how, with respect to the IASC, the European Commission did not want to become 
a standard-setter). 
122  Newman, supra note 7, at 859 (arguing that U.S. companies’ accounting 
figures serve the purpose of being the most beneficial to the company while still 
fitting within the regulatory scheme, rather than trying best to fit into the defined 
rules). 
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cial statements as favorably as possible.”123  Newman’s argument 
lends itself to some obvious criticism.  First, other countries have 
produced their fair share of accounting scandals.124  European 
scandals such as Parmalat have prompted the EU to pass a new 
Audit Directive in 2006,125 and auditing remains high on the Com-
mission’s agenda.126  It is not clear why issuers and auditors in the 
U.S.—a country that scores quite well on corruption indices127—
should be culturally more susceptible to accounting fraud than 
others.  For the argument to persuade, the opportunities and incen-
tives to publicize misleading financial statements would have to be 
particularly strong in the United States. 
In fact, another concern seems to point in exactly the opposite 
direction, namely a particularly strong, possibly excessive incen-
tive structure discouraging accounting fraud.  It is sometimes ar-
gued that “IFRS’s less detailed and prescriptive guidance could 
                                                     
123  Id. at 866–67 (explaining that before the U.S. can effectively utilize the 
less-structured IFRS, it must first address corporations’ reluctance to a principles-
based regime); Bratton, supra note 121, at 28–30 (arguing that auditors and the ac-
counting industry demand rules because clients require justifications); see, e.g., 
Woo, supra note 23, at 121 (citing SEC Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey noting 
“that one of the lessons of the current financial crisis is that financial stability de-
pends on investor confidence, which in turn depends on the transparency of fi-
nancial statements.”). 
124  E.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the United 
States and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005) (comparing U.S. 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom with European ones such as Parmalat and 
Ahold). 
125  Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 
May 2006 on Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, 
Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and Repealing 
Council Directive 84/253/EEC, 2006 O.J. (L 157/87). 
126  In November 2011, the commission issued two further proposals: the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Spe-
cific Requirements Regarding Statutory Audit of Public-Interest Entities, and the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts.  See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Specific Requirements Regarding Statutory Audit of Public-Interest Entities, 
COM (2011) 779 final (Nov. 30, 2011); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council Amending Directive 2006/43/EC on Statutory Audits of Annual 
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, COM (2011) 778 final (Nov. 30, 2011).  
127  For example, Transparency International lists the United States in the 
nineteenth position on its 2012 corruption index, just behind the United Kingdom 
and ahead of several Western European countries, including Austria, France, 
Spain, and Italy.  See Corrupt Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (lasted visited Oct. 1, 2014) (show-
ing a map of corruption perceptions globally). 
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expose companies to increased claims by shareholders and others 
seeking to challenge its application, given the perceived litigious 
environment in the United States.”128  Preparers and auditors of fi-
nancial statements are not comfortable with the possibility that 
even judgments made in good faith, that seemed reasonable at that 
time, could be second-guessed in court, in spite of them having 
asked for assurance from the SEC on that matter.129  IFRS require 
accountants to use more judgment and, while this may have sever-
al advantages, might also mean a greater exposure to liability for 
them.130  Some argue that litigation against auditors based on al-
leged negligence and defending accountants against such suits 
might result in increased opportunities for lawyers when IFRS are 
fully adopted.131  Given that most jurisdictions using IFRS still lack 
class action suits, extensive discovery, and contingency fees,132 liti-
gation risk simply may not be salient outside the United States. 
However, class action litigation is extensively used in the Unit-
ed States and, as Woo points out, “in 2004 class action suits cost 
publicly traded companies in the United States $4.74 billion, com-
pared with $40.48 million in the United Kingdom.  The fact that the 
number in the United States is more than one hundred times that 
                                                     
128  SEC Work Plan, supra note 4, at 7 (citing comment letters from FPL 
Group, Inc. (“FPL”) and tw telecom); see Pöschke, supra note 28, at 66–69 (discuss-
ing the effects of securities litigations in the United States); Phillips, supra note 87, 
at 608–12 (discussing the role of GAAP violations in securities fraud litigation); 
Robert M. Bushman & Joseph D. Piotroski, Financial Reporting Incentives for Con-
servative Accounting: The Influence of Legal and Political Institutions, 42 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 107, (2006) (exploring how reported accounting figures are shaped by a 
country’s individual regulation scheme).   
129  SEC Study 2003, supra note 11 (explaining the work plan to transition the 
United States into an IFRS regime); SEC Work Plan, supra note 4 (concluding that 
the benefits of using objectives-oriented or principles-based standards in the Unit-
ed States are challenging to determine). 
130  See Bratton, supra note 121, at 28–30 (arguing that auditors and the ac-
counting industry demand rules because clients require justifications); Cunning-
ham, supra note 107, at 1473 (arguing that a principle-based system is needed for a 
broad regulatory scheme); Newman, supra note 7, at 873 (asserting that it is ineffi-
cient for GAAP and IFRS to govern accounting principles across the globe). 
131  Thomas C. Pearson, Potential Litigation Against Auditors for Negligence, 5 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405 (2011) (arguing that measures should be taken 
to alleviate the rampant negligence in the auditing field); Sharma, supra note 28, at 
163 (asserting that a switch to IFRS will likely affect the legal profession). 
132  E.g. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An 
Unlikely Export to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1083–87 (2012) (dis-
cussing reasons why securities class actions are unlikely to spread widely in the 
EU). 
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experienced in the United Kingdom is the primary reason the cost 
of director and officer insurance in the United States is six times 
greater than in Europe.”133 
Although the number of securities class action settlements has 
decreased significantly in recent years, total settlement dollars in 
2012 alone increased by more than 100 percent from 2011.134  This 
mechanism in the United States “has enjoyed considerable success 
both as a deterrent to large-scale corporate securities fraud and as a 
source of compensatory recovery for investors.”135  According to 
Warren, its success originates from a “uniquely adversarial legal 
system in a uniquely litigious culture.”136  From a behavioral law 
and economics perspective, the concern about excessive litigation 
risk seems at least plausible. 
Hindsight bias compounded with the ex-post judgment of an 
incident under a less detailed, principles-based IFRS may increase 
the liability risk of companies, accountants, and auditors.  Accord-
ing to this concept, defendants are relatively likely to be found lia-
ble ex-post because “once something happens, people tend to think 
it was more likely to occur, and easier to foresee, than it really 
was.”137  For example, jurors of a car accident case are more likely 
to think that the car accident was foreseeable and that the driver 
could have prevented it had she been more careful.  However, par-
ticipants in behavioral experiments intended to mimic a jury trial 
were more reluctant to find a driver negligent because the accident 
was supposedly foreseeable if conditions (e.g. weather, road) were 
                                                     
133  Woo, supra note 23, at 132 (arguing that the U.S. regulatory system should 
be devised to decrease risk of future decline in order to compete with foreign 
stock markets). 
134  The number of securities class action settlements reached a fourteen-year 
low in 2012, with only fifty-three court-approved settlements.  However, the aver-
age settlement amount ($54.7 million) increased more than 150 percent in 2012 
from prior years, and this amount is well above the historical average ($36.8 mil-
lion).  Mega settlements (settlements over $100 million) accounted for 75% percent 
of all settlement dollars in 2012.  See Ellen Ryan & Laura Simmons, CORNERSTONE 
RES., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2012 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (2013) (ex-
ploring the implications and causes of several class action settlements); see also 
Renzo Comolli et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2012 Mid-
Year Review: Settlements Bigger, But Fewer, NERA, July 24, 2012 (describing the rise 
of recent claims in the past several years).  
135  Warren, supra note 132, at 1080–83 (describing the structure of U.S. class 
actions and the failure of the regulatory regime). 
136  Id. at 1081–82 (asserting the weaknesses of the securities class action). 
137  WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST 218 (2007) (describing hindsight 
bias). 
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explained without being informed about the outcome (i.e. the acci-
dent).138  This is simply because, after the incident, it is often hard 
to imagine that it may not have been foreseeable.139  Hindsight bias 
is said to “blur the distinction between fraud and mistake.”140  
Looking at the securities-fraud cases, scholars found that judges do 
identify the influence of hindsight on the jury.141  However, a rem-
edy to correct this serious problem is yet to be found, and juries 
may be punishing fraud and mistake equally.142 
In stark contrast to these concerns, those who have greater dis-
cretion afforded to managers by principles-based standards would 
significantly weaken a plaintiff’s chances to prove a corporate mis-
statement and scienter and thereby significantly weaken the effec-
tiveness of securities law in general.143  From a theoretical perspec-
tive, it seems more plausible that a less clearly defined standard 
will lead to a higher, possibly excessive level of deterrence.  The 
law and economics literature on liability suggests that less predict-
ability in the imposition of liability will increase incentives for risk-
averse (or even risk-neutral) individuals to avoid possibly harmful 
actions.144  The contrary argument seems to assume that compli-
                                                     
138  Id. at 218–23 (describing the phenomena of outcome and hindsight bias 
and how to cope with them); see, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex 
Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) 
(showing how participants in hindsight give higher estimates for the probability 
of a disaster occurring). 
139  FARNSWORTH, supra note 137, at 220 (describing how once an outcome is 
experienced, it is hard for an individual to believe it was foreseeable at the time); 
see Donald Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, 
Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997) (discussing preva-
lent biases in managerial behavior and how it affects corporate attorneys).  
140  Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Donald Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 (2003) (arguing the hindsight blurs the distinction be-
tween one’s misconduct and her mistake). 
141  Id. at 775 (finding that one-third of published opinions in securities class 
action cases mention concerns with hindsight).  
142  Id. at 774; see also Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judg-
ing in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (describing psychological views that 
people often overstate their view of what occurred during an event in the past). 
143  See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 87, at 608–14 (describing the role of GAAP in 
securities violations); Newman, supra note 7, at 860–61 (using a fictitious dialogue 
to show the necessity of more rigid standards to avoid a gray area that may create 
conflict between auditors and clients). 
144  John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (asserting that uncertainty 
in the legal standard can cause those who behave according to the highest possi-
ble standards to be held liable due to a gray area which was interpreted in the 
wrong way); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
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ance with the applicable accounting and auditing standards pro-
vides a safe harbor from liability; less clearly defined accounting 
standards would, thus, increase the discretion of the defendant and 
not that of the court.  U.S. courts have consistently refused to grant 
such a safe harbor to auditors, and have often largely disregarded 
GAAP.  The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that GAAP 
“are far from . . . a canonical set of rules that will ensure identical 
accounting treatment of identical transactions.  GAAP, rather, tol-
erate a range of ‘reasonable’ treatments, leaving the choice among 
alternatives to management.”145  In the view of the courts, compli-
ance with U.S. GAAP does not necessarily provide users of finan-
cial statements with transparent or fairly presented information, 
and thus protection from litigation.  Generally, the courts did not 
permit a defense of formal compliance with accounting standards.146  
In the 1969 case of U.S. v. Simon, the defendant auditors had in-
duced the audit client to relegate the explanation of one account 
receivable (which was especially a vehicle for the CEO to borrow 
money from the company without shareholders knowing about it) 
to one footnote.  During the trial, eight leaders of the accounting 
profession testified on their behalf that, with the exception of mi-
nor technicalities, the accounting treatment was consistent with the 
applicable standards; seven of these prominent accountants testi-
fied that a more revealing disclosure actually would have been im-
proper under GAAP.147  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit upheld the trial judge’s decision that compliance 
with GAAP did not provide a defense, but that the critical test was 
                                                     
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (describing how uncertainty in legal 
rules will increase the likelihood that an individual will not comply and also will 
not be punished); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 97 (1987) 
(describing a mathematical formula for negligence); Steven Shavell, Liability for 
Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECON. 139, 159–60 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Ste-
ven Shavell eds., 2007) (suggesting that less certain legal standards will result in a 
higher level of deterrence). 
145  Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 439 U.S. 522, 544 
(1979) (holding constitutional that the Internal Revenue Service could regulate 
how inventory was recorded); see also Ezra Charitable Trust v. Tyco Intern, Ltd., 
466 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (“GAAP can tolerate a range of reasonable approach-
es.”). 
146  In its Regulation S-X, the SEC requires auditing financial statements by an 
independent accountant in accordance with generally accepted auditing stand-
ards.  17 C.F.R § 210.1–02(d) (2015). 
147  Fred Kuhar, The Criminal Liability of Public Accountants: A Study of United 
States v. Simon, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 564, 593–94 (1971) (listing the eight witness-
es in the case and their accolades). 
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whether the financial statements as a whole fairly presented the fi-
nancial situation of the firm.  If they did not (as was apparently the 
case), the question on trial would have to be whether the account-
ants had been acting in good faith.148  In light of the courts’ lack of 
deference to GAAP, it appears unlikely that more principles-based 
accounting standards would have more than a marginal effect on 
the incidence of litigation.  
The experience of foreign issuers with U.S. GAAP until 2007 
supports this argument, given that many of them faced the consol-
idation requirement and had to bear significant compliance 
costs.149  These costs did not serve to eliminate the risk of litigation 
in the United States150 but, rather, demonstrated the acceptance of 
the fear of litigation as an inevitable part of “the deal” of being 
listed in the United States, which also, signaled their good quality.  
There is no evidence that foreign issuers listed in the United States 
would consider increased litigation risk to be a disadvantage.  In 
fact, they already reported under IFRS, and by virtue of a U.S. list-
ing, that they and their auditors are already exposed to exactly the 
same litigation risk of which United States issuers and their audi-
tors are supposedly afraid.  Moreover, it is often suggested that 
foreign issuers often seek a listing in the United States because of 
strong enforcement of securities law, which sends a positive signal 
to potential investors.151  In other words, litigation risk is high in 
the United States, and a switch to IFRS will most likely neither 
lower nor substantially increase such a risk. 
Some claim that IFRS simply have not yet evolved to a similar 
                                                     
148  United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969) (involving con-
spiracy to commit and mislead with fraudulent corporate financial statements). 
149  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. 
CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (Mar. 
2007) (listing requirements for foreign issuers to conduct securities activities in the 
United States).  
150  See, e.g., Woo, supra note 23, at 130–34 (discussing survey data showing 
that CEOs preferred litigation in the United Kingdom to the United States). 
151  See, e.g., Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World of International 
Capital: Another Look at the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 411, 413–15 (2013) (examining the effect of U.S. regulation on foreign 
private investors; Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible 
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 691–96 (2002) 
(discussing how disclosure standards impact domestic and foreign corporations 
decisions to “opt-in” to the U.S. system); René M. Stulz, Securities Laws, Disclosure, 
and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 349, 
366 (2009) (showing some firms choose stronger securities laws than those of the 
country in which they are located if those rules are strictly enforced). 
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level as U.S. GAAP and will eventually develop into a rules-based 
set of standards.152  In this view, U.S. GAAP were originally princi-
ples-based but gradually took their contemporary rules-based 
shape because of litigation risk.  The United States is therefore 
bound to end up with rules-based accounting standards one way 
or another.  Bratton and Cunningham suggest that IFRS in the 
United States will, over time, become as rules-based as U.S. GAAP 
by gradually adopting an increasing number of rules.153  In their 
view, Americans will likely grow disenchanted with IASB.  IASB, 
as a globally oriented standard-setter, will not be responsive to 
“particular demands emanating from a single national interest 
group or regulator,” which is why “new domestic politics of ac-
counting standard setting will emerge.”154  Others argue that U.S. 
GAAP are “too complex and proscriptive, and result in a system in 
which entities tend to follow form over substance while violating 
the underlying spirit of transparency.”155  They expect that “con-
vergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS will take the best practices of 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards . . . .  Under 
such a setting, transparency would be greatly enhanced.”156   
In spite of all of the possible benefits, FASB has still not suc-
ceeded in reducing the complexity of its standards more than ten 
years after Enron.157  The convergence initiatives, namely, revenue 
                                                     
152  See SEC Work Plan, supra note 4 (referring to comment letters from Air 
Products and Chemicals, Inc. (“Air Products”), Community Health Systems, Inc. 
(“Community Health”), JP Morgan Chase (“JP Morgan”), The London Centre for 
International Corporate Governance Law (“London Ctr Int’l Corp Gov Law”), and 
Edward Randle). 
153  Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1008 (predicting that U.S. IFRS 
will begin a long process of converting to U.S. GAAP).  
154  Id. at 1006–08 (weighing domestic market interest against global market 
share). 
155  RUTH ANN MCEWEN, TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CONCISE 
COMPARISON OF IFRS & U.S. GAAP 3 (2009).  
156  Id.  
157  See, e.g., Russell G. Golden, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Board, 
Remarks at the AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, at 
4–7 (Dec. 10, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=FASB%2F
Document_C%2FDocumentPage&cid=1176163675405) (explaining future steps of 
FASB and how they are working towards their mission to “promote transparen-
cy,” “reduce complexity,” and ensure continued progress toward the convergence 
of international accounting standards); see also Updates from FASB and the SEC: 
Standards Setting, Outreach and the Convergence Projects, CPA J. (July 2013), at 14–19 
(describing the legacy and progress of the FASB). 
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recognition, leases, insurance contracts, and financial instruments 
have been seen as massive barriers in this endeavor.  For instance, 
for lessor accounting, many argued, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it.”158  Revenue recognition, on the other hand, has seen the most 
agreement between IASB and FASB leaders.  The two boards are 
expected to publish an almost identical standard on revenue 
recognition.159 
 
3. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING 
 
While in the United States IFRS are sometimes seen as an ex-
pansionist project of a European accounting or corporate govern-
ance model, the perception is different in Europe, where the intro-
duction of IAS/IFRS continue to be seen as an expansion of Anglo-
Saxon capital market tradition that brought fundamental changes 
to the various continental accounting styles.  Section 3.1 describes 
the background history of continental European accounting, specif-
ically German and French, before the introduction of IFRS.  Section 
3.2 discusses the introduction of IFRS in Continental Europe and 
the resistance it faced, again focusing on Germany and France.  
Section 3.4 describes the modus vivendi that accounting seems to 
have reached for the time being. 
 
3.1. European Accounting Before IAS/IFRS  
 
3.1.1. The Institutional Framework 
 
The legal framework of accounting within the European (Eco-
nomic) Community (“EEC”) that later morphed into the EU must 
be understood against the backdrop of harmonization in the com-
pany law area in general.  With the creation of the common market 
and the free movement of capital during the 1960s, policymakers 
                                                     
158  Christopher Westfall, Convergence 2014: The Tip of the Iceberg, FIN. EXEC. 
(Dec 1, 2013) (finding that many people in the United States believe that lessor ac-
counting is not broken).  
159  Hoogervorst, supra note 22, at 3 (stating the published “final standard will 
be almost identical between IFRS and U.S. GAAP”). 
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thought it imperative to harmonize important areas of corporate 
law in order to facilitate the free movement of capital and the es-
tablishment of businesses across borders, foster legal certainty, and 
to avoid a race to laxity.160  Accounting came on the EEC’s harmo-
nization agenda early, and a requirement for all limited-liability 
entities to disclose a set of financial statements was introduced as 
an amendment to First Company Law Directive in 1972.161  The en-
actment of substantive accounting standards, which had already 
been on the European Community’s agenda, followed with the 
1978 enactment of the so-called Fourth Directive or Accounting Di-
rective.162  The United Kingdom had joined the Community in 
1973, alongside Ireland and Denmark, which made an agreement 
on a number of issues considerably more difficult and which ulti-
mately resulted in a greater need to compromise.163  In 1983, the 
European Community passed the Directive on Consolidated Ac-
counts (known as the Seventh Directive),164 which supplemented 
                                                     
160  E.g., Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role 
for the EC?, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW IN ACCELERATED PROGRESS 59, 61 (Steef M. 
Bartman ed., 2006) (describing the prevention of a race to the bottom as the main 
original goal in light of the incipient debate about a possible “race to the bottom” 
in the U.S.);  Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 257, 269 (2000) (explaining the EC Commission’s rationale for company law 
harmonization in the 1960s); see also Claus Luttermann, Accounting as the Documen-
tary Proof of Good Corporate Governance, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 275, 281 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2012) (noting the connection between the EC Treaty’s freedoms of establish-
ment and freedom of movement of capital on the one hand and accounting har-
monization on the other); Friedrich Kübler, A Shifting Paradigm in European Com-
pany Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 220–21 (2005) (providing references from the 
1970s that purported that the “race to laxity” in the United States was a major fac-
tor influencing harmonization). 
161  First Council Directive 68/151/EEC, art. 2(1)(f), 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8, art. 
2(1)(f) (introduced by Amendment O.J. L 73/89, March 27, 1972).  The directive 
has recently been re-codified as Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, 2009 O.J. (L 258) 11. 
162  Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11, at intro. 
[Fourth Directive] (discussing the reasons for enacting the accounting standards).  
Regarding the relationship between the First and Fourth Directive, see VANESSA 
EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 118 (1999) (“The Fourth Directive has its roots in the 
discussions leading up to the First Directive. . . . ”). 
163  See e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 162, at 120–21 (discussing U.K. influence in 
the 1970’s); Lisa Evans & Christopher Nobes, Some Mysteries Relating to the Pru-
dence Principle in the Fourth Directive and in German and British Law, 5 EUR. ACCT. 
REV. 361, 363–65 (1996) (discussing changes to the original, German-inspired draft 
as a result of U.K. influence). 
164  Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 193) [hereinafter 
Seventh Directive]. 
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the Accounting Directive’s regime for corporate groups (since the 
Fourth Directive applied to the accounts of the individual business 
entity).  Only in 2013 were the two directives, which had been 
amended numerous times, recodified in a single new accounting 
directive.165   
At first glance, the two directives in combination seemed to set 
forth a comprehensive regime of accounting standards.  The 
Fourth Directive provided that limited liability entities,166 irrespec-
tive of whether they were publicly traded or not, had to set up and 
disclose financial statements (consisting of a balance sheet, a profit 
and loss account, and the notes).167  More importantly, and maybe 
more unusually from a U.S. perspective, the Fourth Directive in-
cluded sections on the presentation of financial statements (i.e. on 
the format of the balance sheet and the income statement)168 and a 
plethora of rules for the recognition of assets and liabilities, ex-
penses, and revenue, as well as rules on valuation.169  These rules 
—at least in their original form— are far less case-based than IFRS 
or U.S. GAAP.  For example, Articles 35–38 provide valuation rules 
for fixed assets in general (i.e. at what value they are to be recog-
nized when they have to written down), and Articles 39–42 do the 
same for current assets.170  IFRS are more strongly case-based and 
                                                     
165  Directive 2013/34/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial State-
ments and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Di-
rective 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing 
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19 (according 
to its Article 53, the Member States will have to implement the new directive by 
July 20, 2015). 
166  This includes stock corporations (e.g. the public company in the U.K., the 
société anonyme in France, and the Aktiengesellschaft in Germany) and limited liabil-
ity companies (i.e. the private company in the U.K., the société à responsabilité limi-
tée in France, and the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Germany).  In addi-
tion, it applies to partnerships where all unlimited partners are companies of the 
types just mentioned. Fourth Directive, supra note 162, art. 1(1).  
167  Id. at introduction (noting that the publication of annual accounts, annual 
reports, and valuation methods for certain companies of limited liability is of 
“special importance for the protection of members and third parties.”). 
168  Id. arts. 9, 10, 22, 23, 26 (outlining one of two balance sheet layout alterna-
tives, which consists of certain defined assets and liabilities, that can be used by 
member states in presenting profits and losses).  
169  See generally id. arts. 31–42.  
170  Id.  Articles 42a–42f on the use of fair value for financial assets were only 
introduced in 2001, when the influence of “Anglo-Saxon” accounting concepts 
oriented toward the capital market was about to reach its peak, and even then re-
mained largely optional.  Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and 
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have lengthy standards that apply in specific business contexts, 
such as research and development, construction contracts, proper-
ty, plant and equipment, or leases.171  
The greatest influence on the directives came from the French 
and German accounting law in place at that time,172 although the 
directives added an additional layer of complexity that required all 
Member States to recodify their accounting laws.173  British ac-
counting tradition also had a considerable influence, leading, for 
example, to the inclusion of the “true and fair view” standard,174 
originally derived from the Companies Act of 1948.175  Correspond-
                                                     
of the Council of 27 September 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 28 (amending the Fourth 
Directive). 
171  See IAS 9 (Research and Development), IAS 11 (Construction Contracts), 
IAS 16 (Property, Plant and Equipment), IAS 17 (Leases). 
172  EDWARDS, supra note 162, at 118–21 (discussing the Elemendorff report of 
1966, the first proposal of 1969, and the subsequent effect of the United Kingdom 
and other new Member States); Brigitte Eierle, Differential Reporting in Germany—A 
Historical Analysis, 15 ACCT., BUS. & BUS. HIST. 279, 290 (2005) (noting strong Ger-
man influence on the Fourth Directive). 
173  E.g., Eierle, supra note 172, at 289–91 (discussing implementation of the 
directive in Germany); see Gesetz zur Durchführung der Vierten, Siebenten und 
Achten Richtlinie des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung 
des Gesellschaftsrechts [Bilanzrichtlinien-Gesetz] [BiRiLiG] [Law to Enact the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Guidelines of the Council for the European Commu-
nity for the Coordination of Corporate Law], Dec. 19, 1985, BGBl. I at 2355 (Ger.) 
(enacting changes to German commercial law mandated by the European Com-
munities to coordinate corporate law among member states). 
174  Fourth Directive, supra note 162, art. 2(3–6).  
175  See Lawrence E. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay 
on the True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 893, 904 (2003) (“[I]n Brit-
ain, the goal is producing financial statements giving a ‘true and fair view’ of 
business condition and results.  These concepts . . . were utterly alien to non-
Dutch Europe until the "true and fair" view was sanctioned by the Fourth Di-
rective in 1978, driven by the United Kingdom's recent admission to the European 
Union.”); see also Dieter Ordelheide, True and Fair View: A European and a German 
Perspective, 2 EUR. ACCT. REV. 81, 82 (1993) (describing how it was “Great Britain, 
which argued for bringing the true and fair view principle into Art. 2 of the 
Fourth Directive . . . .”); Jonathan Rickford, Legal Approaches to Restricting Distribu-
tions to Shareholders: Balance Sheet Tests and Solvency Tests, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
135, 147 (2006) (“At a relatively late stage in the negotiation of the [Fourth] Di-
rective, the Anglo-Irish concept of the overriding principle of the ‘true and fair 
view’ . . . was added.”).  This presumably overarching goal of accounting subse-
quently caused considerable problems; several Member States, including Germa-
ny, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Finland refused to implement Art. 2(5), ac-
cording to which the reporting firm must, “in exceptional cases” depart from 
specific accounting rules where they would be incompatible with a “true and fair 
view” (the so-called “overriding principle”).  David Alexander & Eva Eber-
hartinger, The True and Fair View in the European Union, 18 EUR. ACCT. REV. 571, 572 
(2009); David Alexander & Eva Jermakowicz, A True and Fair View of the Princi-
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ingly, the Seventh Directive included requirements regarding how 
the companies heading corporate groups needed to represent con-
solidated financial statements and specific rules on the consolida-
tion process.176 
The Fourth and Seventh Directives were often criticized for 
having dozens of options, including some leaving the choice to the 
respective Member State in the national implementation of the di-
rective, and some leaving the choice to the reporting firm.177  The 
large number of options, which were often the result of compro-
mises between different accounting traditions, have often been 
given as a reason why the EU never achieved true accounting har-
monization.  Member States were able to maintain their traditional 
accounting cultures, and financial statements never became truly 
comparable.178 
The directives, however, had to be implemented into the Mem-
ber States’ legal systems as formally enacted laws.179  The content 
                                                     
ples/Rules Debate, 42 ABACUS 132, 139 (2006) (reporting that Germany, Austria and 
Sweden refused to implement the overriding principle); Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the True and Fair View, 28 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 893, 910–11 (2003) (explaining how European countries 
adopted a range of responses to the “true and fair” mandate, from insisting on 
strict compliance with rules to permitting the override in defined contexts).  
Moreover, in continental Europe, particularly Germany, traditional goals of ac-
counting such as prudence were considered to predominate the true and fair 
view.  E.g., Evans & Nobes, supra note 163 (discussing discrepancies between dif-
ferent linguistic versions of the directive as a possible reason).  The interpretation 
of the overriding principle in French law has remained rather unclear.  Partie lé-
gislative Code de Commerce, art. L 123–14 al. 3 2006 (France); see CHRISTIAN DE 
LAUZAINGHEIN, JEAN-LOUIS NAVARRO & DOMINIQUE NECHELIS, DROIT COMPTABLE 
¶ 361 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that “after twenty years the notion is still unclear”). 
176  Seventh Directive, supra note 164, arts. 16–35.  
177  E.g., RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND 
THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 235 (1988) (noting the Fourth Directive “leaves no less 
than forty-one options open to the Member States in addition to thirty-five op-
tions left to the business enterprises themselves”); Luca Enriques, EC Company Law 
Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 26–27 
(2006) (stating that the Fourth and Seventh directives, respectively, offer forty-five 
and fifty-seven opt-in or opt-out provisions).  
178  E.g., Werner F. Ebke, Accounting, Auditing and Global Capital Markets, in 
THEODOR BAUMS ET AL., CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW: 
LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM 113, 119–20 (2000) (discussing the conse-
quences of different laws and languages in maintaining different accounting cul-
tures).  The 2013 recodification of the EU Accounting Directives did not signifi-
cantly reduce the number of options. See, e.g., Georg Lanfermann, EU-
Rechnungslegungsrichtlinie: Zum Handlungsbedarf des deutschen Gesetzgebers, DIE 
WIRTSCHAFTSPRÜFUNG 849, 849–50 (2013). 
179  E.g., EDWARDS, supra note 162, at 119 (“Like France, . . . Germany regarded 
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of financial statements were, thus, more strongly characterized by 
formal laws in European countries than they ever were in the Unit-
ed States, where—like in the United Kingdom—the tradition has 
been private standard setting.180  For example, while in Germany 
recommendations and standards set by the German Institute of 
Chartered Accountants were and are influential, it had no official 
mandate, and its pronouncements had no binding legal force.  
Germany, thus, did not have a formally recognized standard-
setting body until 1999, and even the one created then has a very 
limited scope of tasks relating mainly to the use of IFRS in consoli-
dated accounts in the specific German context.181  
The situation was somewhat different in France.  While the 
French commercial code included provisions on accounting,182 a 
committee was set up under the aegis of the ministry of the econ-
omy (and composed of representatives of a large number of inter-
est groups) and had the mandate to amend the General Accounting 
Plan (Plan comptable général or PCG), which effectively provided 
accounting standards.183  These standards were, of course, subor-
                                                     
accounting regulation as a matter for the statute book rather than for guidelines 
issued by the accountancy profession, as was the tradition in the United King-
dom”). 
180  See C. W. Nobes, The Evolution of the Harmonising Provisions of the 1980 and 
1981 Companies Acts, 14 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 43, 52 (1983) (concluding that the Fourth 
Directive will lead to revolutionary changes in British accounting, “because their 
inspiration comes from outside the Anglo-Saxon world; the most obvious source 
being the German Aktiengesetz of 1965”). 
181  See GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH 
(KonTraG) [Law Governing Supervision and Trasparency in Business], Mar. 3, 
1998, BGBl I at 786, § 5, no. 24, (adding § 342 to the German Commercial Code, 
which permits the Ministry of Justice to recognize a private standard setter).  For 
information concerning the activities of the Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards 
Committee (the standard setting body), see Christian Leuz & Jens Wüstemann, The 
Role of Accounting in the German Financial System, in THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
450, 458–59 (Jan Pieter Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., 2004); Matthias 
Schmidt, On the Legitimacy of Accounting Standard Setting by Privately Organised In-
stitutions in Germany and Europe, 54 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 171, 173 (2002) (dis-
cussing German “developments in national and supranational accounting regula-
tion”). 
182  Partie legislative Code de Commerce, art. L 123–12 to L 123–28, 2006 
(France) (describing rules for financial accounting methods and balance sheets). 
183  See CHRISTOPHER NOBES & ROBERT PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING 331 (12th ed. 2012) (providing a timeline of the PCG inception and 
reform in France); Christian Hoarau, The Reform of the French Standard-Setting Sys-
tem: Its Peculiarities, Limits and Political Context, 6 ACCT. IN EUR. 127, 129–32 (2009) 
(providing “a social and historical perspective on accounting standard-setting in 
France).  Between 1998 and 2009, the National Accounting Council (Conseil natio-
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dinate to the applicable law and had to be promulgated by the 
ministry of the economy until 2009.184  Only after a 2007 reform, 
these standards were replaced with an independent regulatory 
agency, which, however, is still subject to considerable government 
influence.185  
Financial statements had to be set up following the rules of the 
accounting law included in the respective Commercial Code.186   
The implementation of the directive led to a considerable growth 
of the body of accounting law.187  Like the directives, these account-
ing rules always had a higher level of generality than U.S. GAAP 
or IAS/IFRS.  German accounting law refers to “principles of 
proper bookkeeping,”188 which, if taken literally, one might under-
                                                     
nal de la comptabilité or CNC) and the Accounting Regulation Committee (Comité de 
Réglementation Comptable or CRC) shared the standard-setting role, but their pro-
nouncements had to be approved by the ministry of the economy.  CHRISTIAN DE 
LAUZAINGHEIN, JEAN-LOUIS NAVARRO & DOMINIQUE NECHELIS, DROIT COMPTABLE ¶ 
24 (3rd ed. 2004). 
184  See Christian Hoarau, International Accounting Harmonization: American 
Hegemony or Mutual Recognition with Benchmarks?, 4 EUR. ACCT. REV. 217, 224 (1995) 
(discussing state and private-sector influence on accounting standard-setting in 
France). 
185  A 2007 law creating the Accounting Standards Authority (Autorité des 
Normes Comptables or ANC) came into force in 2009.  Rouba Chantiri-
Chaudemanche & Christine Pochet, La normalisation comptable: l’expert, le politique 
et la mondialisation, Comptabilité, Société, Politique. Mélanges en l’honneur du 
Professeur Bernard Colasse 143, 145 (Marc Nikitin & Chrystelle Richard eds., 
2012); see Bernard Colasse & Christine Pochet, De la Genèse du Nouveau Conseil Na-
tional de la Comptabilité (2007): un case d’Isomorphisme Institutionnel? 15 
COMPTABILITE CONTROLE AUDIT 7 (2009), translated in Bernard Colasse & Christine 
Pochet, The Genesis of the 2007 Conseil National de la Comptabilité: A Case of Institu-
tional Isomorphism?, 6 ACCT. EUR. 25, 25 (2009) (arguing that the AMC rather re-
sembles the SEC than FASB); Hoarau, supra note 183, at 136–39 (discussing the 
“reform of the CNC and the Creation of the ANC”). 
186  HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE] Oct. 4, 1897, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] as amended, §§ 238–342e (Ger.) (codifying that finan-
cial statements must be set up following the rules of the accounting law included 
in the Commercial Code); Loi no. 83-353 du 30 avril 1983 (introducing art. L.123–
12 to L.123–28 into the French Commercial Code). 
187  For France, see Hoarau, supra note 184, at 224 (stating that there were rela-
tively few legal rules in France before the Accounting Act of 1983, which imple-
mented the directives). 
188  According to HGB § 238(1), “every merchant is obligated to keep books 
and to show his commercial transactions and to show his net asset position in 
these according to the principles of proper bookkeeping” (own translation, emphasis 
added).  Specifically for corporations and other limited liability entities, Sec-
tion 264(2) provides that “the financial statements must provide, in compliance with 
the principles of proper bookkeeping, a view of the company’s assets, liabilities, finan-
cial position and profit and losses” corresponding to the actual circumstances.  Id. 
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stand as a reference to professional opinion and good accounting 
practice to fill gaps.  Since the 1950s, these principles have been 
understood in practice as the set of rules deductively developed 
from the principles underlying accounting law and codified in it.189  
As Leuz and Wüstemann put it, “accounting principles are consid-
ered to be legal rules (‘Rechtsnormen’) and not professional stand-
ards (‘Fachnormen’).”190  Consequently, accounting principles have 
been shaped by similar forces as other laws where the guidance 
provided by the general legal rules was insufficient.  Besides rec-
ommendations of the German Institute of Chartered Accountants 
and the still relatively new “officially recognized” accounting 
standards committee191 (whose standards have only been provided 
with a presumption of compatibility with the principle of proper 
bookkeeping that was widely considered problematic when it was 
introduced in 1999),192 substantive requirements for accounting are, 
in practice, often determined by judicial decisions.  This typically 
applies to tax law issues, given the high degree of book-tax con-
formity.193  Like in other fields of law, academic and professional 
writing had a certain influence on the practice of legal interpreta-
tion.194 
                                                     
§ 264(2) (own translation, emphasis added); see Ordelheide, supra note 175, at 85 
(discussing the relationship between German “principles of proper bookkeeping” 
and the “true and fair view” principle); Alexander & Eberhartinger, supra note 
175, at 579 (addressing the question whether the “true and fair view” trumps the 
principles of proper bookkeeping).  
189  Lisa Evans, Language, Translation and the Problem of International Account-
ing Communication, 17 ACCT. AUD. & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 210, 227–28 (2003) (discuss-
ing the historical development of the “deductive methods” since the 1950s);  Leuz 
& Wüstemann, supra note 181, at 456–57; David Alexander, Legal Certainty, Euro-
pean-ness and Realpolitik, 3 ACCT. IN EUR. 65, 71–72  (2006) (pointing out that the GoB 
“should be expected to change if the purposes of accounting change”).   
190  Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 181, at 457. 
191  Ebke, supra note 181 (the accounting standards committee remains lim-
ited to standards for accounting consolidation). 
192  HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], Oct. 4, 1897, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] as amended, § 342(2) (Ger.) (codifying presumption of 
compatibility); see Schmidt, supra note 181, at 180 (discussing problems of the pre-
sumption raised under German constitutional law). 
193  See infra notes 221–232 and accompanying text (discussing book-tax con-
formity and its impact on law and procedure). 
194  Generally, German law is analyzed by academics and leading practition-
ers in academic writing.  Specifically through so-called “commentaries,” or trea-
tises, these writings expose a field of law organized by section.  E.g., Carl Bau-
denbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 333, 354–55 
(1999) (discussing the impact of legal scholars and judges on civil law in European 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:04 PM 
138 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the U.S., accounting standards were 
basically enacted as laws.  In both France and Germany, the term 
“accounting law” (droit comptable or Bilanzrecht) is often used in 
reference to the respective legal field.  As explained above, that 
should not be understood to imply that there was no sub-legal 
standard setting.  Nevertheless, accounting was not seen merely as 
a technical matter best left to the accounting profession, but as an 
issue of legislation.195  Given the legal consequences of accounting 
standards, a legislature abdicating its rulemaking power, as has 
been the case in the U.S. since the early days of securities law in the 
1930s, would have been seen as problematic from a constitutional 
perspective.196 
 
3.1.2. Continental European Objectives of Accounting 
 
In the United States, there is no doubt about the objective of fi-
nancial reporting:  financial statements are intended to provide 
timely, useful, and material information to investors in the capital 
markets.  The disclosure of financial information is required by the 
Securities Act of 1933 (in the context of the registration state-
ment),197 and perhaps more importantly, as part of the periodical 
                                                     
countries, including Germany).  Regarding the significance of academic writing in 
civil law systems, see generally Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
2201, 2205 (1991); MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 14–
17 (2001).  These tend to be more detailed than American legal treatises, with the 
better ones providing guidance even on issues that have not yet arisen in court by 
establishing a scholarly interpretation of the law.  Baudenbacher, supra note 194, 
at 345–55 (evaluating a legal scholar’s proposed method for civil code interpreta-
tion and its impact on German law).  For an accounting perspective, see Stuart 
McLeay, Dieter Ordelheide & Steven Young, Constituent Lobbying and Its Impact on 
the Development of Financial Reporting Regulations: Evidence from Germany, 25 ACCT. 
ORG. & SOC. 79, 84 (2000) (discussing the formulation of German accounting law 
and standards); Rolf Uwe Fülbier & Malte Klein, Financial Accounting and Report-
ing in Germany: A Case Study on German Accounting Tradition and Experiences with 
the IFRS Adoption 22–24 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200805 (dis-
cussing the role of traditional German accounting scholarship).   
195  E.g., RICHARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 428 (stressing the influence of legisla-
tion in France compared to the U.S.).  
196  Functionally, U.S. GAAP could also be seen as law, since violation of 
GAAP may lead to civil and criminal penalties.  See Cunningham, supra note 118, 
at 292, 323–24 (“Federal securities laws vest the SEC with authori-
ty to define generally accepted accounting principles.”). 
197  Schedule A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.610a (2010) (detailing the method and proce-
dure for disclosure of financial information); 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2013) (giving authori-
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reporting requirements for publicly traded firms under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.198  The administrative competence to 
pass regulations on accounting – including recognition of balance 
sheet items and valuation – therefore lies with the SEC, which has 
passed Regulation S-X199 and other accounting series releases.  
However, the SEC has overwhelmingly deferred to private stand-
ard-setting and has in fact been explicitly permitted to recognize a 
standard-setting body that conforms to certain legal requirements 
since Sarbanes-Oxley.200  In any event, within the framework of 
U.S. Securities Law, financial reporting has always had only one 
objective, namely, the provision of information to capital markets. 
This stands in contrast to the EU law encapsulated in the origi-
nal accounting directives, under which not only publicly traded 
firms, but all limited liability entities have to follow the national 
implementation of the Fourth Directive’s accounting rules and 
must disclose the information to the public by filing it to the com-
mercial register.201  The directives thus implemented a wide-
ranging scheme of mandatory disclosure, which was seen as the 
“price” for limited liability, an idea originating in the U.K.202 that 
                                                     
ty to the SEC to regulate the information or document specified in Schedule A). 
198  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (detailing contents and 
requirements of the reports); 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)–(b) (2012) (discussing the reporting 
and record keeping requirements).  
199  Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4–01 (detailing the general rules for ac-
counting forms as required by the SEC).   
200  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, § 108 (in-
serting § 19(b) into the Securities Act and permitting the SEC to recognize a 
standard setting body that complies with certain criteria). 
201  See First Directive, supra note 161, art. 1, 2(f) (listing the types of compa-
nies that the directive applies to by Member State); Fourth Directive, supra note 
162, art. 1 (listing corporate types to which the Directive applies); id. art. 47 (re-
quiring disclosure of at least a limited set of financial statements for all firms).  To 
be precise, all stock corporations and private limited companies are required to 
make these disclosures, as well as partnerships whose only personally liable 
members are such limited liability entities. 
202  See Fourth Directive, supra note 162, at intro (suggesting that limited lia-
bility companies’ “activities frequently extend beyond the frontiers of their na-
tional territories and, on the other, they offer no safeguards to third parties be-
yond the amounts of their net assets”); EDWARDS, supra note 162, at 123 n.41 (“The 
latter rationale has a familiar ring for lawyers in the UK, where it has long been 
the accepted view that extensive disclosure is the price of limited liability.”);  Jon-
athan Rickford, Fundamentals, Developments and Trends in British Company Law–
Some Wider Reflections, 1 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 391, 408 (2004) (describing publici-
ty as the main protection for creditors and tracing the U.K. legislative develop-
ment); see also Wolfgang Schön, Corporate Disclosure in a Competitive Environment—
The Quest for a European Framework on Mandatory Disclosure, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 259, 
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met considerable resistance on the continent.203  It also connected 
accounting to the protection of creditors, who are, for private firms, 
the primary presumed beneficiaries of accounting and mandatory 
disclosure.204  Even a recent reform intended to eliminate bureau-
cratic burdens for very small businesses (“micro-entities”) did not 
completely eliminate the disclosure requirement.205 
                                                     
264 (2006) (“Evidently, the First Directive (and this approach has been confirmed 
in the Fourth Directive . . . ) dwells upon the hypothesis that ‘disclosure’ has to be 
regarded as a collateral to ‘limited liability’.”). 
203  See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 162, at 22–23 (discussing German and 
French resistance to disclosure of accounting information for small firms during 
the drafting process for the directives).  The resistance was particularly fierce in 
the German Mittelstand.  Until at least the early 2000s, reportedly about 30% of 
French SARLs and around 90% of German GmbHs failed to disclose their ac-
counts.  Enriques, supra note 177, at 14 (discussing Germany’s failure to comply 
with the Fourth Council Directive); Armour et al., supra note 7, at 125 n.46 (“Stud-
ies estimate that 30% of French SARLs and non-listed SAs, and 80–95% of Germa-
ny’s GmbHs, do not disclose their financial statements.”).  The European Court of 
Justice repeatedly found that sanctions were not strong enough.  Case C-97/96, 
Daihatsu Deutschland v. Verband deutscher Daihatsu-Händler, 1997 E.C.R. I-
6843; Case C–191/95, Commission of the European Communities v. Germany, 
1998 E.C.R. I-5449.  The court also had to deal with the question of whether man-
datory disclosure was a violation of fundamental rights.  Case C-435/02, Axel 
Springer AG v. Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein, 2004 E.C.R. I-8663; see Schön, supra 
note 202, at 260–62 (discussing the Axel-Springer case, in which the court consid-
ered whether “mandatory disclosure in the above-mentioned cases infringe on the 
freedom to exercise a trade or profession and the freedom of the press as they 
have evolved in the jurisprudence of the ECJ.”). 
204  See Armour et al., supra note 7, at 124–25 (discussing differences in U.S. 
and foreign financial accounting requirements for closely-held corporations).  In 
practice, however, it is doubtful whether creditors ever avail themselves to inspect 
financial statements submitted to the company register: sophisticated creditors 
with the capability of using the financial information contained therein (such as 
banks) will typically have the bargaining power to ask the company to disclose 
the information voluntarily.  See Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old 
World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European 
Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577, 610 (2007) (“For important credi-
tors, such as banks, information provided by mandatory disclosure under the re-
gime of the directive is of little significance because creditors are usually able to 
gain access directly through the firm’s managers.”).  Moreover, the directives do 
not say when financial information has to be disclosed, which is why deadlines 
vary widely between Member States.  Id. (citing a deadline of nine months after 
the balance sheet date for the U.K. and Austria, seven months for Italy and Spain, 
and twelve months for Germany). 
205  See Directive 2012/6/EU, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
14 March 2012, Amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the Annual Ac-
counts of Certain Types of Companies as Regards Micro-Entities, 2012 O.J. (L 81) 
3, amended art. 1a(2)(e) (exempting entities not meeting two out of three thresh-
olds [balance sheet total of € 350,000, net turnover of € 700,000, ten employees] 
from the disclosure requirement “provided that the balance sheet information 
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The accounting rules of the Fourth Directive are also linked 
with the regulation of legal capital under the Second Directive.206  
While this directive has also recently been re-codified (its original 
version was passed in 1976),207 it provides, among other things, 
rules on capital contributions and distributions to shareholders of 
stock corporations.  Distributions to shareholders through divi-
dends, repurchase of shares, or otherwise, are only permitted as far 
as equity exceeds stated capital.208  This does not seem too unusual 
from an American perspective, given that many U.S. corporate 
laws still have similar distribution constraints, including in the 
corporate law of Delaware.209  However, these rules have usually 
                                                     
contained therein is duly filed, in accordance with national law, with at least one 
competent authority designated by the Member State concerned”).  In the new, 
consolidated Accounting Directive, “Micro entities” thus still have to file an ab-
breviated balance sheet, but it may be more difficult for outsiders to inspect it.  
Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 165, art. 36(d).  For example, in Germany, “mi-
cro entities,” instead of filing electronically, will be allowed to deposit a simplified 
balance sheet with the commercial register, which can be looked up on location 
and will not be accessible over the internet.  Karlheinz Küting & Raphael 
Eichenlaub, Verabschiedung des MicroBilG (Kleinstkapitalgesellschaften-
Bilanzrechtsänderungsgesetz) – Der vereinfachte Jahresabschluss für 
Kleinstkapitalgesellschaften [Passage of the MicroBilG  (Law Amending Accounting 
Laws for Very Small Corporations) – Simplified Annual Financial Statements for 
Micro-Entities] DEUTSCHES STEUERRECHT 2615, 2618 (2012) (Ger.) (describing 
passage of a new law allowing ultra-small businesses to make abreviated filings).  
206  Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, on Coordination of Safeguards 
Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, Are Required 
by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of 
Article 58 of the Treaty, in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited Liability 
Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, with a View to 
Making such Safeguards Equivalent, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1 [hereinafter Second Di-
rective] (providing legal procedure for the formation and maintenance of limited 
liability companies’ capital). 
207  Directive 2012/30/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2012 on Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the 
Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member States of Companies 
Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited 
Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, with a 
View to Making such Safeguards Equivalent, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 74, at intro. 
(providing that the purpose of this Directive is to amend and recast the Second 
Council Directive 77/91/EEC).  
208  Second Directive, supra note 206, art. 15(1)(a) (limiting distributions); id. 
art. 19(1)(c) (limiting repurchases).  
209  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170 (West 2013) (providing when “directors of 
every corporation . . . may declare and pay dividends”).  The Revised Model 
Business Corporations Act (RMBCA) did away with these rules, but many States 
still have them.  See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 182–
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not been taken very seriously in the U.S., partly because it was not 
clear under which accounting principles the “surplus” available for 
distribution was to be computed.210  Accounting can therefore be 
manipulated to generate profits if a distribution is desired.211  In 
Europe, however, with the Directives’ comprehensive system of 
accounting principles in place, the accounting rules of the Fourth 
Directive were intended to be the basis of profit distribution as 
well, even if the Second Directive only applies to public companies 
(stock corporations) and not to private limited liability compa-
nies.212  Member States typically applied largely the same princi-
ples of legal capital to the latter type of firm.  Therefore, accounting 
standards, or more precisely accounting laws, were directly rele-
vant to the amount firms were allowed to distribute, and possibly 
to the amount shareholders could claim.213  Measuring the proper 
amount of distributions was therefore a central purpose of ac-
counting214 and sometimes even thought to be more important 
than providing accurate information.215 
In combination, mandatory disclosure for all firms and the cap-
ital maintenance objective underlying accounting rules helped to 
infuse and solidify a greater degree of creditor protection spirit in-
                                                     
89 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the policy and procedural reasons for both adjusted 
net worth tests); James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital and the Model Business Corporation 
Act: An Essay for Bayless Manning, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 214 (2011) (“In 
Delaware, which to this day still has a modified old-style liabilities-plus-stated-
capital statute, the concept of revaluation surplus has been adopted by case 
law.”). 
210  The only exception seems to be California, which requires at least public-
ly traded firms to use GAAP.  Infra note 367. 
211  ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 618–23 (1986) (showing how a distrib-
utable surplus can be created by writing assets up to fair value and other account-
ing changes). 
212  Second Directive, supra note 206, art. 1 (specifying the types of companies 
to which the Directive shall apply). 
213  Schmidt, supra note 181, at 176 (discussing minimum dividends). 
214  Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 181, at 459; see also Axel Haller, Interna-
tional Accounting Harmonization: American Hegemony or Mutual Recognition with 
benchmarks? Comments and Additional Notes from a German Perspective, 4 EUR. ACCT. 
REV. 235, 236 (1995) (describing the computation of the distributable income as one 
of the two major purposes of financial accounting in Germany); Eilís Ferran, The 
Place for Creditor Protection on the Agenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the 
European Union, 3 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 178, 200–01 (2006) (stating that U.K. com-
panies have been operating on this basis); id. at 208–09 (describing the interplay 
between the Second and Fourth Directives).  
215  Schmidt, supra note 181, at 176 (describing the secondary importance of 
this goal).  
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to accounting standards and how they were usually interpreted: 
reporting entities were supposed to make sure that they did not 
show more profits than they had actually made.216  Thus, under the 
system of the Fourth Directive, financial accounts had to conform 
strictly with the historical cost principle in order to avoid distribu-
tions to shareholders based on profits that were not realized.217  For 
the same reason, the definition of “assets” that could be capitalized 
remained relatively narrow.218  On the credit side of the balance 
                                                     
216  E.g., Rickford, supra note 175, at 146–55 (discussing the influence of the 
Directives on the balance sheet tests); Wolfgang Schön, Balance Sheet Tests or Sol-
vency Tests–or Both?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 181, 186–87 (2006) (discussing the 
role of accounting in limiting the distribution of unrealized gains).  
217  Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 181, at 459 (giving the example of long-
term construction contracts, from which profits could only be realized after com-
pletion); Ferran, supra note 214, at 209–10 (describing the “prudent” position of 
the Fourth Directive).  Note that article 33 of the Fourth Directive always permit-
ted the Member States to allow some degree of revaluation above historical cost 
under some circumstances, but at the same time required the creation of a non-
distributable revaluation reserve in the balance sheet’s equity section.  See id. at 
209–10 (discussing the requirements of the Second and Fourth Directive); Rick-
ford, supra note 175, at 152 (“In Member States which permitted revaluations, the 
effect of the net assets test would be to reduce the profits available for distribution 
for public companies suffering such losses whether or not they had a surplus in 
the revaluation reserve.”).  While “replacement valuation” was originally only 
permitted for “tangible fixed assets with limited useful economic lives and for 
stocks” (art. 33(1)(a)) and for valuation methods taking inflation into account (art. 
33(1)(a)), two directives passed in the early 2000s expanded these possibilities to 
bring the Fourth Directive more in line with IFRS.  Directive 2001/65/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 Amending Direc-
tives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as Regards the Valuation Rules 
for the Annual and Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies as well 
as of Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 28, at intro. (“[F]air 
value directive” introducing art. 42a-42d on the “fair valuation” of financial in-
struments); Directive 2003/51/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 June 2003 Amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC 
and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of 
Companies, Banks and Other Financial Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, 
2003 O.J. (L 178) 16 (modernization directive introducing, among other things, art. 
33(1)(c) permitting the “fair” valuation of fixed assets).  In the case of “fair” valua-
tion of financial instruments, no revaluation reserve is required.  See Rickford, su-
pra note 175, at 156–57. 
218  Bernhard Pellens & Thorsten Sellhorn, Improving Creditor Protection 
Through IFRS Reporting and Solvency Tests, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE 365, 372 
(Marcus Lutter ed., 2006) (comparing the definition of assets under German law 
and under IFRS); Christian Nowotny, Taxation, Accounting and Transparency: The 
Missing Trinity of Corporate Life, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 101, 104–05  
(Wolfang Schön ed., 2008) (discussing how “financial accounting . . . forms the ba-
sis of the computation of the amount of profits that can be distributed to share-
holders”); see also RICHARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 260–61, 362 (comparing the 
French and IASB understanding of assets, the latter being rooted in “neoclassic 
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sheet, losses had to be recognized as soon as they arose (e.g. 
through provisions for future losses and contingent liabilities).219  
Hidden reserves were an element of the creditor protection objec-
tive that led to an understanding of accounting law permeated by 
an asymmetric understanding of the prudence principle, i.e. a ten-
dency to show losses earlier than comparable profits.220  
The third big difference compared to the United States lies in 
the role of accounting for taxation.  While the Internal Revenue 
Code provides that “taxable income shall be computed under the 
method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly 
computes his income in keeping his books,”221 this provision is un-
derstood to refer only to the choice between cash and accrual ac-
counting.222  The actual degree of book tax-conformity in the Unit-
ed States is actually quite low.223 The courts have long recognized 
                                                     
theory”).  Where the directive originally permitted the capitalization of cost that 
could be problematic under a narrowly understood asset definition, it prohibited 
the distribution of the profits resulting from capitalization.  See Fourth Directive, 
supra note 162, art. 34(1)(b) (discussing formation cost); id. art. 37(1) (discussing 
expenses for research and development). 
219  Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 181, at 459–60 (stating that accounting for 
liabilities and contingent liabilities can be characterized as more prudent than in 
the U.S.). 
220  Art. 31(1)(c) of the Fourth Directive provides that  
[V]aluation must be made on a prudent basis, and in particular: (aa) only 
profits made at the balance sheet date may be included, (bb) account 
must be taken of all liabilities arising in the course of the financial year 
concerned or of a previous one, even if such liabilities become apparent 
only between the date of the balance sheet and the date on which it is 
drawn up, (cc) account must be taken of all depreciation, whether the re-
sult of the financial year is a loss or a profit.   
Fourth Directive, supra note 162, art. 31(1)(c).  The prudence principle is asymmet-
ric because profits must already have been “made” at the balance sheet date, 
whereas liabilities must be taken into account if they “arose” during the balance 
sheet year.  See also Karel van Hulle, Prudence: A Principle or an Attitude?, 5 EUR. 
ACCT. REV. 375, 376 (1996) (explaining that prudence was introduced “with a view 
to protecting the interests of creditors”); Schön, supra note 216, at 196 (2006) (“the 
‘asymmetry’ between shareholders and creditors leads to a ‘conservative’ frame-
work of accounting law”); Giovanni E. Colombo, International Accounting Princi-
ples (IAS/IFRS), Share Capital and Net Worth, 4 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 553, 555 (2007) 
(comparing this approach with the IFRS where “[t]he ban on the inclusion of non-
realized capital gains—characteristic of traditional historic cost balance sheets—is 
not considered any more [sic]”). 
221  I.R.C.  § 446(a) (2013). 
222  See, e.g., 2 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX'N § 12:10. 
223  Henry J. Lischer & Peter N. Märkl, Conformity Between Financial Account-
ing and Tax Accounting in the United States and Germany, in WPK-MITTEILUNGEN, 
SPECIAL ISSUE JUNE 1997, at 91, 97–98 (describing “general nonconformity”); Ebke, 
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that the objectives of taxation and financial reporting are too dif-
ferent to allow a close connection.224  By contrast, book-tax con-
formity is much stronger in the majority of European countries.225  
In Germany, according to the legal principle of “authoritativeness” 
(Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip), the financial statements of business entities 
required to draw up financial statements (including corporations 
and limited liability companies) according to the Commercial Code 
also form the basis of taxation.226  Similarly, in France the tax au-
thorities have traditionally insisted on a “principle of unity” ac-
cording to which financial statements form the basis also for tax 
accounting.227   
This means that, for example, an accounting option that has 
been used in a certain way for purposes of disclosure under the 
applicable financial accounting principles applies also under tax 
purposes unless mandatory tax law overrides this particular op-
tion.228  Given the financial incentives set by corporate taxes, the 
practical consequence has usually been the dominance of tax law; 
firms use accounting options in order to minimize taxes and there-
                                                     
supra note 178, at 124 (comparing book-tax conformity in the U.S. and Germany); 
Wolfgang Schön, The Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Account-
ing?, 58 TAX L. REV. 111, 119–22 (2004) (describing the history of increasing diver-
gence between tax and financial accounting).  
224  E.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1979) (finding 
that a corporation’s method of accounting of inventories in alignment with GAAP 
did not meet the “clear reflection of income” standard). 
225  Peter Essers & Ronald Russo, The Precious Relationship Between IAS/IFRS, 
National Tax Accounting Systems and the CCCTB, in THE INFLUENCE OF IAS/IFRS ON 
THE CCCTB, TAX ACCOUNTING, DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE LAW ACCOUNTING 
CONCEPTS 29, 33 (Peter Essers et al. eds., 2009) (listing EU Member States by 
strength of book-tax conformity). 
226  EINKOMMENSTEUERGESETZ [ESTG] [INCOME TAX ACT] Oct. 17, 2008, § 5(1) 
(Ger.) (requiring “merchants” to use their bookkeeping under the commercial law 
requirements as the basis of their tax returns); see Nowotny, supra note 218, at 105 
(noting the German theory that the government could be seen as a “dormant 
partner”).  
227  A. Frydlender & D. Pham, Relationships Between Accounting and Taxation in 
France, 5 EUR. ACCT. REV. SUPPLEMENT 845, 845–46 (1996) (discussing the reasons 
for historical ties between accounting and taxation in France). 
228  For a closer look at Germany’s accounting and tax principles, see Dieter 
Pfaff & Thomas Schröer, The Relationship Between Financial and Tax Accounting in 
Germany—The Authoritativeness and Reverse Authoritativeness Principle, 5 EUR. ACCT. 
REV. SUPPLEMENT 963, 967–69 (1996) (“[C]ommercial accounting law is authorita-
tive for the tax accounts as long as it is supported by GoB and is not in contradic-
tion of any specific tax rules”); for France, see DE LAUZAINGHEIN ET AL., supra note 
183,  ¶ 29 (discussing the relationship between accounting principles and tax law 
in France).  
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fore have a strong interest not to show excessive profits in their fi-
nancial statements.229  Taxation depends on the profits shown by 
an individual reporting entity, and not on the consolidated ac-
counts that also include profits made by subsidiaries.230  Conse-
quently, it would have been theoretically possible to keep the con-
solidated accounts, which are of interest in the capital markets, free 
from the influence of taxation.  In practice, however, since in prin-
ciple the same accounting rules applied to both sets of financial 
statements (with the addition of consolidation rules applicable on-
ly to group accounts), accounting standards for both purposes de-
veloped largely uniformly because any legislative change to ac-
counting standards was always also discussed in terms of its tax 
consequences.231  Furthermore, empirical evidence up to the 1990s 
showed that firms typically used accounting options in similar 
ways both in individual and group accounts, thus creating an indi-
rect link between group accounts (which only serve information 
purposes) and individual accounts (which also serve tax and capi-
tal maintenance purposes).  Tax dependence of consolidated ac-
counts only decreased in the 2000s with the introduction of IFRS on 
the consolidated level.232 
                                                     
229  E.g., Pfaff & Schröer, supra note 228, at 970–72 (discussing the reverse au-
thoritative effect of tax law).  Arguably, directors may even be required to mini-
mize the firm’s tax burden under their duty of care, which creates some obvious 
tension with truthfulness in accounting.  Wolfgang Schön, Tax and Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Legal Approach, TAX & CORP. GOVERNANCE 31, 46-47 (Wolfgang Schön 
ed., 2008) (stating that “the minimization of the corporate tax burden is an integral 
part of the managers’ duty of care.”).  For France, see Frydlender & Pham, supra 
note 227, at 856 (discussing that many French businesses are engrained in tax ori-
ented policies); see also Reginald Hansen, Assessing and Tax Accounting Principles in 
the German Civil and Commercial Code and the Impact on Tax Compliance, 7 EUR. J. L. & 
ECON. 15, 34 (1998) (“This being so led to the consequence, that most commercial 
balance sheets in the FRG are totally deformed, at least compared with what they 
should normally be expected to show.”) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
230  E.g. Ebke, supra note 178, at 124 (noting that within Germany a group of 
affiliated companies is not considered a single taxable person for tax purposes). 
231  Moreover, when a firm wanted to use accounting options differently in 
the individual and consolidated accounts (provided that Member State law al-
lowed it), this divergence had to be explained in the notes.  Seventh Directive, su-
pra note 164, art. 29.  This may have discouraged some firms from tailoring its in-
dividual accounts to tax purposes and consolidated accounts to purposes of 
investors.  
232  Maria Gee et al., The Influence of Tax on IFRS Consolidated Statements: The 
Convergence of Germany and the UK, 7 ACCT. IN EUR. 97, 100–06 (2010) (describing 
the reduction of “tax pollution” in German consolidated accounts in the 2000s).  
But see Giovanna Gavana et al., Evolving Connections Between Tax and Financial Re-
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All in all, these non-disclosure purposes of financial reporting 
had two consequences relevant to the debate about IFRS.  First, the 
objective of limiting distributions to residual claimants (sharehold-
ers and the tax authorities) created incentives for firms to deflate 
their reported earnings, quite in contrast to the capital-markets 
driven tendency to inflate earnings that is common in the United 
States and elsewhere today.  Arguably, tax goals in particular dis-
tracted from the goal of providing a true and fair view.233  Second, 
the high degree of book-tax conformity strengthened state in-
volvement in financial accounting, given the legal and fiscal conse-
quences of the numbers computed with the applicable accounting 
standards.234  In particular, private standard setting would have 
been considered problematic from a constitutional law perspective 
because of the tax consequences.235 
 
3.2. The Growth of Capital Markets and the Decline of Traditional 
Accounting During the 1990s 
 
IFRS only entered the European picture described so far at a 
relatively late point in time.  IASB’s predecessor body, the IASC 
(International Accounting Standards Committee), was founded in 
1973 upon the initiative of prominent British accountants, along 
with the participation of accountants from Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.236  While there is no way to prove 
                                                     
porting in Italy, 10 ACCT. IN EUR. 43, 45–48 (2013) (finding that in Italy, where pub-
licly traded firms use IFRS also for entity-level accounts, book-tax conformity has 
decreased in recent years, while it has increased in firms that still use Italian 
GAAP). 
233  DE LAUZAINGHEIN ET AL., supra note 183, ¶ 377. 
234  Id. (explaining the strong influence of tax law on the standard setting pro-
cess in France). 
235  Schmidt, supra note 181, at 172, 180 (discussing the “specific legitimacy 
concerns” for accounting standard setting “that derive from the German constitu-
tion”). 
236  John Flower, The Future Shape of Harmonization: The EU Versus the IASC 
Versus the SEC, 6 EUR. ACCT. REV. 281, 288 (1997) (stating that “[t]he IASC was set 
up in 1973 at the initiative of Henry Benson” and accountant representatives from 
nine countries); Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of the IASC into the IASB, and the 
Challenges It Faces, 87 ACCT. REV. 807, 809 (2012) (discussing how the British ac-
countant Benson “led a movement to tackle the issue of diverse accounting prac-
tices.”). 
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the participating individuals’ true motivation, it is often believed 
that it was a reaction to the accounting harmonization ambitions of 
the European Commission, which were seen as a threat to British 
accounting tradition in the United Kingdom emanating from the 
continental European statutory approach.237  At that point, the 
IASC—as a private, relatively informally constituted association—
had no power whatsoever to set accounting standards and acted 
primarily as a coordinating and consultative body between its 
members.238  While in countries following the Anglo-Saxon model, 
representatives at the IASC were generally sent by the respective 
accounting standard setter; in countries with an accounting law 
model, representatives at the IFRS generally had no standard set-
ting power at home.239  Even though the IASC’s membership cut 
across the fault lines between different accounting cultures, there is 
consensus that it followed an Anglo-American approach.240  The 
influence of continental European members with little influence on 
the national standard setting process remained as limited as the in-
fluence of the IAS on these jurisdictions.  As one commentator put 
it, the IASC at that time began to be seen in Europe as a “Trojan 
horse which conceals the Anglo-American accounting enemy in-
side a more respectable international façade.”241  French accounting 
                                                     
237  Anthony G. Hopwood, Some Reflections on ‘The Harmonization of Account-
ing Within the EU,’ 3 EUR. ACCT. REV. 241, 243 (1994) (linking the formulation of the 
IASC to the British “extensive political campaign” mobilized in response to fear of 
“continental Europe statutory and state control”); see also Flower, supra note 236, at 
288 (“The British accountancy profession was horrified at the thought of be-
ing obliged to accept alien accounting principles consequent on Britain's en-
try into the European Union.”); Zeff, supra note 236, at 809–10 (discussing how 
British accountant Benson’s formulation of the IASC may have been for “U.K.-
centric reasons.”). 
238  E.g., Per Thorell & Geoffrey Whittington, The Harmonization of Accounting 
Within the EU, 3 EUR. ACCT. REV. 215, 223 (1994) (describing the “voluntary nature” 
of the IASC’s standards); Zeff, supra note 236, at 810 (members committed to using 
“their ‘best endeavours’” to implement IAS).  
239  Colasse, supra note 9, at 32. 
240  Flower, supra note 236, at 288–89 (“[I]t is abundantly clear that . . . the 
IASC's standards have reflected the Anglo-American approach to financial report-
ing and have completely ignored the traditional approach of Continental Eu-
rope.”). 
241  Id. at 289 (quoting CHRISTOPHER NOBES, A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 21 (1994)); see also Gordon L. Clark et al., 
Emergent Frameworks in Global Finance: Accounting Standards and German Supple-
mentary Pensions, 77 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 250, 255 (2001) (“For some, the IASC is an 
extension of FASB because the IASC is an agent of the SEC, which represents U.S. 
nation-state interests in extending the geographic reach of U.S. capital markets”); 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/2
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:04 PM 
2014] WHOSE TROJAN HORSE? 149 
scholar Bernard Colasse goes even further by suggesting that the 
IASC remained true to a “Friedmanian conception of corporate re-
sponsibility,” which focuses only on the needs of investors, in con-
trast to continental European models of corporate governance in 
which corporations serve broader goals.242 
While the IASC was thus initially a bulwark erected to protect 
the Anglosphere against an onslaught from a regulatory European 
accounting model, the tide began to change in the 1990s, during 
which the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition began to become at-
tractive for at least some large continental European firms.  Capital 
markets began to grow in Europe, and firms increasingly sought to 
cross-list in New York or London in order to tap new sources of 
capital.243  At the same time, continental European governments 
became increasingly interested in shoring up their capital markets 
to attract international investors.  In retrospect, scholars identified 
a convergence in corporate governance practices in that period, 
most of all during the late 1990s.244  Before accounting law could 
                                                     
Haller, supra note 214, at 238 (“[I]nternational harmonization is very much per-
ceived as the introduction of the American accounting model”); Jane Fuller, The 
Continent’s Largest Companies Are Gearing Up for Change that Should Reduce the Need 
to Reconcile Accounts to Different Rules.  But the Relevance and Reliability of the 
Measures is Open to Question, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at 17 (“[M]ost of the 7,000 
companies concerned do not have securities listed in the US and so are less moti-
vated by convergence. . . .  Convergence has heightened fears within Europe that 
this will lead to the import of prescriptive US standards.”).  
242  Colasse, supra note 9, at 35.  Even without providing a citation, it is clear 
that Colasse is referring to Milton Friedman.  See Milton Friedman, A Friedman 
Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17 (discussing how “social responsibility” in business means 
considering the shareholders and customers).  
243  E.g., Flower, supra note 236, at 282–86 (discussing the motivation for Eu-
ropean firms to tap international capital markets in the 1990s from a contempo-
rary perspective); Zeff, supra note 236, at 817-18 (discussing how “Europe’s largest 
company” and other corporations began to list in New York). 
244  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corpo-
rate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 443 (2001) (“[A]t the beginning of the twenty-first centu-
ry we are witnessing rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented 
model as a normative view of corporate structure and governance.”).  For a per-
spective from the accounting literature, see Yuri Biondi, What do Shareholders Do? 
Accounting, Ownership and the Theory of the Firm: Implications for Corporate Govern-
ance and Reporting, 2 ACCT. ECON & L. 1, 3, 18 (2012) (discussing the “accounting 
perspective of the relationship between shareholding and the inner congeries of 
the enterprise entity”); Yuan Ding et al., Towards an Understanding of the Phases of 
Goodwill Accounting in Four Western Capitalist Countries: From Stakeholder Model to 
Shareholder Model, 33 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 718, 739–46 (2008) (arguing that the ac-
counting treatment of goodwill is connected to the respective orientation of capi-
talism, and suggesting that there has been a trend from stakeholder to shareholder 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:04 PM 
150 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
follow, some pioneering firms spearheaded the trend by adopting 
accounting standards from the English-speaking world.  In most 
cases, these standards were initially U.S. GAAP, as in the case of 
Daimler-Benz’s 1993 stock issue in New York, and in some cases 
U.K. GAAP for firms that sought a listing in London.245  None of 
these firms had a legal mandate to “internationalize” their account-
ing systems, which in those days was often a term used for apply-
ing U.S. GAAP.  Instead, in addition to setting up entity-level and 
consolidated accounts under their respective national law, these 
large firms put together an additional set of financial statements or 
reconciliation statements applying the standards required in the 
respective capital market where they sought a listing.246  The Daim-
ler-Benz case was a watershed for this development, particularly in 
Germany, since it allowed a direct comparison between German 
accounting and the U.S. GAAP.  While its consolidated financial 
statements under the German commercial code showed profits of 
DM 602m., its financial statements under U.S. GAAP actually 
showed a loss of DM 1,839m.247  Unsurprisingly, this undermined 
German confidence in the capability of the traditional accounting 
law to protect creditors through prudent financial accounting.248  
Pressure to internationalize accounting grew, until the German 
parliament passed a law in 1998 that permitted publicly traded 
firms to draw up consolidated financial statements under “interna-
tionally recognized accounting principles” as long as they were 
still in accordance with EU accounting directives, instead of apply-
ing the rules of the German commercial code.249  Public firms 
                                                     
capitalism reflected in accounting). 
245  Zeff, supra note 236, at 817 (discussing Daimler-Benz’s listing on the New 
York Stock Exchange and results concerning the U.S. GAAP). 
246  Eierle, supra note 172, at 291 (describing the differentiating reporting re-
quirements between large and small/medium companies). 
247  Interestingly, its equity leapt from 17,584 million DM to 26,281 million 
DM.  Flower, supra note 236, at 285. 
248  See Eierle, supra note 172, at 291 (noting a loss of confidence among inter-
national investors). 
249  HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], Oct. 4, 1897, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] as amended,  § 292a, as introduced by the GESETZ ZUR 
VERBESSERUNG DER WETTBEWERBSFÄHIGKEIT DEUTSCHER KONZERNE AN 
KAPITALMÄRKTEN UND ZUR ERLEICHTERUNG DER AUFNAHME VON 
GESELLSCHAFTERDARLEHEN [KAPITALAUFNAHMEERLEICHTERUNGSGESETZ] [KAPAEG] 
[Law on the Improvement of the Competiveness of German Companies in Capital 
Markets and the Facilitation of Raising Shareholder Debt] [Capital Raising Facili-
tation Act], Apr. 20, 1998, BGBL. I at 707 (Ger.) (codifying permission for publicly-
traded companies to publish financial statements using “internationally recog-
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quickly jumped onto the bandwagon; by 1999, more than half of 
German publicly traded firms already used either U.S. GAAP or 
IAS for their consolidated financial statements.250  However, as re-
quired by the law, they continued to use the standards of the Ger-
man commercial code for entity-level financial statements, thus 
maintaining the previous standard for creditor protection and taxa-
tion purposes.251  Concurrently, in 1999 Germany created the legal 
basis for a private standard setter in the form of a not-for-profit or-
ganization, which was charged with the task of setting “principles 
for the implementation of consolidated financial statements.”252 
France first permitted the use of IFRS in consolidated financial 
statements in 1998.253  Scholars noted a change in French account-
ing culture, as financial markets became more important and the 
function of providing financial information to shareholders began 
to gain ground.254  Besides a number of reforms that better aligned 
French accounting with IFRS, the most conspicuous change has 
been the evolution of the French standard-setter.  In the 1990s the 
CNC still had more than a hundred members, which were sup-
                                                     
nized” standards provided they are identified as such and “in accordance with” 
EU law); see Eierle, supra note 172, at 291–92 (discussing how German reporting 
techniques lost credibility among international investors).   
250  Holger Daske, Economic Benefits of Adopting IFRS or US-GAAP—Have the 
Expected Cost of Equity Capital Really Decreased?, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 329, 336 
(2006) (“By 1999, over 50 percent of the DAX 100 index of German listed firms 
were reporting according to international standards.”).  
251  Eierle, supra note 172, at 291–92 (describing how Germany implemented 
new rules which differentiated between listed and nonlisted companies). 
252  GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH 
[KonTraG] [Law on Control and Transparency in Business], Apr. 27, 1998 BGBL. I, 
at 786 (Ger.) (introducing, among others, a § 342 into the commercial code that 
permits the Ministry of Justice to recognize a private standard setter for purposes 
of principles of consolidated accounts); see Fülbier & Klein, supra note 194, at 19–
21 (discussing the role of the German Accounting Standards Board).  
253  Loi no. 98-261 du 6 avril 1998 portant réforme de la réglementation comp-
table et adaptation du régime de la publicité foncière, J.O. no. 82 du 7 avril 1998, 
p. 5384, art. 6 al. 1 (adding a new section to article number 357-58 to la loi no. 66-
537 du juillet 1966 sur les Sociétés Commerciales, section number 357-8-1) (permit-
ting publicly traded firms to apply “international rules translated into French” 
instead of national French accounting laws and standards, provided that they also 
conform to community law); see also Hoarau, supra note 183, at 133 (noting that 
this law allowed firms to choose either IAS or U.S. GAAP).  
254  E.g., René Ricol, Vers une normalisation comptable internationale, condition de 
la transparence de l’information financière, in LE JUGE ET LE DROIT DE L’ÉCONOMIE 
MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE BEZARD 137, 137 (Marie-Charlotte Piniot, Jean-
Pierre Dumas & Paul Le Cannu eds., 2002) (noting that “practice has evolved; the 
rules must follow”). 
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posed to represent various interest groups, including labor.255  The 
1996 reform reduced the number of members in the CNC to fifty-
eight, the emphasis among which shifted from representation of 
interest groups to “technical” competence, which resulted in an in-
creasing role for representatives of international accounting 
firms.256  The body’s newest incarnation, the ANC, has a board of a 
handful of full-time members,257 among which the large accounting 
firms and large publicly traded corporations dominate.258 
Not only Germany, but also Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy 
passed laws permitting firms to use IAS.259  At that time, the EU 
Commission had already oriented itself toward IFRS,260 which is 
why the question of whether laws permitting the use of “interna-
tionally recognized financial accounting principles” were compati-
ble with a correct implementation of EU law261 was never seriously 
addressed.  Ultimately, the EU solved this untenable situation by 
                                                     
255  Colasse & Pochet, supra note 185, at 10–11 (discussing the number of 
members prior to the 1996 reform); Hoarau, supra note 183, at 129, 131 (discussing 
CNC membership during the late 20th century). 
256  Colasse & Pochet, supra note 185, at 11–12, 30 (noting the “new mix fa-
vored professionals . . . at the expense of Government representatives”); see also 
Hoarau, supra note 183, at 133, 136 (noting that the state no longer had the domi-
nant role). 
257  Hoarau, supra note 183, at 138 (noting the ANC has been “restricted to a 
Collége of sixteen members”). 
258 Colasse & Pochet, supra note 185, at 13–14 (noting that, while the leader-
ship of the organization is still appointed by various government bodies, the actu-
al standard-setting committee is dominated by the accounting profession); 
Hoarau, supra note 183, at at 139 (noting the influence of large companies and ac-
counting firms). 
259  Axel Haller et al., Financial Accounting Developments in the European Union: 
Past Events and Future Prospects, 11 EUR. ACCT. REV. 153, 169 (2002) (“Germany, 
Austria, France, Italy and Belgium . . . changed their national laws”, allowing 
companies to “base their financial statements on IAS or US GAAP instead of do-
mestic rules.”).  For the French law passed in April 1998, see Loi no. 98-261, supra 
note 253.  Of course, in all cases, entity-level accounts still had to be drawn up un-
der the respective national law. 
260  Haller, supra note 259, at 170 (noting that the Commission’s strategy was 
made clear by the mid-1990s). 
261  See, e.g. Wolfgang Schön, Gesellschafter-, Gläubiger- und Anlegerschutz im 
Europäischen Bilanzrecht (Shareholder, Creditor and Investor Protection in European Ac-
counting Law), 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 706, 
720–25 (Holger Fleischer et al. eds., 2000) (criticizing a tendency to permit a “dy-
namic interpretation” of the EU directives, and allowing national legislatures to 
permit firms to use internationally recognized accounting principles that were “in 
accordance” [im Einklang] but not “in compliance” [in Übereinstimmung] with the 
directives, thus complying only with their broad goals, but not necessarily with 
the specific provisions of the directives). 
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passing the IFRS Regulation in 2002, which explicitly required 
firms to use IAS (now IFRS) that had been endorsed by a new EU 
body for their consolidated accounts, thus reducing the sphere of 
application of the directives.262  
The regulation gives EU and EEA Member States the option to 
require or permit firms to also use IFRS in their entity-level finan-
cial statements and also grants the same option to Member States 
with respect to the entity-level and consolidated accounts of non-
listed corporations.263  The states used this option in a variety of 
ways: 
  
Country Entity-level ac-
counts of listed 
firms 
Consolidated 
accounts of non-
listed firms 
Entity-level ac-
counts of non- 
listed firms 
Austria IFRS not per-
mitted 
IFRS optional IFRS not permit-
ted 
Belgium IFRS not per-
mitted 
IFRS optional IFRS not permit-
ted 
Bulgaria IFRS required IFRS optional 
for SMEs, re-
quired for all 
others except 
entities in liqui-
dation and in-
solvency 
IFRS optional 
for SMEs; re-
quired for all 
others except 
entities in liqui-
dation and in-
solvency 
Cyprus IFRS required  IFRS required IFRS required  
Czech Republic IFRS required IFRS optional  IFRS not permit-
ted 
Denmark IFRS optional 
for listed com-
panies which 
do prepare con-
solidated ac-
counts; required 
for listed com-
panies which 
IFRS optional IFRS optional 
                                                     
262  Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 19 July 2002 on the Application of International Accounting Standards, art. 5, 
2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, 6; see also van der Tas & van der Zanden, supra note 80, at 8 
(observing that the firms were forced to accept IAS). 
263  Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, supra note 262. 
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do not prepare 
consolidated 
accounts 
Estonia IFRS required IFRS optional IFRS optional 
Finland IFRS optional IFRS optional 
for companies 
audited by certi-
fied auditors 
IFRS optional 
for companies 
audited by certi-
fied auditors  
France IFRS not per-
mitted 
IFRS optional IFRS not permit-
ted 
Germany IFRS optional, 
but additional 
balance sheet 
under German 
law required 
IFRS optional; 
required if filed 
for listing 
IFRS optional, 
but additional 
balance sheet 
under German 
law required 
Greece IFRS required IFRS optional 
for companies 
audited by certi-
fied auditors 
IFRS optional 
for companies 
audited by certi-
fied auditors 
Hungary IFRS optional, 
but additional 
balance sheet 
under Hungari-
an law required 
IFRS optional IFRS optional, 
but additional 
balance sheet 
under Hungari-
an law required 
Iceland IFRS optional 
for the years 
2005 and 2006; 
required from 
2007 
IFRS optional 
only for medi-
um-sized and 
big companies 
IFRS optional 
only for medi-
um-sized and 
big companies; 
required for the 
annual accounts 
of each subsidi-
ary from 2007 if 
consolidated 
groups are per-
mitted to use 
IAS 
Ireland IFRS optional IFRS optional IFRS optional  
Italy IFRS required IFRS optional 
except for SMEs 
IFRS optional 
except for SMEs 
Latvia IFRS required IFRS optional IFRS not permit-
ted 
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Liechtenstein IFRS optional IFRS optional  IFRS optional 
Lithuania IFRS required IFRS optional IFRS optional  
Luxemburg IFRS optional IFRS optional IFRS optional 
Malta IFRS required IFRS required 
for larger com-
panies deemed 
significant in the 
local economy; 
optional for all 
others 
IFRS required 
for larger com-
panies deemed 
significant in the 
local economy; 
optional for all 
others 
Netherlands IFRS optional IFRS optional IFRS optional 
Norway IFRS required 
for listed com-
panies that do 
not prepare 
consolidated 
accounts start-
ing from 2011; 
optional for 
others 
IFRS optional IFRS optional 
Poland IFRS optional IFRS optional 
for companies 
filed for admis-
sion to public 
trading, option-
al for parent 
company being 
subsidiary of 
parent company 
preparing con-
solidated ac-
counts in line 
with IAS 
IFRS optional 
for companies 
filed for admis-
sion to public 
trading and for 
companies 
whose parent 
company pre-
pares its consol-
idated accounts 
in line with IAS 
Portugal IFRS required if 
the statutory 
accounts are the 
only accounts 
that they pub-
lished to the 
market; other-
wise optional 
IFRS optional  IFRS optional 
for companies 
within the scope 
of consolidation 
of an entity who 
applies 
IAS/IFRS 
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Romania IFRS permitted 
for purposes of 
information on-
ly 
IFRS optional 
for companies 
which have ob-
ligation to draw 
up consolidated 
financial state-
ments 
IFRS permitted 
for purposes of 
information on-
ly. 
Slovakia IFRS permitted, 
and required 
for companies 
of public inter-
est. 
IFRS required IFRS optional 
for listed com-
panies 
Slovenia IFRS optional IFRS optional IFRS optional 
Spain IFRS not per-
mitted 
IFRS required 
for groups in 
which there is a 
listed company; 
optional for all 
others 
IFRS not permit-
ted 
Sweden IFRS not per-
mitted 
IFRS optional IFRS not permit-
ted 
UK IFRS optional IFRS optional IFRS optional 
 
Table 1:  Implementation of Options Under the IAS Regula-
tion in EU and EEA Countries (2010)264 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that IFRS are not as ubiquitous in Europe 
as a casual American observer might think.  Several important 
Member States, including Germany and France, continue to adhere 
to their respective traditional accounting standards for non-listed 
firms and the entity-level accounts even of listed firms.  The reason 
is that IFRS, being drawn up only for the purpose of providing in-
formation for capital markets, are not considered suitable for calcu-
lating distributable profits under the legal capital system265 or 
                                                     
264  European Commission, Implementation of the IAS Regulation (1606/2002) in 
the EU and EEA (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/ias-use-of-
options2010_en.pdf (showing the status of the implementation of IAS/IFRS, as 
well as special rules and exceptions, including those for banks, other credit and 
financial institutions, investment companies, insurance companies, and charities). 
265  E.g., Colombo, supra note 220, at 554 (arguing that under IFRS the balance 
sheet’s role is solely to inform investors of the “‘effective’ result of the accounting 
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computing the basis of corporate tax.266  While EU law now per-
mits Member States to use IFRS by giving firms the option to use 
IFRS in individual accounts, a number of Member States have not 
decided to do so. 
In Germany, for example, after some adjustments, the law now 
permits all firms to use IFRS in their entity-level accounts, but they 
additionally have to draw up financial statements under the tradi-
tional rules for purposes of distribution of profits and taxation (and 
to submit it to the commercial register).267  This rule not only fails 
to provide firms with any cost savings, it basically does not permit 
them to do anything that they could not have done without the 
law, since there was clearly never a prohibition against drawing up 
IFRS statements in addition to the required ones drawn up under 
German accounting law.  Another option would have been to re-
quire reconciliation from IFRS to traditional financial statements.  
Because of the cost of these two options for firms, Italy opted for a 
third option, namely to require the creation of restricted reserves to 
prevent unrealized gains (resulting, for example, from write-ups to 
fair value) from showing up as distributable profits or reserves in 
                                                     
period,” without regard to the issue of profit distribution); Schön, supra note 216, 
at 197 (discussing the implications of using the balance sheet model in IFRS); Gio-
vanni Strampelli, The IAS/IFRS After the Crisis: Limiting the Impact of Fair Value Ac-
counting on Companies’ Capital, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV.  1, 7 (2011) (Ger.) (pointing 
out that many authors have criticized IFRS as inadequate because they are “in-
compatible with the ‘organisational’ function of annual accounts.”). 
266  E.g., Eve Chiapello & Karim Medjad, Une privatisation inédite de la norme:  
Le cas de la politique comptable européenne, 49 SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL 46, 54 (2007) 
(Fr.) (pointing out that in the Anglo-Saxon countries, other than in France, finan-
cial and tax accounting are separate). 
267  HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], § 325(2a) (Ger.) (permit-
ting firms to submit financial statements drawn up under IFRS to the commercial 
register for purposes of disclosure without eliminating the duty to draw up regu-
lar financial statements under the rules of the commercial code).  Subsection (2a) 
was introduced by the Gesetz zur Einführung internationaler Rechnungs-
legungstsandards und zur Sicherung der Qualität der Abschlussprüfung,  
(Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz – BilReG) of Dec. 4, 2004, BGBl 2004, I, Nr. 65, at 3166.  
 See e.g., Eierle, supra note 172, at 295–96 (noting that the German legislature 
regards IAS/IFRS as inappropriate for individual financial statements because 
individual accounts in Germany have both informational and tax/dividend dis-
tribution purposes); Luttermann, supra note 160, at 284–85 (noting that German 
law still requires German companies with limited liability to also provide their 
annual accounts in accordance with the German Commercial Code); see also 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], § 315a(3) (Ger.) (permitting un-
listed firms to draw up financial statements under IFRS endorsed by the EU). 
§ 315a was also introduced with the BilReg (cited above). 
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the balance sheet.268  France also does not permit the use of IFRS in 
entity-level accounts.  
The European institutional structure of accounting continues to 
diverge from that of the United States.  Unlike FASB in the United 
States, IASB has by no means been given a blank check to develop 
accounting standards for Europe.  Both on the national and the EU 
level, it has sometimes been questioned whether it is permissible 
for the respective legislature to delegate its core function of law-
making to a private body that is neither elected nor politically ac-
countable.269  On the EU level, the IAS Regulation applies the 
“comitology” technique, under which the Accounting Regulatory 
Committee (ARC) of the EU level endorses a standard promulgat-
ed by the IFRS and recommended by the European Financial Re-
porting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the Commission.270  Unless 
the European Parliament or Council of the European Union oppos-
es a standard within three months, the Commission adopts a regu-
lation enforcing the standard as a regulation of the European Un-
ion and publishes the regulation in the official journal, thus 
binding firms in the Member States.271  While critics continue to oc-
                                                     
268  Colombo, supra note 220, at 556 (noting that Italy rejected both the hy-
pothesis of drawing up two accounting period balance sheets and that of asking 
for a “reconciliation account” in favor of allocating unrealized profits in a restrict-
ed reserve); Strampelli, supra note 265, at 19–20 (describing the Italian approach, 
which requires IAS/ISFR financial statements to be changed to figure out capital 
losses and distributable profits, as “asymmetric” insofar as “it only requires unre-
alized fair value profits to be neutralized”).  But see Schön, supra note 216, at 198 
(pointing out that in this case, “the company will virtually be obliged to draw up 
a second set of accounts,” thus eliminating any cost savings).  Note, however, that 
the Italian legislator chose to permit the offsetting of revaluation reserves with 
losses, which may result in the permission of distributions when the firm reen-
tered the profit zone earlier than under “traditional” accounting.  Strampelli, supra 
note 265, at 25 (arguing for a solution to the risks posed by the Italian approach 
that ensures that “only reserves formed by injections of capital or allocation of re-
alized profits” are made available to cover losses). 
269  See infra note 282 and accompanying text (noting criticisms of IASB for its 
lack of political legitimacy and accountability to a government).  
270  E.g., van der Tas & van der Zanden, supra note 80, at 9 (describing the en-
dorsement process). 
271  Article 6 of the IAS Regulation refers to Council Decision 468/1999 
(which applies more generally to the so-called “comitology” procedure).  Article 
5a(3)(c) of this Council decision sets up the three-month period for the parliament 
and the council to oppose a proposed standard.  Council Decision of 28 June 1999, 
1999/468/EC, Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing 
Powers Conferred on the Commission, 1999 O.J. (L184) 23, 26.  The Council Deci-
sion has since been repealed by and replaced with Regulation 182/2011.  Howev-
er, article 12 of that regulation states that article 5(a) of the Council Decision re-
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casionally voice doubts,272 at least the constitutional conundrum 
seems to have been resolved.  EFRAG has so far taken its task very 
seriously, and in some cases refused to “rubber-stamp” new stand-
ards proposed by the IFRS because they were, in EFRAG’s view, 
not compatible with the objective of providing a true and fair view 
to investors.273   
 
3.3. Continental Criticism of IFRS 
 
In the past years, the IFRS and the Anglo-Saxon accounting 
tradition they stand for have been subject to increasing criticism in 
Europe.  A French textbook (comparing French and IFRS account-
ing), for example, criticizes IFRS as “dangerous and obsolete.”274   
In the authors’ view, IASB “pretends to be neutral and independ-
ent from any political pressure,” while fundamental flaws in its 
approach to fair value accounting have been exposed.275  Some 
have criticized IASB’s (as well as FASB’s) self-congratulatory use of 
terms such as “high-quality accounting standards.”  The German 
comparative law scholar Bernhard Grossfeld, for example, argues 
that this kind of language obscures the fact that there is no single 
measure of quality, and that accounting policy choices (very much 
                                                     
mains effective.  Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 February 2011, Laying Down the Rules and General Principles 
Concerning Mechanisms for Control by Member States of the Commission’s Exer-
cise of Implementing Powers, 2011 O.J. (L 55) 13, 18, art. 12  (EU); see The Endorse-
ment Process in the EU, EUR. COMM’N, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/endorsement_proces
s.pdf (showing, through a chart, the process through which a regulatory standard 
is endorsed by the European Union).  
272  For an example of how there has been some debate as to whether IFRS 3, 
which does not require amortization of goodwill, is compatible with the European 
true and fair view principle, rendering its endorsement a mistake, see Jens 
Wüstemann & Sonja Kierzek, True and Fair View Revisited—A Reply to Alexander 
and Nobes, 3 ACCT. IN EUR. 91, 100 (2006) (Ger.) (suggesting that IFRS 3 does not 
result in a true and fair view). 
273  IAS Regulation, art. 3(2) requires that standards “meet the criteria of un-
derstandability, relevance, reliability and comparability required of the financial 
information needed for making economic decisions and assessing the stewardship 
of management.” Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 supra note 262, at 5–6. 
274  RICHARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
275  Id. at 1; see also Colasse, supra note 9, at 35-36 (criticizing that IASB devel-
oped a rhetoric of competence, independence, and impartiality to enhance its per-
ceived legitimacy). 
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like choices of legal policy) inevitably involve value judgments.276 
A considerable part of the critique seems to be directed against 
fair value accounting,277 which is sometimes blamed for exacerbat-
ing some effects of the financial crisis:  as financial assets are re-
quired to be shown at their current market value, they arguably 
gained value quickly during the period leading up to the financial 
crisis, thus inflating the amount of assets held by financial institu-
tions, and then fell equally quickly after the bust, thus undermin-
ing financial institutions’ capital base and pushing them out of 
compliance with regulatory requirements.278  The critique in the 
context of accounting is broader.  Fair value accounting, as op-
posed to historical cost accounting, allows profits to be shown that 
have not yet been realized, which, as discussed above, may allow 
firms to distribute profits that are not yet certain and may easily be 
reversed by subsequent losses.  This may lead to pressure from 
shareholders to distribute these (arguably fictional) profits, which, 
in turn, may lead to a reduction in liquidity, particularly when fair 
value arguably renders net assets more volatile.  Just before the on-
set of the financial crisis, a German group of accounting professors 
and professionals christened “Saarbrücken Initiative Against Fair 
Value” expressed concern that the term fair value is too vague, 
leaves too much discretion to firms and their auditors, enhances 
opportunities to manipulate earnings and equity, and thus makes 
it generally more difficult to analyze financial statements objective-
ly.279  Similarly, French scholars have criticized that IFRS have 
                                                     
276  See, e.g., Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geog-
raphy, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 294–300 (2000) (criticizing FASB’s and IASB’s use of 
the term “high quality” accounting standards as “magical words” tantamount to 
“self-flattery” and intended to put down other accounting systems); Yuri Biondi, 
The Pure Logic of Accounting: A Critique of the Fair Value Revolution, 1 ACCT. ECON. & 
L. 1, 3, 6, 21, 25 (2011) (comparing the language used by the Anglo-Saxon account-
ing standard setters to “Newspeak” in George Orwell’s 1984).  
277  See, e.g., Bernard Raffournier, Les oppositions françaises à l’adoption des IFRS: 
examen critique et tentative d’explication, 13 COMPTIBILITE – CONTROLE – AUDIT 21, 24–
25 (2007) (Fr.) (summarizing French criticism of fair value and defending IFRS). 
278  See, e.g., Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, The Crisis of Fair-Value Account-
ing: Making Sense of the Recent Debate, 34 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 826, 831–32 (2009) (dis-
cussing problems banks had with fair value accounting during the financial cri-
sis); Bernard Colasse, La normalisation comptable internationale face à la crise, 95 
REVUE D’ECONOMIE FINANCIERE 387, 389 (2009) (Fr.) (arguing that fair value accoun-
ting played a role in the 2008 economic crisis due to the application of IAS 39). 
279  Hartmut Bieg, Peter Bofinger, Karlheinz Küting, Heinz Kußmaul, Gerd 
Waschbusch & Claus-Peter Weber, Die Saarbrücker Initiative gegen den Fair Value, 
61 DER BETRIEB 2549-52 (2008); see also Burlaud & Colasse, supra note 80, at 165 (crit-
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deemphasized the principle of prudence in accounting, and thus 
reduced the protection of creditors compared to the previous na-
tional law.280  
Others have criticized IASB’s lack of accountability and politi-
cal legitimacy, as well as a perceived absence of a transparent pro-
cess.  Even the European Parliament, while committing to IASB as 
a standard-setter, has criticized it as lacking “transparency and ac-
countability as a consequence for not being under the control of 
any democratically elected parliament.”281  Similarly, French schol-
ars have criticized IASB for its lack of political legitimacy and ac-
countability to a government, given that it grew out of a profes-
sional organization dominated by accounting firms.282  Some of the 
critique in the French literature ties differences between accounting 
systems to different models of corporate governance:  IFRS, based 
on fair value accounting, are more strongly based on the needs of 
financial markets because they reflect short-term developments; 
they are based on the agency theory view of the corporation and 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis.283  Thus, in this view IFRS 
provide a fit for a corporate governance system characterized by 
small, short-term investors with little to no long-term interaction 
with the firm.284  Traditional historical cost accounting standards 
are said to be, by contrast, more relevant for large, long-term 
                                                     
icizing fair value on the grounds that it is based on internal computations in many 
areas). 
280  See Raffournier, supra note 277, at 28-29 (summarizing the criticism 
against IFRS and arguing that IFRS are merely ending an abnormal privilege for 
creditors). 
281  European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
Report on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the Governance 
of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), A6-0032/2008 (Alexan-
der Radwan Report), quoted in Luttermann, supra note 160, at 283 (quoting from a 
report and a non-legislative resolution of the European Parliament). 
282  Burlaud & Colasse, supra note 80, at 155–56; see also Raffournier, supra 
note 277, at 30–33 (summarizing the criticism).  
283  Colasse, supra note 278, at 392; Céline Michaïlesco & Véronique Rougés, 
Le reporting financier: Enjeux actuels, in COMPTABILITE, SOCIETE, POLITIQUE – 
MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR B. COLASSE 75, 79 (explaining that IFRS 
predominantly adhere to the theory of corporate responsibility, but have also re-
lied on the agency theory and theory of efficient markets); see also RICHARD ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 363 (suggesting that IFRS are based on neoclassical economic theo-
ry). 
284  Colasse, supra note 278, at 392 (suggesting that, following the lead of 
FASB, IASB adheres to a Friedmannian conception of corporate responsibility, ac-
cording to which a business is only responsible to its shareholders). 
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shareholders, creditors, and employees, who are interested in the 
long-term viability of the firm.285  The IFRS framework indeed pro-
fesses to privilege the interests of investors, given that they are the 
residual risk-bearers of the firm; critics have sometimes argued 
that it is doubtful that financial investors bear greater risks than 
other actors, e.g., employees.286 
 Colasse also criticizes the composition of IFRS, whose inde-
pendence, in his view, “is a myth resulting from the false idea that 
an organization is independent if its members are.”287  He argues 
that IASB’s members, by and large, went through the same cultural 
experience and education emphasizing the same vision of econom-
ics.  Moreover, the majority of them are from English-speaking 
countries, and most of them were socialized in large international 
accounting firms; hence, a true debate that integrates different 
views is not possible.288  As to due process, he suggests that only us-
ers of financial statements with financial interests – but not other 
stakeholders – can make their voices heard at IASB.289 
While this criticism originates from a time even before the fi-
nancial crisis, its advocates certainly tend to argue their view has 
been vindicated.  While IASB has resiliently defended fair value 
against the post-financial crisis critique, its long-term viability may 
well depend on the long-term path of European corporate govern-
ance systems.  If we will indeed see convergence toward share-
holder capitalism, IASB is certainly in line with the development.  
In light of all of this criticism due to the apparent ill-fit with Conti-
nental European financial systems, why did the EU even adopt 
                                                     
285  RICHARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 691–92 (suggesting that IFRS prioritize the 
interests of shareholders desiring dividend payments); Michaïlesco & Rougés, su-
pra note 283, at 92–93 (arguing that IFRS privilege investors, while undermining 
the relationship with groups interacting with the firm in the long run, such as 
employees). 
286  See, e.g., Burlaud & Colasse, supra note 80, at 161 (stating the proposition 
that investors differ from one another including with respect to the level of risks 
that they bear). 
287  Colasse, supra note 278, at 393.  
288  Burlaud & Colasse, supra note 80, at 159; see Colasse, supra note 278, at 394 
(describing the similar Anglo-Saxon backgrounds and accounting firm experienc-
es of the IASB’s members). 
289  Colasse, supra note 9, at 36; Burlaud & Colasse, supra note 80, at 160 (men-
tioning states, representatives of employees, financial analysts, the majority of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and academics specifically, and noting both 
that third-world countries are underrepresented and that changes to IAS 1 were 
introduced in spite of the opposition of most commentators during the process). 
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IFRS?  First, there was clearly a growing dissatisfaction with the 
limited success of the harmonization process and the EU’s inability 
to adopt national accounting standards that would lead to compa-
rable financial statements.  Given that the Member States could not 
agree on a transnational standard-setting process within the 
framework of the EU – which would have required further com-
promise – it was likely easier to adopt the only existing external in-
ternational standard, namely IAS/IFRS.290  Given the pressures 
from, and the then-prevailing political enthusiasm for capital mar-
kets, the moment for IFRS seemed to have come; arguably, 
IASC/IASB used financial analysts to create pressure for publicly 
traded firms to apply to IAS/IFRS.291  Second, the important role 
(even though it is no longer a one-sided dominance) of the large 
(now Big Four) accounting firms in IASB may have played a role.292  
While the Big Four are by no means internally homogenous across 
borders, complex, international standards whose application re-
quires substantial training favors firms with international net-
works.  The local incarnations of the Big Four may have seen an 
opportunity to capture a larger slice of the respective national 
market.  
 
3.4. The Road Ahead for Europe 
 
The discussion above has shown that the problems of IFRS in 
Continental Europe were considerably greater than in the U.S.  
However, at least for now, the need for a stronger integration of 
accounting standards into the legal system in light of their conse-
quences for corporate and tax law seems to have been met.  Still, 
the current situation does not seem entirely satisfactory.  Firms ap-
plying IFRS still often must have a “dual” accounting system, since 
they are forced to use IFRS by the IAS Regulation and international 
capital markets on the one hand, and often to use national account-
                                                     
290  Chiapello & Medjad, supra note 266, at 58–59 (stating that it was easier to 
adopt a transnational accounting standard-setting process instead of agreeing on a 
particular national one).  
291  Michaïlesco & Rougés, supra note 283, at 85.  
292  See, e.g., Colasse, supra note 278, at 394 (arguing that because the IASB is 
an Anglo-Saxon organization, it is more prone to the influence of the big auditing 
firms); Chiapello & Medjad, supra note 266, at 49, 57 (noting the influence of the 
Big Four firms on IASB).  
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ing laws by their respective national legislatures on the other hand.  
Having two sets of accounting standards – even within a single 
country – undermines the core benefit of accounting standards set-
ting:  namely, a relatively large degree of comparability of different 
firms’ financial statements.  EU accounting harmonization and 
IFRS in part came about because financial statements were consid-
ered to be insufficiently comparable between countries.  However, 
at this point, IFRS have undermined comparability between differ-
ent groups of firms within countries and possibly also within sin-
gle corporate groups, namely where consolidated statements are 
drawn up under IFRS and entity-level statements under national 
accounting laws. 
Europe will have to find a more persuasive solution.  Obvious-
ly, the IFRS pose certain challenges if the computation of the dis-
tributable and taxable amounts of profits is to be retained as a 
function of financial accounting.  With respect to taxation, policy 
makers may eventually have to decide whether to integrate finan-
cial and tax accounting, or whether to separate them completely.  
Whereas book-tax conformity has a preparation cost advantage for 
firms, governments are understandably reluctant to delegate the 
authority to manipulate their corporate tax base to private actors.  
The EU has been discussing a possible “common consolidated tax 
base” (without harmonizing rates) for business in recent years.  
The EU Commission’s 2011 proposal seeks to establish autono-
mous tax accounting rules that “will not interfere with financial ac-
counts.”293  The debate, however, is far from over.294 
With respect to legal limitations to the distribution of profits, 
one possible long-term solution could be the abandonment of the 
capital-based creditor protection system implemented by the 2nd 
Directive.  While legal capital was never taken quite seriously as a 
creditor protection mechanism in the United States,295 it also took 
enormous heat in the European literature and policy debate in the 
                                                     
293  Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM (2011) 121 final, at 5 (2011) (proposing a directive harmonizing the corporate 
tax base in the EU Member States). 
294  For a comprehensive analysis, see generally Essers & Russo, supra note 
225. 
295  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Legal Capital Rules and the Structure of Corporate 
Law: Some Observations on the Differences Between European and U.S. Approaches, in 
CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 145–46 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch 
eds., 2003) (“To oversimplify, the U.S. rules are lax, while the European rules im-
pose some meaningful constraints.”). 
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early and mid-2000s.296  Given the heavy criticism, the EU and na-
tional governments may eventually abandon the system and re-
place it with something else, most likely along the lines of the 
“Solvency Test” proposed in the Rickford report and would thus not 
rest on accounting.297  At the moment, however, the debate seems 
to be stalled.  An abandonment of the legal capital system would at 
least make the problem of how to reconcile prudent, creditor-
oriented accounting with capital-market oriented accounting moot. 
Another possibility would be to gradually decouple distribu-
tions constraints from financial statements.  Where profits under 
IFRS seem too optimistic from the creditor protection perspective, 
firms would be required to have revaluation reserves in their equi-
ty showing the amount by which they diverge from prudent, credi-
tor-protection oriented accounting.298  Most importantly, firms ap-
plying fair value accounting would have to create revaluation 
reserves for the amount exceeding historical cost (net of deprecia-
tion), which would then have to be excluded from distribution to 
shareholders.299  The recodified Accounting Directive of 2013 is go-
ing in this direction when it allows Member States to revalue assets 
above historical cost:  firms choosing revaluation must create re-
valuation reserves that may only be distributed if they represent 
gains that have been “actually realized.”300  UK law already limited 
                                                     
296  See generally John Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient 
Rules for a Modern Company Law, 63 MOD. L. REV. 355 (2000) (suggesting that the EU 
rules on the maintenance and raising of share capital do not promote efficiency); 
John Armour, Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 5 (2006) 
(arguing that legal capital fails as a means of protecting creditors’ interests); Luca 
Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against 
the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1166 (2001) (arguing that the 
E.U. should jettison its “inefficient approach” to legal capital rules); Peter O. Mül-
bert & Max Birke, Legal Capital – Is There a Case Against the European Legal Capital 
Rules?, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 695 (2002) (outlining the criticisms of the European 
legal capital rules and concluding that these are inefficient and offer poor creditor 
protection). 
297  Jonathan Rickford, Reforming Capital: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group 
on Capital Maintenance, 2004 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 919, 967–82.  For a defense of the cur-
rent regime, see, for example, David Kershaw, Involuntary Creditors and the Case for 
Accounting-based Distribution Regulation, 2 J. BUS. L. 140, 140–65 (2009) (arguing that 
reliance on accounting-based tests to determine when companies may distribute 
dividends to shareholders protects involuntary creditors by taking these creditors’ 
claims into account at an earlier stage than a solvency test). 
298  See generally supra note 217.  
299  Pellens & Sellhorn, supra note 218, at 377–79. 
300  Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 165, at 30–31 (stating the steps required 
to distribute revaluation reserves). 
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distributions to “realized” profits in the Companies Act of 1985,301 
and Italian law now requires it for firms applying IFRS in the indi-
vidual accounts.302  Nevertheless, it is to some extent questionable 
whether this approach is practical.  Given the speed of develop-
ments in business life, legislatures (possibly even on the EU level) 
would have to closely follow the development of the IFRS and 
ponder where additional distribution constraints are necessary in 
order to pursue such a strategy consistently. 
Finally, it is not yet completely clear whether IFRS should be 
expanded to non-listed firms, where creditor protection and book-
tax conformity are most relevant.  The IFRS has launched a project 
“IFRS for SMEs,” the basic approach of which is to by and large 
apply recognition of the IFRS, but with relaxed provisions on dis-
closure.303  However, in light of heavy criticism, it is questionable 
whether the project will ever receive the endorsement of the EU.304 
 
4. LESSONS FOR THE US DEBATE 
 
As we have seen, the changes in accounting culture brought 
about by IFRS in Continental European countries were much more 
                                                     
301  Companies Act, 1985 (UK), §§ 263–64 (this has now been superseded by 
the Companies Act, 2006 (UK), pt. 21, c. 1, § 830); see Schön, supra note 216, at 198 
(arguing that the U.K.’s Companies Act, insofar as it requires the distribution of a 
company’s profits is only as far as they are “realized,” demonstrates that merging 
financial accounting under IAS/IFRS and other undistributable reserves is “feasi-
ble”); Strampelli, supra note 265, at 19 (reporting that the Companies Act, 2006 
measures distributable profit by accounting for realized profits and losses). 
302  Strampelli, supra note 265, at 19–20 (discussing Italy’s treatment of distri-
butions and realized profits). 
303  See IFRS for SMEs, IFRS.COM, http://www.ifrs.org/IFRS-for-
SMEs/Pages/IFRS-for-SMEs.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) (describing IFRS for 
SMEs Standard, and the steps the IFRS Foundation and IASB have taken to im-
plement the Standard); see also van der Tas & van der Zanden, supra note 80, at 21–
22 (discussing the “IFRS for SME” program).  
304  “IFRS for SMEs” is not endorsed in the EU and there is no plan for such 
an adoption in a foreseeable future as “IFRS for SMEs” was assessed to be incom-
patible with the EU Accounting Directive.  See European Financial Reporting Ad-
visory Group, Compatibility Analysis IFRS for SMEs and the Council Directives, 
http://www.efrag.org/Front/p172-4-272/Compatibility-Analysis-IFRS-for-
SMEs-and-the-Council-Directives.aspx (analyzing the ways in which the “IFRS for 
SMEs” program is incompatible with the current EU Accounting Directives); 
Memorandum from ICAEW to Françoise Flores, EFRAG Chair (Apr. 19, 2010), 
available at www.efrag.org (answering specific questions regarding the “IFRS for 
SMEs” and its compatibility with the EU Accounting Directives).  
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radical than a shift from GAAP to IFRS would be in the United 
States, where both GAAP and IFRS are firmly established in An-
glo-Saxon accounting culture.  There are, however, a number of 
remaining hurdles and implementation issues, which we address 
in this section.  First, we address the question of whether the U.S. 
should require firms to use IFRS, or whether it should give them 
the option of using it.  Do we want a monopoly or competition in 
the setting of financial reporting standards?  Section 4.1.1. analyzes 
the possibility of mandatory adoption of IFRS for U.S. issuers, 
while section 4.1.2. looks at the possibility of giving an option to 
U.S. issuers to adopt IFRS if they desire to do so.  Second, we look 
at the possible institutional integration of IASB into the U.S. legal 
system.  Does it matter how IASB is funded?  What will the fate of 
FASB be in this case?  Section 4.2.1. seeks alternative setups for 
FASB.  Section 4.2.2. discusses the controversial issue of funding. 
 
4.1. IFRS or U.S. GAAP? 
 
4.1.1. Should U.S. Firms Be Required to Apply IFRS? 
 
As we have seen in section 2.2., the substantive arguments 
against IFRS per se are rather weak; the criticism relates primarily 
to their purported principles-orientation, which could also be seen 
as the strong point of IFRS against the backdrop of accounting 
scandals.  A more rules-based accounting system may, to some ex-
tent, be the consequence of the U.S. accounting profession’s desire 
to avoid litigation.305  Given that bright-line rules seem to have en-
couraged circumvention, IFRS’s supposed lack of specification, 
which arguably makes circumvention more difficult, may well be 
an advantage.  Even if capture by the accounting profession inevi-
tably results in the coalescence of general principles into rules over 
time,306 it may at least temporarily be beneficial to “reboot” the sys-
tem and focus on principles. 
                                                     
305  See supra notes 94 and 117 with the accompanying text (discussing the 
choice between a principle based accounting system or one that used bright-lined 
rules); see also Goldschmid, supra note 31, at 5–7 (arguing that the SEC should take 
steps to incorporate IFRS). 
306  Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 28, at 1008 (positing that the U.S. IFRS 
will eventually “revert” back to U.S. GAAP). 
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The most fundamental argument in favor of IFRS, however, is 
comparability.  In globalizing capital markets, it seems to make lit-
tle sense for some firms to apply one accounting system while oth-
ers use another, which will obviously make comparisons by inves-
tors and analysts more difficult on the margin.  Arguably, if one 
believes that financial markets should be global, global accounting 
standards must follow.307 
Other objections to IFRS in the U.S., as we have seen, relate to 
their institutional integration into the U.S. financial system, namely 
the sheer size of the U.S. economy and problems of delegating a 
quasi-legislative function to an international body.  As to market 
size, any problems arising from it clearly can only be transitory, as 
adjustment to IFRS may take time for firms and investors.  Howev-
er, this problem seems to pale in comparison to the Continental 
Europe’s transition to IFRS, which, contrary to popular belief, is far 
from complete.  While it may be difficult to set a new course for a 
large, inert ship such as the U.S. economy, as we have seen in sec-
tion 3 the smaller vessels of the Continental European financial 
systems may break with the past much more radically.  In fact, 
these countries may set a completely new course that diverges 
much more from their previous traditions than the course of the 
IFRS diverges from U.S. GAAP, which developed within the same 
tradition of investor orientation.  If comparability is a virtue, then 
there seems to be no reason to stick to GAAP. 
The SEC is unlikely to rush towards mandatory adoption in 
part because of the ongoing recession.  For all the economic, regu-
latory, and political difficulties,308 the real fear seems to be the high 
first-time adoption costs, which would excessively burden firms in 
difficult economic times.309  Many U.S. companies are already con-
                                                     
307  See supra note 28. 
308  Hail et al., supra note 13 (discussing the many political and regulatory 
costs that must be taken into account when determining whether or not to adopt 
the IFRS). 
309  See, e.g., Hail et al., supra note 44 (detailing the potential costs and benefits 
of adopting IFRS in the U.S. and concluding that all firms and the entire U.S. 
economy will bear the “one-time transition costs”); Hans Hoogervorst, Chair, Int’l 
Acct. Standards Bd., Address at IFRS Foundation/AICPA Conference, Boston 
(Oct. 5, 2011) (“Many American companies worry about the costs of adopting 
IFRSs.  Let’s not beat about the bush; these are real costs”); see also SEC Concept 
Release, supra note 4, at 29–30 (explaining that the transition period will be rela-
tively long and the SEC will provide enough time – four years or so – before man-
datory adoption); Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, Speech by SEC Chairman: 
Statement at SEC Open Meeting – Global Accounting Standards (Feb. 24, 2010) 
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cerned about a possible mandatory adoption and have stated that 
its high costs make such a switch undesirable, at least in the short 
term.310  
Again, this argument does not seem entirely persuasive in light 
of the European experience.  True, the EU “switched” to the IFRS 
in better economic times, namely the mid-2000s, when enthusiasm 
for capital markets was still running high.  However, given the 
greater distance between the accounting cultures of many Europe-
an countries from the IFRS, arguably, one would expect the switch-
ing cost in the U.S. to be lower.  However, an SEC study published 
in 2008 estimated the switching cost for United States companies to 
be likely higher than those for comparable European companies, 
namely between 0.125% to 0.13% of revenue for U.S. issuers com-
pared to 0.05% for EU companies.311  This translates into a switch-
ing cost of $32 million per U.S. issuer.312  Yet these numbers are at 
the very least questionable.  For instance, in Canada, where IFRS 
have been mandatory since 2011, a survey of 146 companies 
showed that Canadian companies budgeted less than $500,000 in 
Canadian dollars for the changeover.313  The SEC roadmap did not 
explain how these estimates were calculated, while another study, 
conducted after the SEC report by academics, provides an estimat-
ed switching cost of $420,000 for small firms and $3.24 million for 
large ones, thus corresponding to almost one tenth of the SEC es-
timates.314  Since the publication of the SEC study preceded the ac-
tual measurement of switching costs in Canada in 2011, the SEC 
probably should update, if not completely reassess, its estimate.  
                                                     
(explaining that incorporating the IFRS into the U.S. financial reporting system 
requires investigation into whether this would serve the interests of U.S. investors 
and markets); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 2–4, 11–14 (underscoring the substan-
tial costs of the transition to IFRS in the U.S. and the uncertainty of investor 
gains). 
310  See Black et al., supra note 31, at 23 (“Many corporations, such as Exx-
onMobil and Citigroup, believe the costs of IFRS adoption are too high, potential-
ly higher than any benefit received from the conversion.  Other companies, such 
as Walmart, think that implementing changes to financial accounting during a 
depressed economic climate does not seem wise.”). 
311  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4, at 116–17 (citing ICAEW, supra 
note 5, and offering the SEC’s own, higher, projections). 
312  Id. at 130 (“For the companies we estimate to be eligible . . . we estimate 
the costs for issuers of transitioning to IFRS to sum to approximately $32 million 
per company . . . .”). 
313  Oct. 2012 IFRS Foundation Report, supra note 4, at 18. 
314  Hail et al., supra note 44, at 373 (estimating the transition costs for small 
and large U.S. firms using data from Compustat North America in 2005). 
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Finally, publicly traded firms in several European countries, nota-
bly France and Germany, are effectively required to maintain two 
parallel accounting systems since these jurisdictions are not ready 
to abandon traditional accounting for purposes of dividend distri-
butions and taxation.  U.S. firms would not have this ongoing ad-
ditional cost since IFRS would simply replace GAAP. 
 
4.1.2. Should U.S. Firms Be Permitted to Voluntarily Adopt 
IFRS? 
 
One may, however, argue that there is no need to require U.S. 
issuers to apply IFRS, and that one could, at least for the time be-
ing, allow U.S. issues to apply IFRS as an alternative to U.S. GAAP.  
Since 2007, foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. do not face a 
“reconciliation to U.S. GAAP” requirement315 as long as they are 
reporting under IFRS.316  This option for foreign companies has led 
to a discussion on whether the SEC should allow U.S. companies to 
report under IFRS if they prefer to do so.  If mandatory adoption is 
not politically feasible, voluntary adoption might be the next best 
alternative.  Voluntary adoption is favored, among others, by some 
multinationals,317 the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
                                                     
315  Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements, Release 
Nos. 33–8818; 34–55998, at 9 (proposed July 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/33-8818.pdf (describing that the SEC 
proposed amendments to permit foreign private issuers to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS “without reconciliation” to GAAP).  
316  A “foreign private issuer” as defined in Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act 
that files Form 20-F will be eligible to report under IFRS without having to recon-
cile with U.S. GAAP.  See SEC Release, Dec. 21, 2007, supra note 15, at 10 (referring 
to amendments to Form 20-F to allow foreign private issuers to report under IFRS 
without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP).  Also, foreign issuers based in the EU that 
are unable to assert compliance with IFRS as issued by IASB only because of the 
EU “IAS 39 carve-out” were permitted to reconcile those financial statements to 
IFRS as issued by IASB.  Id. at 36 (noting that the SEC was providing temporary 
transitional relief to registrants who had taken advantage of the IAS 39 carve-out 
under IFRS). 
317  See, e.g., Hoogervorst, supra note 309 (listing a number of firms, including 
Ford, Archer-Daniels-Midland, the Bank of New York Mellon, Kellogg, Chrysler 
and United Continental Holdings, that have advocated for the adoption of IFRS in 
the United States); see Michael Rapoport, U.S. Firms Clash Over Accounting Rules, 
WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023039825045764280911532
00076?KEYWORDS=Rapoport&mg=reno64-wsj (noting that “[l]arger companies, 
big accounting firms and top rule makers favor the switch [to IFRS]” including 
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countants (“AICPA”)318 and the Big Four.319  While the AICPA sees 
voluntary adoption as a way of providing equal treatment to U.S. 
companies and their competitors—namely foreign companies that 
report under IFRS320—multinationals tend to see it as a cost-saving 
opportunity.  Many multinationals have non-U.S. subsidiaries re-
porting under IFRS and seek to avoid a costly conversion to U.S. 
GAAP for consolidation purposes.321  At least for these firms, the 
long term cost savings would likely be larger than the initial costs 
of adoption.   
Looking at what Europe experienced in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, known as the period of the “end of history for corporate 
law,”322 capital markets were popular and European firms saw 
larger benefits from tapping capital markets that outweighed 
                                                     
Ford Motor Company). 
318  See Press Release, Am. Inst. of CPAs (“AICPA”), AICPA Recommends 
SEC Allow Optional Adoption of IFRS by U.S. Public Companies (Aug. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter AICPA Recommendations], available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/press/pressreleases/2011/pages/aicparecommendssecall
owoptionaladoptionofifrsbyuspubliccompanies.aspx (recommending that the SEC 
allow U.S. public companies to use IFRS standards while the SEC determines 
whether to officially adopt such standards, and regardless of whether the IFRS are 
ultimately adopted).  
319  See, e.g., Point of View—The Path Forward for International Standards in the 
United States: Considering Possible Alternatives, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/point-of-view/assets/use-of-ifrs-in-
us.pdf (“[T]he SEC should target the beginning of 2015 to allow U.S. companies to 
optionally adopt international standards.”). 
  See also Accounting Standards in the US—Convergence with IFRS, FINANCIER 
WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2011), http://www.financierworldwide.com/accounting-
standards-in-the-us-convergence-with-ifrs (discussing the merits of allowing 
companies to voluntarily adopt either GAAP or IFRS); USA–IFRS Condorsement 
Explained, INT’L ACCOUNTING SEMINARS (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.iaseminars.com/en/condorsement.html (noting that if IFRS are 
good enough for foreign issuers trading in the United States, they should suffice 
for U.S. companies as well). 
320  See AICPA Recommendations, supra note 318 (“An adoption option 
would provide a level of consistency in the treatment of U.S. companies and for-
eign private issuers that report under IFRS . . . .”). 
321  See, e.g., Emily Chasan, Accountants Give International Rules Short Shift, 
CFO Report, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2011, 12:17 PM) (discussing why AICPA and 
some U.S.-based multinational companies prefer adoption of the IFRS to be op-
tional instead of mandatory); see also Hoogervorst, supra note 309 (noting that 
“Ford Motor Company sees IFRSs as an important element of its ‘One Ford’ strat-
egy” and pointing out the advantages of standardization in a multinational firm). 
322  See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 244 (arguing that the 
global acceptance of the shareholder primacy (or “standard”) model will lead to 
increasing convergence of corporate law).  
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Daimler-Benz-style revaluations.323  Arguably, the Daimler-Benz 
incident was the catalyst for change in Europe as the European 
firms had something to gain at the time – namely, accessing the 
capital markets – but such a change is not going to take place in the 
United States when there is no evidence of a similar collaborative 
gain.  There is rather a firm-specific gain mostly for the multina-
tionals, whereas for the rest it seems to be more of an overwhelm-
ing cost at this point.   
Thus, an option for publicly traded U.S. companies to report 
under IFRS would permit firms to engage a cost-benefit analysis 
before they switch.  The firms themselves are likely better posi-
tioned to make an assessment about which standards are superior 
from a business perspective.  However, individual firms will not 
weigh all social benefits arising from worldwide standardization of 
accounting standards and increased comparability.  Because of 
these network benefits, financial disclosure is often thought to have 
a public good component, which is why firms would not produce 
the socially optimal amount in the absence of regulation.324  Sur-
veys reveal that few firms are likely to switch immediately to IFRS, 
even if they are given the option to do so.325  If this is indeed the 
                                                     
323  See supra Section 3.2. (“Capital markets began to grow in Europe, and 
firms increasingly sought to cross-list in New York or London in order to tap new 
sources of capital”). 
324  See, e.g., Harry I. Wolk, James L. Dodd & John J. Rozycki, ACCOUNTING 
THEORY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 105–07 
(8th ed. 2012) (explaining that “overall, . . . there is reason to believe that account-
ing regulation produces a net benefit to society.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Fail-
ure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723–
27 n.23 (1984) (defining a public good as being non-excludable and indivisible and 
stating that public securities information falls under such a definition); Cunning-
ham, supra note 2, at 26–28, 63 (discussing benefits and costs of allowing a market 
in accounting standards in the United States and noting that “[o]nce information 
is seen as a public good, the need to generate it to reduce information asymme-
tries appears.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Cost-
ly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 791–92 n.76 (1985) (us-
ing a prisoner’s dilemma scenario to articulate and problematize the information 
paradox, according to which an investor will be discouraged from gaining market 
information because no individual can secure gains due to the efficiency of the 
market); see also supra Section 2.2.1., “Too Big to Fail: The U.S. Economy and the 
Role of the SEC” (explaining how the public good of corporations’ publicly dis-
closed financial information is a key rationale for making such disclosures manda-
tory). 
325  See Marie Leone, Ready but Not Eager for IFRS, CFO.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2010/11/ready-but-not-eager-for-ifrs (quot-
ing a survey from August 2010 of accounting and financial reporting executives in 
relation to IFRS, that finds that most companies believe they could adopt IFRS by 
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case, allowing the small number of potential first time adopters to 
switch voluntarily to IFRS might offer exactly the stress test the 
SEC needs to assess the next steps.326  The data from voluntary 
adoption would likely help the SEC to engage in discussions with 
U.S. issuers whether IFRS should be mandated for all publicly 
traded companies. 
 
4.1.3. Should There Be Regulatory Competition Between 
Standard-Setters? 
 
A possible choice of two different sets of accounting standards 
raises the question whether regulatory competition is desirable in 
this area, or whether one accounting standard setter should have a 
monopoly, irrespective of the content of accounting standards.  
There are of course similar debates in many other fields, possibly 
most prominently – and most closely relevant – in corporate law.  
To keep it short, proponents of a “race to the bottom” argue that 
choice between different sets of laws allows firms to select a regime 
that benefits managers, while shareholders are inadequately pro-
tected.327  Adherents of the “race to the top” school, by contrast, 
                                                     
2016 but were not likely make a switch until SEC requires them to do so); see also  
2011 US IFRS OUTLOOK SURVEY (2011), PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, available at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/2011-ifrs-
implementation-survey.jhtm (surveying various industries and companies of var-
ious sizes and finding that, if given the option to voluntarily adopt IFRS, only 21% 
would definitely consider voluntary adoption). 
326  See AICPA: Allow US Companies the IFRS Option Now, J. ACCT (Oct. 6, 
2011), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/20114658.htm 
(quoting a 2011 speech from the President and CEO of AICPA in which he called 
on the SEC to immediately allow U.S. companies to use IFRS); see also 
Hoogervorst, supra note 309 (arguing that a “reasonably long transitional period” 
would be appropriate for the changeover given the cost); Accounting Standards in 
the US—Convergence with IFRS, supra note 319 (quoting Barry Jay Epstein’s view 
that “[i]t makes sense to level the playing field with foreign private issuers that 
already have been granted the privilege of using IFRS”); David M. Katz, Investors 
Defend FASB Role on IFRS, CFO.COM (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/14587240 (quoting a managing direc-
tor at Morgan Stanley saying he prefers “a gradual adoption of IFRS that hedges 
against risk of IFRS failure.”) 
327  See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (arguing that jurisdictions should “import lifting 
standards” instead of entering the “race to the bottom”); Lucian Beb-
chuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992) (“My analysis indicates that . . . 
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suggest that firms need to attract investment, which creates an in-
centive for managers to choose a value-maximizing corporate 
law.328  Various intermediate views have developed in the context 
of the United States;329 the role of Delaware as a quasi-monopolist 
and its relationship to the federal government has drawn particular 
                                                     
state competition produces a race for the top with respect to some corporate is-
sues but a race for the bottom with respect to others.”); Stulz, supra note 151, at 
349 (“[C]ost advantages for a firm’s securities to trade publicly in the country in 
which that firm is located and for that country to have a market for publicly trad-
ed securities distinct from the capital markets of other countries will progressively 
disappear”); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition 
in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1820 (2002) (”[T]he body of empirical ev-
idence on which supporters of state competition rely does not warrant their 
claims of empirical support”); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover 
Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Over-
reaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1872 (2002) (summarizing evidence of a race to 
the bottom, and concluding that managers migrate to states with antitakeover 
laws).  
328  Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpo-
ration, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 251, 251–52 & 289–92 (1977) (arguing that the race to the bot-
tom theory is incorrect and that, rather, competition between states creates a race 
to the top fueled by the desires of managers to value maximize when given a 
share of residual profits); see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW 14–24 (1993) (arguing that state competition in corporate law 
does not lead to a race to the bottom but a race to the top); Robert Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 533 (2001) (noting that cor-
porations incorporated in Delaware have been worth meaningfully more than 
firms incorporated elsewhere since at least the early 1980s); Roberta Romano, Em-
powering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 
2427–28 (1998) (suggesting that allowing states to compete in terms of their securi-
ties regulations is beneficial for shareholders); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory 
Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 212, 229 (2005) (“If anything, it is the competition of states in producing 
corporate law that has, however modestly, facilitated the reorganization of the 
U.S. economy in the last several decades . . . .”); Ralph Winter, The “Race for the 
Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1529 (1989) (sug-
gesting that the race to the top is happening slowly due to the lack of a state com-
peting directly with Delaware). 
329  See, e.g., Ray Ball, Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent 
Accounting Scandals, 47 J. ACCT RESEARCH 277, 317 (2009) (concluding that the U.S. 
financial market is not as efficient as it has historically been and is unable to pre-
vent violations even though it is able to punish violators); William W. Bratton, 
Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 419 (1994) 
(noting that the “form and intensity” of the United States’ stance towards corpo-
rate law “varies from period to period”); Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of Corpo-
ration Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989) (arguing that the U.S. federal gov-
ernment has an incentive to mitigate suboptimal rules but, because the costs of 
doing so are high, the risk of federal intervention increases if prevailing state law 
becomes highly suboptimal). 
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attention.330  And in the European context, scholars have argued 
that different ownership structures might lead to different out-
comes in regulatory competition.331  Generally, views on where 
regulatory competition actually leads on the top-bottom continu-
um depend on what one believes about how well markets work:  
The more efficient they are, the more likely there is a movement to 
the top; the more they are distorted by information asymmetries, 
irrational behavior and cognitive distortions on the part of inves-
tors, the more likely managers may be able to exploit these disad-
vantages. 
The debate in the accounting literature parallels the one in cor-
porate law.  The two competing views are either to “let the market 
forces determine how much and what kind of information firms 
should produce” or “to turn to regulation to protect investors, on 
the grounds that information is such a complex and important 
commodity that market forces alone would fail.”332 
The second view is based on the premise that market forces are 
not well-suited to incentivize firms to produce the optimal amount 
of information, given that managers and investors have diverging 
interests and will eventually try to capture standard-setting pro-
cesses to pursue them,333 and that information asymmetry that in-
                                                     
330  See e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590, 
644–46 (2004) (arguing that the chief pressure on Delaware’s corporate law comes 
from the U.S. federal government, which sometimes tolerates and other times in-
tervenes with Delaware law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington As Corporate 
Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 32–33 (2009) (“There is a vast federal presence in 
the law governing the American corporation and that federal presence affects 
state-based jurisdictional competition.”). 
331  See Hanne Søndergaard Birkmose, A ‘Race to the Bottom’ in the EU? 13 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 35, 51–52 (2006); Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The 
Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 939, 950 (2006); Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Com-
petition in European Corporate Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247, 273–75 (2005); Federico 
M. Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the 
U.S. and the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. 421, 445 (2012); Tobias H. Tröger, 
Choice of Jurisdiction in European Company Law—Perspectives of European Corporate 
Governance, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 3, 28–29 (2005) (all discussing the possibility 
that reincorporations will be driven by large shareholders rather than manage-
ment in concentrated ownership systems). 
332  WILLIAM R. SCOTT, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING THEORY 15 (5th ed. 2009). 
333  Id. at 466; see, e.g., William U. Parfet, Accounting Subjectivity and Earnings 
Management: A Preparer Perspective, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 481, 484 (2000) (noting that 
business executives, like all people, are self-interested, and that accounting stand-
ards are helpful, although not sufficient, to guard against potential abuse in rela-
tion to financial reporting).  
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vestors face while trading in the market will result in an adverse 
selection problem.334  Whether the existence of multiple standard-
setters is a vice or a virtue is thus a matter of perspective:  propo-
nents of uniform regulation argue that letting standard-setters 
compete would force each of them to lower its standards as to at-
tract firms and their managers away from the other, thus resulting 
in a race to bottom.335 
Both in the markets for corporate law and accounting stand-
ards, network externalities may play a role:336  Delaware, by virtue 
of its developed law and its specialized courts, creates an ad-
vantage for firms to incorporate there that is independent from 
which group its corporate law actually favors.  Managers and 
shareholders, whose interests seem to play the greatest role in the 
debate, therefore have an additional advantage when choosing 
Delaware over other states.  
In accounting, investors’ ability to compare creates a different 
kind of network externality, which is why mandatory and harmo-
nized disclosure requirements may be necessary to induce firms to 
produce the desirable amount of information.  An individual firm 
may actually lose because comparability might shed an unfavora-
ble light on it, but, on the aggregate, capital market participants 
will gain.  As financial accounting information is a public good 
(since it can be shared with those who did not “pay for it”), it ar-
guably will be underproduced under purely voluntary market 
conditions.337  In some cases, particularly when a firm issues capi-
                                                     
334  E.g., Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial 
Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 6 
(UNIV. OF CHI. & MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT., Working Paper No. 1, 2008) (discuss-
ing, among other points, the theory that “information asymmetries among inves-
tors introduce adverse selection into share markets . . . .”). 
335  See, e.g., Ronald Dye & Shyam Sunder, Why Not Allow FASB and IASB 
Standards to Compete in the U.S.?, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 257, 257 (2001) (considering 
arguments for and against “introducing competition into the accounting stand-
ard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue finan-
cial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or ISAB rules”); Karmel & 
Kelly, supra note 24, at 950–51 (arguing that “regulatory competition will lead to a 
race to the bottom and the absence of meaningful standards” unless “soft law 
standards” are introduced). 
336  See generally Ramanna & Sletten, supra note 46 (highlighting the network-
ing effects that countries have experienced as a result of their adoption of IFRS). 
337 See generally supra note 45 and supra note 324; Christian Leuz, Different Ap-
proaches to Corporate Reporting Regulation: How Jurisdictions Differ and Why, 40 
ACCT. & BUS. RES. 229, 231 (2010) [hereinafter Leuz, Corporate Reporting] (outlining 
arguments for regulating corporate reporting).  But see Leuz & Wysocki, supra 
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tal, firms may be inclined to overproduce information in order to 
attract investment; however, this incentive typically does not per-
sist after an IPO, thus resulting in an underproduction of infor-
mation.338  It is therefore often argued that in a purely market-
based system, where firms freely decide on the extent of disclosure 
(when there is no regulation), firms would not disclose the right 
level of information.339  A regulatory solution, as opposed to one 
where firms privately choose the level of disclosure, may achieve 
better outcomes and be cheaper, which may be why it is today 
widespread around the world.340  Regulation, among other ad-
vantages, makes it easier to process the information and compare 
across firms while eliminating the cost of negotiating disclosures 
with various parties such as shareholders and creditors.341  
One could therefore argue, with some justification, that the 
very idea of allowing two sets of accounting standards to compete 
is incompatible with accounting standard-setting as such.342  If 
there are multiple standard-setters, comparability between the fi-
nancial statements of firms using different standards would likely 
suffer.343  Advocates of competition suggest that the latter is neces-
                                                     
note 334, at 16–20 (reviewing arguments for regulating corporate reporting). 
338  Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 335, at 17 (“It is easy to imagine situations 
after the IPO in which firms have incentives to withhold or manipulate infor-
mation (e.g., when performance is poor.)”). 
339  Leuz, Corporate Reporting, supra note 338, at 231–32 (discussing the bene-
fits and costs of a regulatory scheme for a company’s financial reporting, and 
warning that a “solid case for regulation” rather than a market solution is neces-
sary). 
340  Id. at 232 (“Overall, there seems to be a reasonable case for a mandatory 
reporting regime.  Consistent with this view, mandatory reporting regimes are 
widespread around the world.”). 
341  Id. at 231 (highlighting various benefits of having a regulatory scheme 
imposed on a company’s financial reporting and referred to such a scheme as a 
“low-cost standardised solution”). 
342  Cunningham, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the competing accounting 
standards framework may pose practical problems and produce negative conse-
quences); Pöschke, supra note 28, at 64 (critiquing the aim of comparability). 
343  Cunningham, supra note 2, at 4 
(“[C]ompetition among accounting standards is inconsistent with comparabil-
ity in financial  reporting.”); Pöschke, supra note 28, at 64 (“Any form of option 
would thwart comparability by allowing for the co-existence of and competition 
between substantially different accounting systems . . . .”).  But see Hans B. Chris-
tensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in En-
forcement, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 147, 147 (2013) (reporting findings of their study, 
including that a change in reporting standards does not have an effect on market 
liquidity). 
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sary for the evolution of accounting standards, while a monopoly 
of one standard-setter would eliminate the possibility of compar-
ing alternative methods in the pursuit of identifying the best 
ones.344  In this view, competition would lead to a race-to-the-top 
by pushing standard-setters toward the direction of passing better 
standards and be selected by firms.  In fact, a recent study found 
that “allowing choice between competing standards increases 
market value over a single uniform standard.”345   
Allowing GAAP and IFRS to compete in the U.S. capital market 
would therefore require at least two conditions to work.  First, in-
                                                     
344  See e.g., SCOTT, supra note 333, at 503 (“[C]omplete integration of account-
ing standards will take some time if, indeed, it is desirable at all.  In the meantime, 
some ability of firms to choose between competing sets of accounting standards 
should not be ruled out”); Jeremy Bertomeu & Edwige Cheynel, Toward a Positive 
Theory of Disclosure Regulation: In Search of Institutional Foundations, 88 ACCT. REV. 
789, 792–93 (2013) (arguing that “[c]ompetition also disciplines standard-setters to 
cater to different groups and thus encourages the revelation of information 
through standard adoptions”); Shyam Sunder, Adverse Effects of Uniform Written 
Reporting Standards on Accounting Practice, Education, and Research, 29 J. ACCT. PUB. 
POL’Y 99, 100 (2010) (“Uniformity discourages research and debate in academic 
and practice forums, and promotes increasingly detailed rule-making.  It shuts the 
door on learning through experimentation, making it difficult to discover better 
ways of financial reporting through practice and comparison of alternatives.  Im-
proved financial reporting calls for a careful balance between written standards 
and unwritten social norms.”); Shyam Sunder, IFRS and the Accounting Consensus, 
23 ACCT. HORIZONS 101, 101, 105–06, 109 (2009) (arguing that a monopoly of IFRS 
will “discourage discovery of . . . better methods of financial reporting [and] make 
it difficult [if not impossible] to conduct comparative studies of the consequences 
of using alternative methods of accounting . . . .”); Shyam Sunder, Regulatory Com-
petition Among Accounting Standards Within and Across International Boundaries, 21 J. 
ACCT & PUB. POL’Y 219, 219 (2002) (examining the consequences of regulatory 
competition on the “quality and efficiency of standards, quality of information 
provided to shareholders and other interested parties, and the efficiency of corpo-
rate governance and managerial actions”); Shyam Sunder, Uniform Financial Re-
porting Standards: Reconsidering the Top-Down Push, 77 CPA J., Apr. 2007, at 6 (2007) 
(suggesting that there are several advantages of a system of supervised competi-
tion among multiple sets of financial reporting standards that allow investors, 
companies, and auditors to choose from a set of competing standards); see S.P. Ko-
thari, Karthik Ramanna, Douglas J. Skinner, Implications for GAAP from an Analysis 
of Positive Research in Accounting, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 246 (2010) (arguing that 
“competition between the FASB and the IASB would allow GAAP to better re-
spond to market forces”); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in Internation-
al Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 391–92 (2001) (arguing that 
international securities regulation restricts firms to “only a limited choice of re-
gime” and that these restrictions should be removed “[t]o create a truly competi-
tive regime of securities regulation.”). 
345  Bertomeu & Cheynel, supra note 344, at 789, 792–93 (outlining the benefits 
of allowing individual issuers to choose between competing sets of accounting 
standards). 
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vestors must be able to assess which accounting standards provide 
them with the better information.  Second, overall market condi-
tions must not make it impossible for two sets of standards to 
compete on fair terms.  Among other things, this means that the 
choice of accounting standards should not be inherently linked to 
other institutional factors so that competition on quality is impos-
sible.  For example, as discussed above in section 3.2. in the 1990s 
European firms began to use not only IAS, but also U.S. GAAP in 
addition to domestic accounting laws and standards.346  At that 
time, firms seeking a listing at European exchanges generally chose 
IAS, while those traded in New York had to comply with U.S. 
GAAP.347  Clearly, the strategic choice of a capital market deter-
mined the choice more than the quality of accounting standards.  
Moreover, since comparability is so essential to financial account-
ing, there would have to be a significant number of firms for each 
set of standards to achieve a critical mass.  With FASB starting as 
the market-dominant standard-setter, this would clearly not be a 
problem for GAAP.  U.S. firms switching to IFRS would have a 
comparative frame primarily in the form of foreign firms, which 
differ from their U.S. competitors in a variety of other ways and 
may thus not provide the best comparison. 
However, arguably, for over a decade the IFRS and U.S. GAAP 
convergence process has brought those two sets of standards so 
close to each other that there is no competition on the merits any-
way, and thus comparison between firms applying either standard 
is not excessively difficult.  Competition between two standard-
setters would therefore primarily only be about which of the two 
entities sets the agenda in accounting, and which one follows.  Yet, 
the study on the advantages of competition mentioned above also 
suggests that these benefits could disappear if competing standard-
setters effectively begin to collude by substantively setting the 
same standards (as FASB and IASB have been doing in their con-
                                                     
346  See Michael A. Schneider, Foreign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S. Secu-
rities Exchanges: Should the SEC Recognize Foreign Accounting Standards?, 3 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 301, 301–05 (1994) (describing the difficulties in attracting foreign 
companies to list on U.S. exchanges while requiring them to use GAAP); see also 
Eierle, supra note 172, at 299–301 (discussing “differential reporting” with differ-
ent standards within European countries, as well as in New Zealand, Canada, and 
Hong Kong). 
347  Eric M. Sherbet, Bridging the GAAP: Accounting Standards for Foreign SEC 
Registrants, 29 INT’L L. 875, 875–77 (1995) (arguing in favor of requiring foreign 
firms to comply with U.S. GAAP requirements). 
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vergence projects).348 
At present, the SEC is still considering whether permitting vol-
untary adoption would complicate the process, or whether it 
would be a welcome experiment.  Judging by SEC Staff Papers and 
Progress Reports, the Commission is currently focusing on the fu-
ture of the FASB and on how exactly to adopt IFRS.  From a practi-
cal point of view, it may be better to resolve these issues first.  For 
instance, if the SEC allowed U.S. companies to voluntarily adopt 
IFRS but then, when making it mandatory for all U.S. publicly 
traded companies, decided to move forward with some “carve-
outs,”349 this would complicate the process, as the early adaptors 
would end up having to switch once again, this time to a U.S. ver-
sion of IFRS.  Alternatively, they would be allowed to use IFRS as 
issued by IASB for the sake of consistency and comparability of 
their financial statements over the years and forego comparability 
at the national level.  Of course, if the SEC ever decides to adopt 
IFRS, the ultimate goal should be to adopt them as issued by IASB, 
without any carve-outs.  For the time being, it may make sense to 
allow voluntary “early” adoption. 
 
4.2. Changing Institutions 
 
4.2.1. The Future of FASB If IFRS Are Adopted in the U.S. 
 
If it is inevitable for the U.S. to fall in line with the rest of the 
world and adopt IFRS, this raises questions of institutional transi-
tion that are to some extent comparable to those encountered in the 
EU.  As was discussed above in section 2, there are some questions 
concerning how IASB, as a private self-regulatory body on the in-
ternational level, would be integrated into the U.S. legal system.350  
The more practical question is how to transition from the old to the 
                                                     
348  Bertomeu & Cheynel, supra note 344, at 808–09 (observing that a possible 
result of allowing firms to choose their own standard would be “that competing 
standard-setters would optimally choose to converge and pass the same stand-
ard”). 
349  See infra Section 4.2.1. 
350  See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text at Section 2.2.2. (discussing 
concerns about delegating law making authority to a small, self-appointed, and 
private body). 
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new status quo on the factual level.  It may be problematic to em-
power an international organization while undercutting a very 
powerful national one.  The SEC has statutory authority to estab-
lish financial reporting standards for publicly held companies.351  
With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC may recognize “any 
accounting principles established by a standard setting body” as 
U.S. GAAP.352  If the SEC decides to adopt IFRS, IASB will in effect 
take over the current role of FASB as the standard-setting body.353  
Setting aside concerns about delegating power to an international 
private organization, there has also been some discussion on the 
future role of FASB.354 
The SEC has been mapping out the new roles of FASB depend-
ing on various possibilities of IFRS adoption and making it clear – 
via staff papers and press releases – that there will be a need for 
FASB even after the adoption of IFRS.355  For instance, in 2011 the 
then SEC Chair Mary Schapiro expressed her view that FASB 
                                                     
351  See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(1) 
(1934) (granting the SEC authority to prescribe reporting standards for publicly 
held companies), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf; see also 
SEC Study 2003, supra note 11 (reaffirming the SEC's role in establishing account-
ing standards to be used by public companies).  
352  15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1) (permitting the SEC to “recognize, as ‘generally ac-
cepted’ for purposes of the securities laws, any accounting principles established 
by a standard setting body” that fulfill certain criteria). 
353  See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 63, at 472 (discussing the SEC's Roadmap to 
achieve mandatory use of IFRS by U.S. domestic issuers); see generally SEC 
Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4.  
354  See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 63, at 495–96 (discussing political concerns 
about mandating IFRS for U.S. companies, arising from the relations between the 
SEC and IASB); SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4, at 9–10  (outlining the 
FASB's role in incorporating IFRS into U.S. GAAP); SEC Staff Paper, May 26, 2011, 
supra note 4 at 2–3 (discussing various roles that FASB could serve in implement-
ing a convergence of accounting standards); see also Mary-Jo Kranacher, FASB 
Looks to the Future: Standards Setting in the Post-Convergence World, CPA J., Dec. 
2011 (addressing FASB's potential role in a post-convergence world). 
355  Until recently, all discussions focused on three main alternatives of allow-
ing IFRS use in the U.S.: adoption, conversion and endorsement.  Adoption is a 
switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS, without converging them first, while convergence 
is a gradual movement from U.S. GAAP to full or near-full IFRS.  Finally, endorse-
ment is used for the new or amended IFRS before they are formally enacted.  See, 
e.g., Accounting Standards in the U.S.—Convergence with IFRS, supra note 319 (dis-
cussing these four routes to IFRS use in the United States); USA - IFRS Condorse-
ment Explained, IASEMINARS (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.iaseminars.com/latest/135_usa_-_ifrs_condorsement_explained 
(outlining the four separate approaches to implementing IFRS in the United 
States).  
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would “continue to play a substantive role not only in achieving 
the promise of high-quality global accounting standards but also – 
should the Commission decide to move forward with incorpora-
tion – in helping to maintain those standards, as well.”356 
In light of the plans published by the SEC so far, it seems likely 
that it will not directly designate IASB as the standard setter.  The 
2008 Roadmap outlines an “endorsement” mechanism as a possi-
ble option that would keep FASB as the “designated standard set-
ter” expected to incorporate all provisions under the IFRS, and all 
future changes to the IFRS directly into U.S. GAAP.357  For exam-
ple, Pöschke argues that the most reasonable way of incorporating 
IFRS could be “by using U.S. GAAP as the mechanism of imple-
mentation, i.e. by amending and substantially replacing U.S. 
GAAP.”358  This way, he claims, the risk of having a dual system of 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP would be eliminated.359  Most recently, the 
SEC has been discussing another alternative called “condorse-
ment”360 (a neologism combining “convergence” and “endorse-
ment”), which seems to be similar to EU endorsement process ex-
cept the fact the endorsed standards will be called U.S. GAAP (or 
part of U.S. GAAP) rather than IFRS.  Arguably, the strongest rea-
                                                     
356  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Financial Account-
ing Foundation’s 2011 Annual Board of Trustees Dinner (May 24, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052411mls.htm.  
357  SEC Roadmap, Nov. 14, 2008, supra note 4, at n.31 (describing that “[o]ne 
of the options would be for the Financial Accounting Standards Board . . . to con-
tinue to be the designated standard setter for purposes of establishing the finan-
cial reporting standards in issuer filings with the Commission”). 
358  Pöschke, supra note 28, at 58; see also Hail et al., supra note 13, at 572-75 
(discussing current and proposed implementation and oversight organizations). 
359  Pöschke, supra note 28, at 58 (describing the “mere formal co-existence of 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS” while in reality, “U.S. companies would . . . have to apply 
IFRS rules in all areas”). 
360  See SEC Staff Paper, May 26, 2011, supra note 4 (referencing and explain-
ing condorsement, a possible incorporation approach, which is “in essence an En-
dorsement Approach that would share characteristics of the incorporation ap-
proaches with other jurisdictions that have incorporated or are incorporating IFRS 
into their financial reporting systems”); see also Accounting Standards in the U.S.— 
Convergence, supra note 319 (describing “condorsement” as a fourth option first 
suggested in late 2010 that became favored by the SEC); Paul A. Beswick, Deputy 
Chief Accountant, SEC, Remarks Before the 2010 AICPA National Conference on 
Current SEC and PCAOB Developments (Dec. 6, 2010) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch120610pab.htm (outlining the co-
endorsement approach); Wing W. Poon, Incorporating IFRS into the U.S. Financial 
Reporting System, 10 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 303, 307–08 (2012) (summarizing the 
SEC’s understanding of the condorsement approach and the subsequent feedback 
on this approach).  
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son for advocating a condorsement approach could be that it 
would maintain the U.S. GAAP system and thus save on adminis-
trative costs.361  The trouble with this is that altering international 
standards to suit an individual economy defeats the very purpose 
of seeking such standards in the first place.  Carve-outs would 
jeopardize precisely the comparability of financial statements that 
was the initial motivation for considering the adoption of a single 
set of financial reporting standards.362  Moreover, allowing carve-
outs would open the door to pressure from politics or local interest 
groups.363 
Moreover, a special U.S. version of IFRS could be seen as indi-
cating a basic lack of commitment to the idea of an international 
standard in financial reporting and this, given the clout of U.S. fi-
nancial markets, could damage the whole international harmoniza-
tion project worldwide.364  For example, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) has warned the SEC about 
the practical challenges that could limit the effectiveness of the 
proposed methodology in achieving the SEC’s objective.365 
No matter how the SEC decides to proceed, it is clear that FASB 
will have to change and take up a fundamentally different role.  
With IASB becoming the standard-setting body, FASB will serve as 
a “facilitator” at best.  Most strikingly, the AICPA recommends 
that FASB’s authority should be limited even further.  In a com-
ment letter, the AICPA suggests that FASB should focus on public-
                                                     
361  See, e.g., Accounting Standards in the U.S.—Convergence, supra note 319 (ar-
guing that it “would help companies save on non-value added conversion costs.  
For instance, they wouldn’t have to amend debt covenants to reference IFRS in-
stead of U.S. GAAP.”). 
362  This problem has emerged in the EU.  As an example, IAS 39 (which deals 
with fair value and hedge accounting) was endorsed with a carve-out.  See Co-
lasse, supra note 278, at 388 (noting that French banks were responsible for the EU 
resistance to IAS 32 and 39); id. at 390 (discussing the amendment to allow firms 
to stay within Basel II); Colasse, supra note 9, at 33, 40–41 (quoting President Chi-
rac).   
363  See generally Naomi S. Soderstrom & Kevin Jialin Sun, IFRS Adoption and 
Accounting Quality: A Review, 16 EUR. ACCT. REV. 675 (2007) (arguing that institu-
tional settings can drive differences in accounting policy). 
364  See IFRS Perspectives: An Executive Survey, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
(Dec. 2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-
reporting/publications/index.jhtml ("A long-term, convergence-only process 
risks derailing the goal of achieving global standards . . . ."). 
365  See AICPA Recommendations, supra note 318 (discussing various practi-
cal challenges); see also Goldschmid, supra note 31, at 11 (agreeing with the SEC 
that carve-outs should be used in only very “rare” and “unusual” circumstances).  
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ly traded companies and the incorporation of IFRS in the United 
States, while a separate board should be established to develop 
GAAP for private companies.366  While privately held firms in the 
United States are not legally required to comply with GAAP, some 
do so voluntarily in practice to satisfy their creditors and other 
stakeholders.367  However, applying the complex standards of U.S. 
                                                     
366  The idea of creating a separate body developing U.S. GAAP for private 
and small businesses has recently gained traction with the possibility of adopting 
IFRS for U.S. publicly traded companies.  A Blue-Ribbon Panel on Private Com-
pany reporting was formed to provide recommendations on the future of stand-
ard setting for 28 million private companies and small businesses in the U.S.  The 
emphasis of this panel was to address how accounting standards could best meet 
the needs of the users of private company financial statements.  See, e.g., BLUE-
RIBBON PANEL ON STANDARD SETTING FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES, REPORT TO THE 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION (Jan. 2011) [here-
inafter Blue-Ribbon Panel Report, Jan. 2011], available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/accountingfinancialreporting/pcfr/do
wnloadabledocuments/blue_ribbon_panel_report.pdf (evaluating standard-
setting for private companies); Elaine Henry & Oscar J. Holzmann, Costly Compli-
ance with U.S. GAAP: The Private-Company Dilemma, J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 87, 87 
(2012) (detailing the results of the Blue-Ribbon panel and other matters); Barry 
Melancon, AICPA President and CEO, Private Company Financial Reporting: The 
Time for Change is Now (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/News/AICPATV/Pages/home.aspx?bctid=955338624001
&Ca=PCFR&Type=VideoCat (arguing for differential standards); Floyd Norris, 
Proposal Would Create New Accounting Standard-Setter for Private Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at B5 (discussing the Blue-Ribbon panel’s proposed modifica-
tions). 
367  The only state corporate law requiring the use of GAAP is that of Califor-
nia, but even California includes an exemption for firms with fewer than 100 
shareholders.  CAL. CORP. C. §§ 114, 1501(3) (“[T]he financial statements of any 
corporation with fewer than 100 holders of record of its shares . . . are not required 
to be prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles . . . . ” 
in particular circumstances); Blue-Ribbon Panel Report, Jan. 2011, supra note 367, 
at 9–10 (discussing the lack of any statutory requirement for private companies to 
comply with GAAP); Video Webcast: Vincent J. Love & John H. Eickemeyer, Ac-
countants’ Liability: Litigation and Issues in the Wake of the Financial Crisis—GAAP v. 
IFRS; Public v. Private Company Accounting; PCAOB AS and GAAS v. ISA (AM. LAW 
INST. Sept. 15–16, 2011); Norris, supra note 366 (discussing the potential modifica-
tion of the accounting rules for private companies); see FIN. ACCT. FOUND. BD. 
TRUSTEES, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRIVATE COMPANY COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT (2012) 
[hereinafter FAF Final Report], available at 
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blo 
btble=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175824045379&blobheader=applic
ation%2Fpdf (suggesting new standards for private companies); CHRISTOPHER 
NOBES & ROBERT PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 177 (12th ed. 
2012) (“[O]nly a small minority of US companies (about 14,000) are SEC-registered 
and have to obey the SEC’s accounting and auditing rules”); Armour et al., supra 
note 7, at 124–25 (explaining that, although private companies in the U.S. are not 
required to disclose financial information, many “voluntarily submit detailed fi-
nancial information to private credit bureaus . . . to gain better access to financing 
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GAAP created primarily for public companies is often too costly 
for other private companies, for which these efforts would be futile 
because the advantages for the ultimate users of their financial 
statements are minimal.368  Still, a “duality” of FASB and a new 
board would create a need for yet another mechanism to ensure 
coordination and cooperation between the two bodies, since hav-
ing public and private companies reporting under substantially 
different standards in the same country would not seem to be ben-
eficial.  On the other hand, mandating the use of IFRS by all com-
panies would place a heavy burden on private and small compa-
nies.369  Alternatively, it seems more practical to create a more 
efficient subcommittee under FASB to work specifically on finan-
cial reporting standards for private companies.  In the end, the Fi-
nancial Accounting Foundation (“FAF”) Board of Trustees found 
this approach more effective and established a new body, the Pri-
vate Company Council (“PCC”), in May 2012.  PCC is intended to 
improve the process of setting accounting standards for private 
companies but the proposed changes will be subject to endorse-
ment by the FASB before becoming part of U.S. GAAP.370 
                                                     
in the ordinary course of business.”); Pöschke, supra note 28, at 60 (noting that 
GAAP are “not part of the ‘law’ in a technical sense,” except for certain SEC regu-
lations, and that their authority is based only on recognition by the SEC); see also 
GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 69–73, 365–67, 376–78 
(1998) (explaining that the maintenance of rigid accounting standards is consistent 
with business success).  See generally Robert Tie, The Case 
for Private Company GAAP, 199 J. ACCT. 27 (2005) (demonstrating that many stake-
holders value GAAP because they allow stakeholders to compare company per-
formance over time). 
368  FAF FINAL REPORT, supra note 368, at 35 (discussing industry participants’ 
views on the FAF proposal); Stuart Moss & Timothy Kolber, Private Matters: Pro-
posed Council to Improve Standard Setting for Private Companies, 18 DELOITTE: HEADS 
UP 1, 2 (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-United-
States/Local%20Assets/Documents/AERS/ASC/us_aers_headsup_101011.pdf 
(discussing how a “one size fits all” standard may strain the resources of smaller, 
private companies). 
369  For example, both IASB and FASB have been shifting toward a fair-value-
based accounting approach.  Thus, compliance with these financial reporting 
standards requires companies to report assets and liabilities at fair value rather 
than historical cost.  The fair value standard increases the cost of compliance be-
cause it demands periodic valuations of many financial statement items.  While 
having the information according to fair value is important for public company 
investors, private companies seem to see it as a costly burden without much bene-
fit because creditors and other users of private company financial statements are 
interested in cash flow and a company’s ability to pay its debts. 
370  See FAF FINAL REPORT, supra note 368, at 10 ("If the FASB makes a final 
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Finally, a transnational harmonization of accounting standards 
may have benefits on the level of private firms, which is why the 
IFRS Foundation has already created a subcommittee to prepare a 
version of IFRS for SMEs.371   
 
4.2.2. Funding the IFRS Foundation from United States Sources 
 
The funding of the IFRS Foundation, an international private 
non-governmental organization, has so far been a big impediment 
for the adoption of IFRS in the United States.  The reason is two-
fold.  First, the SEC is already funding a standard setting body, 
FASB, and has not yet decided about the future of the FASB.  If 
IFRS are adopted, the SEC will have to decide which institution 
will receive the funds.  Second, it is not clear whether the SEC has 
the power to directly transfer funds to IASB, even if IFRS are 
adopted for U.S. issuers.372 
Currently, the SEC funds FASB through an annual levy of ac-
counting support fees from issuers of U.S. securities; however, it is 
not clear whether these funds could be transferred to an interna-
                                                     
decision to endorse, the exceptions or modifications will be incorporated into U.S. 
GAAP."). 
371  See, e.g., GRANT THORNTON, WHO SHOULD SET FINANCIAL REPORTING 
STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES? 1–3 (2011), available at 
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Audit/Assurancepublications/PSG_Sta
ndards-For-Private-Companies-WP_FINAL.pdf (noting the heated debate about 
private company financial reporting, and that 73 countries were then considering 
the adoption of IFRS for SMEs); Glenn Alan Cheney, Private Company Accounting 
Standards—New Road or Same Old Path?, FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L (Mar. 2012), available 
at http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-
Magazine/2012_03/Private-Company-Accounting-Standards--New-Road-or-
.aspx (summarizing various views on special standards for private companies); 
Andy Thrower, Should It Be a ‘Big GAAP’ or ‘Little GAAP’ for Private Companies?, 
FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L (Mar. 2010) (arguing that the GAAP framework should ap-
ply to all U.S. companies, large and small, with additional disclosure require-
ments for large companies); Bruce Pounder, The Big Risks of Little GAAP, CFO.COM 
(Dec. 2010), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2010/12/the-big-risks-of-little-
gaap ("Introducing an additional set of standards without attaining pervasive ac-
ceptance and successful implementation would increase the diversity of standards 
used by private U.S. companies.  In turn, this would further reduce comparability 
across reporting entities while increasing the complexity and cost of financial-
statement preparation, auditing, and analysis."). 
372  SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, supra note 4, at 56 (“[T]he Commis-
sion may be limited from directly funding the IFRS Foundation without an ap-
propriation request of Congress.”). 
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tional body such as IASB.373  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 re-
quires the SEC “to pay for the budget and provide for the expenses 
of [the] standard setting body, and to provide for an independent, 
stable source of funding for such body.”374  The annual funding of 
the FASB is provided only after the SEC annual review of addi-
tional sources of revenue and the budgets of the FAF375 and the 
FASB as well as the annual review of the FASB’s proposed ac-
counting support fee.376 
Not accepting contributions from the accounting industry is es-
sential in this “review and fund transfer” process of the SEC be-
cause independent source of funding is believed to ensure the in-
dependence of a standard setting body.377  Up until Sarbanes-
Oxley, FASB and its predecessors heavily relied on contributions 
from the large accounting firms, which affected at least the outside 
perception of independence.378  IASB faces the same issue because 
the IFRS Foundation relies heavily on contributions from the large 
accounting firms, which contributed approximately twenty-five 
percent of its 2012 revenue.379  Needless to say, the SEC is con-
cerned that the adoption of IFRS might take capital markets back to 
                                                     
373  Id. at 52–58 (outlining various approaches and issues relating to funding), 
at 56 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B) (Antideficiency Act): “An officer or employee 
of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may 
not . . . involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of 
money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law”); see also Oct. 
2012 IFRS Foundation Report, supra note 4. 
374  15 U.S.C. § 7219 (prescribing the funding of the SEC). 
375  See supra note 64 (discussing the FAF and the FASB). 
376  SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, supra note 4, at 55 (noting that, after 
reviewing the budgets of FAS and FASB, “the Commission determines whether 
the proposed annual accounting support fee is consistent with Section 109 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act”). 
377  Id. at 55, 57–58 (“The Commission reviews any additional sources of rev-
enue, and the FAF represents that neither the FAF nor the FASB accept contribu-
tions from the accounting industry.”). 
378  Bratton, supra note 63 at 477 (“[IASB] made ends meet for 2009 only as a 
result of a £5.5 million commitment by the Big Four Accounting Firms.  Red flags 
unfurl accordingly: accounting standards bear critically on the audit process, and 
hence, audit firm earnings.”) (footnote omitted); Anne B. Fosbre, Ellen M. Kraft & 
Paul B. Fosbre, The Globalization of Accounting Standards: IFRS Versus US GAAP, 3 
GLOBAL J. OF BUS. RES. 1, 63–64 (2009) (noting that the Accounting Principles Board 
was responsible for standard setting from 1959–1973, and that the Board “was 
criticized by industry and government for their lack of independence.”). 
379  SEC Final Staff Paper, July 13, 2012, supra note 4, at 58 n.279 (noting that 
international accounting firms contributed twenty-six percent of the 2011 budget 
of the IFRS Foundation). 
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pre-Sarbanes Oxley days in terms of the standard-setter’s financial 
dependence.380 
Dependence on large accounting firms looks like a hurdle that 
could be easily overcome if the United States funds the IFRS Foun-
dation’s budget in proportion to the size of its economy.381  Accord-
ing to the IFRS Foundation Report, the present U.S. contribution 
corresponds to less than one third of what it would pay if the 
amount were proportionately based on GDP.382  Considering the 
fact that around 25% of the total seats in the Foundation’s govern-
ing bodies are held by U.S. individuals (while U.S. contribution ac-
counts only for 8% of national government contributions), this crit-
icism is understandable.  The EU currently provides core funding 
to the Foundation.383  Given the questionable authority of the SEC 
to fund an international body,384 the strong American representa-
tion at IASB and the IFRS Foundation may be in jeopardy.385  The 
SEC, seeing what is at stake, recently made a $3 million special 
contribution to support the completion of the convergence pro-
ject.386  While this is a clear sign of continued commitment by the 
SEC,387 its current strategic plan for the next four years sends 
                                                     
380  Id. at 54–55 & n.263; see Cox, supra note 18, at 950; Walter Mattli & Tim 
Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards 
in Accounting, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 254–55 (2005).  
381  Oct. 2012 IFRS Foundation Report, supra note 4, at 8, 24–25. 
382  Id. (noting that GDP is the primary indicator used by the IFRS Foundation 
to assess the funding expectations of a country). 
383  See Guersent, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that the European Commission 
“decided to enhance EFRAG's resources by co-financing it from 2010."). 
384  See supra note 373 and accompanying text (outlining issues to do with the 
SEC funding an organization like IFRS). 
385  See, e.g., Guersent, supra note 37, at 4–5 (describing the growing frustra-
tion by the EU given continued hesitance in the U.S. and noting the belief that 
“the monitoring board should first be composed exclusively of countries using 
IFRS on their domestic market and second be expanded to major emerging econ-
omies applying IFRS”); see also Parliament to Challenge International Accounting 
Standards, EURACTIV.COM (May 8, 2013, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/parliament-challenge-internation-news-
519598 (“Lawmakers are also annoyed that the United States, which retains a 
strong influence on the IASB, has not itself adopted the IFRS.”). 
386  News Release, Fin. Acct. Found., Financial Accounting Foundation to 
Provide Up to $3 Million to IFRS Foundation to Aid Completion of Joint IASB 
Projects (Jan. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=Foundatio
n%2FFAFContent_C%2FFAFNewsPage&c=FAFContent_C&cid=1176163774653 
(confirming the financial support of the FAF following consultation with the SEC).  
387  Hoogervorst, supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]he US Financial Accounting Founda-
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mixed signals.388  The draft plan does not mention IFRS, but crypti-
cally says that the SEC will “consider . . . whether a single set of 
high-quality global accounting standards is achievable.”389 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we have surveyed the debate about the introduc-
tion of IFRS in the United States and compared it to the one in Eu-
rope.  Contrary to what a casual outside observer might believe, 
IFRS have not completely taken over European accounting, even 
though this set of standards has considerably pushed back tradi-
tional national accounting systems during the past decade.  Never-
theless, national accounting traditions largely persist in parallel, in 
part because they are very different from IFRS in content and pur-
pose.  The debates about IFRS, which were hotly waged in the 
years leading up to their mandatory introduction for the consoli-
                                                     
tion gave a clear sign of continued commitment to the joint work of the IASB and 
the FASB in finalising the remaining convergence projects by making a $3 Million 
dollar financial contribution to our work.”); Is SEC on the (IFRS) Road(map) Again? 
FAF Contributes $3 Million to IFRS Foundation—Update 2, FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L 
(Jan. 29, 2014, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/FEI_Blogs/Financial-
Reporting-Blog/January-2014/Is-SEC-on-the-IFRS-Roadmap-Again-FAF-
Contributes-3.aspx (discussing what can be inferred about the SEC’s IFRS plans, 
given the FAF funding decision, made in consultation with the SEC); but see E-
mail from Carlos Johnson, NASBA Chair & Ken Bishop, NASBA President and 
CEO, to Jeffrey J. Diermeir, FAF Chairman & Teresa S. Polley, FAF President and 
CEO (Feb. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&page
name=Foundation%2FDocument_C%2FFAFDocumentPage&cid=1176163831522 
(criticizing and questioning the FAF contribution to the IFRS foundation). 
388  SEC, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2014–2018, Draft for Comment (2014), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018-draft.pdf 
(detailing the proposed direction of SEC from 2014–2018). 
389  Id. at 8 (linking this to “the increasingly global nature of capital mar-
kets”); see also Ken Tysiac, SEC Plans to Consider Whether Global Standards Are 
Achievable, J.  ACCT. (Feb. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/News/20149536 (commenting on the 
Draft SEC Strategic Plan, with particular focus on the SEC’s plan that “a single set 
of high-quality global accounting standards is achievable”); Emily Chasan, SEC’s 
New Strategic Plan Backs Away from IFRS, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/02/04/secs-new-strategic-plan-backs-away-
from-ifrs (commenting that the “tone” of the Draft SEC Strategic Plan “appeared 
to back away from the possibility that U.S. companies would one day file financial 
reports under International Financial Reporting Standards”). 
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dated accounts in publicly traded firms, have not ceased and even 
surged to some extent after the financial crisis.  In the United 
States, whose GAAP are firmly within the capital-market-oriented 
Anglo-Saxon tradition, differences to their younger sibling IFRS 
are much smaller, which is why hurdles to introduction should be 
so as well.  Nevertheless, the United States, which originally 
pushed IFRS internationally, is still hesitating.  While the SEC side-
lined the issue, we have suggested that introducing IFRS, even on 
the mandatory level, should not pose insurmountable.   
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